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“Against Social Death: Rhetorical Resilience at the Intersection of Higher Education and the 
Prison” is a qualitative study of the experiences of formerly incarcerated people who participated 
in college programming in prison or upon their release. Throughout, I argue that incarcerated 
people engage in everyday rhetorical practice in their resistance to social death. Specifically, I 
chronicle how the convergence of higher education and the prison produces new rhetorical 
possibilities through which these students’ rhetorical resilience is strengthened, amplified, and 
practiced in new ways. At the same time, while research participants often say these college-in-
prison programs are life-changing, even life-saving, they rarely report that they are able to 
leverage their education for material gains once they are released. This notion runs counter to 
common literacy myths about higher education in prison, which suggest that advanced literacy 
leads to better economic opportunities and greater assimilation with mainstream society for 
people who are lacking in both opportunity and ability. By focusing on moments of convergence 
between everyday rhetorical resistance and the privileged practices of the university, “Against 
Social Death” examines how incarcerated college students navigate academic practices to create 
an identity and social connectedness that is habitable, authentic, and resistant to the social 
mechanisms and logics that would reduce them to absence, automation, and powerlessness. Most 
significantly, my dissertation envisions pedagogy that can facilitate these students’ educational 
goals without leaving unchallenged the carceral logics that frame them in deficit terms. My work 
offers guidance for literacy educators working with marginalized students, but ultimately, I argue 
that a commitment to equity and justice cannot be addressed through the writing classroom alone 







First, this dissertation would not be possible without the incredible courage and 
generosity of my research participants. These individuals, most of whom had never heard of me, 
welcomed me into their lives for a few hours, sharing some of their most painful experiences. 
Their extraordinary trust, vulnerability, and hope is the beating heart of this work. I will never be 
able to thank them enough. I am also indebted to the directors of higher education in prison 
programs who contacted their alumni on my behalf.  
 I was so fortunate to find a home in the Education Justice Project universe. Rebecca 
Ginsburg’s mentorship has made me a better scholar, teacher, administrator, organizer, and all-
around human being. My conversations with EJP members, especially Rohn Koester, sharpened 
my thinking regarding incarceration and social justice. But nothing has impacted me more, 
professionally or personally, than the hospitality of the EJP students and alumni. Thank you in 
particular to Chad Rand, Robert Becker, Cragg Hardaway, Kamuyah Ben Rakemeyahu, Otilio 
Rosas, Augie Torres, Luis Saucedo, Juan Sewell, Joseph Mapp, Johnny Page, Rob Garite, 
Rasheed Gilford, Michael Harrell, Orlando Mayorga, Elfego Nunez, Sammy Santiago, James 
Green, Jobie Taylor, Edmund Buck, George Bledsoe, Daniel Graves, Tony Skaug, Shaun 
Wilkes, Andre Slater, Kevin Hubert,  Josh Walbert, Antyon Brown, Greg Donatelli, Will 
Hancock, Larry Barrett, Michael Harrell, and Antione Clark. 
 From my first day as a graduate student at the University of Illinois, I have benefitted 
from the guidance and support of my advisor, Spencer Schaffner. Spencer never told me what to 
do or what not to do, but instead helped me to see the larger context of my scholarly and 
professional decisions, and he laughed good-naturedly with me when I inevitably Shelledy-ed 
something. Above all, I am grateful to Spencer for listening, for his willingness to understand 
and support the work I wanted to do and the future I saw for myself. Spencer taught me to be 
aware of the limitations of my intellectual biases, to be a generous colleague, and to put the 
sometimes-mindfuck of academia in its proper place in my life.  
 I am so grateful for the generous feedback and guidance of my committee. Paul Prior’s 
always-good-natured dissection of my theoretical approaches has taught me to be a more astute, 
meticulous theorist; at the same time, he has shown me the importance of play, uncertainty, and 
improvisation. Of course, I would never have been able to undertake this project without Kate 
Vieira’s early influence. When I took Kate’s class on ethnographic methods, I was merely trying 
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to fulfill a program requirement. Never in a million years did I think I would undertake this kind 
of research. But when I did, I found myself equipped not only with a familiarity with 
transcription software and coding methods, but a recognition of the ethical complexities that 
come with (re)telling stories. And I owe more than I can name to Rebecca Ginsburg, but as a 
committee member, I am grateful for her enthusiasm for my project and that she always kept me 
accountable to its implications for (formerly) incarcerated students and for educators.  
 The Illinois Program for Research in the Humanities, the Department of English, and the 
Graduate College offered crucial financial and institutional support. A thousand thank-yous are 
owed to Teresa Bertram, Amy Rumsey, Lauri Harden, Stephanie Shockey, and Deb Stauffer, the 
administrative support staff who have helped me out in small and large ways as a matter of 
course and with minimal teasing.  
 But I don’t think I would have found my way to Illinois and the Center for Writing 
Studies had it not been for the encouragement and training I received from Chris Nelson at the 
University of North Dakota. Chris was the first educator in my life, I think, who told me I was 
smart, and he expected a lot from me. From Chris, I learned how to read and engage with 
theoretically dense material, to incorporate anti-racist and anti-colonial thinking in my work, and 
to seek justice. 
 This dissertation is, fundamentally, about love and the ways people craft it through 
academia. It remains for me a somewhat dim, bleary hopefulness, but my time in the Center for 
Writing Studies has taught me time and again what constitutive labors of love look like and what 
they can accomplish. I am leaving CWS poised, professional, sharp. But more importantly, I’m 
leaving engaged, open, with an ethic of collaboration over competition. Every day, I’m grateful 
to Gail Hawisher for creating such a unique intellectual home, one where even we misfits have a 
place. I’ve been so lucky to learn from all the CWS faculty, even those who weren’t on my 
committee and had no direct responsibility for me, particularly Kelly Ritter. But I am especially 
grateful to the CWS graduate student community. Jon Stone and Tom McNamara read several 
early, rough drafts, and I’m not sure I would have made it through the job market without their 
advice and friendship. I’m also indebted to my job market support group, Kaia Simon, Katherine 
Flowers, and Pamela Saunders, who read lots (and lots and lots) of drafts of job market 
materials. My literature friends and colleagues, especially Brandon Jones, John Musser, Erica 
Melko, Ben O’Dell, and Silas Cassinelli, offered such useful conversation and insight. And, of 
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course, for all the mixed CDs, Drafts and Draughts, long road trips and crowded hotel rooms, 
singalongs, Maize tacos, drag shows, movies at The Art, trips to the wine trailer, and failed visits 
with prospective students, I am better for having known every one of you.  
 Thanks to the Illinois Program for Research in the Humanities for a fellowship that 
provided time to complete this project, as well as invaluable feedback on one of the chapters. 
Thanks to the Department of English for fellowships, travel grants, and programmatic support. 
 Somehow, I find myself surrounded by the very best people who give their support freely 
to this goofball who can’t seem to find her way to the post office for birthdays or Christmas. 
Thanks, Jen Case and Amanda Nelson, for loving and supporting me anyway. Thanks to Jody 
and Jim Nelson for being life-long role models and always thrusting something to read into my 
hands within seconds of walking through your door. To my whole family of BSF-loving smart 
asses, thanks for always bringing me back to myself. And, especially, thanks to my parents, 
Linda Jackson and Kevin Shelledy, for accepting and supporting my sometimes unconventional 
decisions. You taught me to be brave, confident, and kind, all of which served me well as a 
teacher and scholar.  
 This is weird, but if I’m honest, I owe a not insignificant debt of gratitude to my ex-
husband, Kevin Kainulainen. Whatever else happened, he always believed in me, even when I 
didn’t. 
 And lastly, thank you to my partner, my love, Emmett Sanders. This project has your 
fingerprints all over it. Thank you for talking me through every stage of this work, for your 
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In an essay for an environmental studies course he took in prison, Saul provides a moving 
polemic on the moral outrage of meat production. Through heartbreaking ekphrasis, he argues 
that the material conditions of confinement that young calves experience violates the inherent 
sanctity of life:  
The questionable housing procedures that isolate and restrict movement, and the 
dietary procedures that restrict herbaceous foods to induce iron deficiencies to 
produce the trademark light color in the meat, along with the systemic breakdown 
of the regulatory agency put in place to guard against the inhumane treatment of 
veal calves all show a clear lack of love, reverence, and respect for the natural 
expression of life, which for veal calves means never experiencing the stresses 
born of severe confinement, being separated from its mother and herdmates, or 
being forced to eat an unnatural diet. 
The connection to Saul’s own life is hard to miss. Incarcerated at 15, Saul himself was separated 
from his family, from loving connections, and placed in conditions that, arguably, violated the 
sanctity of his life and humanity. Surely this essay exemplified the emancipatory ideals of 
writing within carceral institutions. Here, I thought, was a man whose everyday conditions 
preclude defiance and critique, who through his classroom writing was afforded an opportunity 
to express not only his own humanity, but the inherent evil of a carceral logic that denies it to so 
many. Certainly, this has been a primary preoccupation of those who have written about literate 
and rhetorical practice within higher education in prison classrooms.  
But in our conversation, Saul practically laughs at my suggestion that classroom writing 
might offer such liberatory possibilities: 
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You present me with information and you ask me to critique this information in 
such a manner, and I present you, uh, you know I go back to the cell, I write a 
paper and I give it to you for your critique of my opinion of the information that 
you presented to me. You know. What is that? 
Clearly, Saul didn’t think much of being “offered” this opportunity to express his opinions about 
the immorality of carceral logics. From his telling, the content of the essay had little impact on 
him whatsoever. And, upon reflection, this makes sense. I’m reminded of a time I was walking 
across the campus of Danville Correctional Center as a coordinator for the Education Justice 
Project, a college in prison program at the University of Illinois. On my way from the front gate 
to the education building, I frequently encountered incarcerated men, in lines or individually, 
walking from one building to another. On this occasion, I walked by a man who yelled to a 
nearby correctional officer, “Hey Officer! This place SUCKS!” It struck me as funny at the time, 
but upon further reflection, it also reveals some assumptions that are inherent in the ways we 
outsiders tend to think about prisons, as well as how we think about education. It is easy to 
imagine prisons as overwhelmingly oppressive. And certainly, they are. But clearly the 
opportunity to voice critiques of the prison are not hard to come by, and the opportunity to 
express oneself may not be quite as rare or as meaningful as prison educators may believe.  
This is not to say that the experience of higher education, or even of academic writing, was not 
meaningful for Saul and my other research participants. Far from it. However, what was 
meaningful and in what ways it was resistant or emancipatory may be different than what we 
might expect. This dissertation argues that incarcerated students, whose rhetorical agency is 
often framed in Writing Studies literature in deficit terms, are engaged in everyday rhetorical 
acts of survival, refusing the prison’s terms of engagement and subject positions. Rather than 
3 
 
introducing possibilities for refusing carceral logics and expressing alternative narratives, these 
students’ stories suggest that higher education in prison can produce habits of being that 
reinforce students’ practices of resilience.  
 In “Against Social Death: Rhetorical Resilience at the Intersection of Higher Education 
and the Prison,” I study the narratives of people like Saul, formerly incarcerated people who 
have engaged in higher education programs in prison or as part of their reentry process. As the 
United States begins, in fits and starts, to reckon with the economic and social catastrophe of 
what has come to be known popularly as “mass incarceration,”1 higher education, both in prison 
and upon release, has reemerged as a popular means of rehabilitation, putting an end to cycles of 
poverty, addiction, violence, and recidivism. Increasingly, state departments of correction are 
looking to partner with institutions of higher education and companies such as Edovo, which 
offers educational programming on secure, corrections-approved tablets, to fill gaps in their 
programmatic offerings. Drawing on interviews with twelve formerly incarcerated people, as 
well as their classroom and personal writing, this dissertation investigates in what ways 
incarcerated people engage in acts of rhetorical resilience against social death and what new 
forms of action and being emerge at the intersection of higher education and the prison. In 
particular, I address the following questions: In what ways is social death enacted and resisted in 
the lives of criminal justice involved college students? What is the role of higher education in the 
rhetorical resilience against social death for these students? How do societal investments in 
                                                          
1 While the term “mass incarceration” is probably the most common term for the extreme rates of incarceration in 
the United States since the 1970s, Loic Wacquant offers an incisive critique of this terms, arguing that 
“hyperincarceration” is a better descriptor. In particular, Wacquant argues that the term “mass incarceration” implies 
that incarceration is experienced across a wide section of the citizenry, as in the case of the terms “mass media” or 
“mass unemployment.” In reality, “the expansion and intensification of the activities of the police, courts, and prison 
over the past quarter-century have been anything but broad and indiscriminate. They have been finely targeted, first 
by class, second by that disguised brand of ethnicity called race, and third by place” (78).   
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correctional and educational ideologies shape and constrain possibilities for college in prison 
program alumni? 
 Throughout, I argue that resilience is a rhetorical action, the possibility for which is 
produced within networks or assemblages. Specifically, it investigates the tactical, subjugated 
rhetorics of (formerly) incarcerated people and how they deny the terms of engagement in 
carceral logics that dehumanize and alienate them. For example, several research participants 
describe the importance of friendships with positive people in prison, while also acknowledging 
the difficulty in navigating are social world heavily marked by distrust, manipulation, and 
violence. Though the rhetorical agency of incarcerated students is largely framed in deficit terms, 
I argue that though severely constrained, these individuals engage in everyday acts of resilience, 
even without the benefit of higher education programming. Rather than offering agency to 
incarcerated students, I contend that college in prison programs offer new opportunities to put 
into practice habits of being that resist the dehumanization and futurelessness of incarceration 
and its enduring stigma. To demonstrate this, this dissertation draws on contemporary rhetorical 
theory, particularly posthuman theories of rhetorical agency, to analyze the narratives of people 
who have participated in higher education in prison programs. My aim is to gain greater clarity 
about what (formerly) incarcerated people do with/in higher education to craft identities, 
connections, and social understandings that resist what many scholars in critical prison studies 
have called “social death.” In order to trace the dynamic and distributed agencies at the 
intersection of higher education and prison, I investigate the ways higher education is imagined 
and enacted by people who are subject to the social death associated with incarceration, 
including the persistent stigma of incarceration upon their release from prison. In particular, I 
focus on the ways research participants engage in the privileged practices of higher education to 
5 
 
create an identity and social connectedness that is habitable, authentic, legible, and resistant to 
the social mechanisms and logics that would reduce them to absence, automation, and 
powerlessness. At the same time, I argue that these rhetorical tactics of resilience within the 
prison do not necessarily transfer to their lives after release. This dissertation contributes to the 
field of rhetorical studies by attending to under-theorized ephemeral, everyday rhetorics of 
resilience and survival. 
Prison Literacy and Writing Studies 
Scholars in diverse fields have adopted rhetorical perspectives on incarceration and 
incarcerated people, focusing especially on the life writing of prisoners (Hauser 2012; Marback 
2004; Willingham 2011; Rolston 2011; Rolston 2013) and the cultural representation of and 
discourses about incarceration (Sloop 1996; Mason 2006; Brown 2009; Smith 2009; Dayan 
2011).  For example, in The Cultural Prison: Discourse, Prisoners, and Punishment, John Sloop 
analyzes public discourses about punishment and prisoners to illuminate the way these 
discourses function pedagogically, instructing all American citizens in the proper relationship to 
institutions and the larger culture. Among other important contributions, these works 
demonstrate the ideological bases for inclusion and exclusion in American institutions and public 
life.  These ideological bases are crucial for understanding the rhetorical landscape at the 
intersection of higher education and incarceration and the way literacy sponsors (IHEs, 
individual educators, departments of correction, individual prison administrators, etc.) and 
incarcerated students make sense of the work of higher education in prison. 
 For those scholars in composition and literacy studies who have written about their 
experiences working with incarcerated writers, this exclusion from public life is a motivating 
concern, as Rob Scott (2013) has shown. Early scholarship within the field demonstrates a 
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profound belief in the power of writing instruction to transform the lives of incarcerated students, 
and there is emphasis on rehabilitation and recidivism. In “On Teaching Convicts,” Maurice 
Laurence Jr. (1990) writes, “Those, including educators, who work in prisons give inmates the 
daily care and guidance they find in no other place” (148). Similarly, James Moffett (1985) 
writes, “Criminals behind walls have the advantage of knowing they’re obsessed. They came to 
class to liberate their inner speech, to have new thoughts that would enable them to stay out of 
prison once they got out” (304). These pieces demonstrate an admirable desire to use the writing 
classroom for the public good, but they also demonstrate a troubling naivete about the diverse 
and complex lives and motivations of incarcerated students.  
 More recent studies, especially those written after 19942, have shifted focus slightly from 
a concern with rehabilitation to a more justice-oriented approach (Maher 2004; Kerr 2004; 
Jacobi 2008; Burzynski 2010; Ketelle 2010; Jacobi 2011; Rogers 2011; Wiltse 2011; Olinger et 
al 2012; Berry 2013; Plemmons 2013; Rogers 2013; Wilkey and Cleary 2015). These scholars 
demonstrate the ways that literate practice, especially reflective life writing, can help 
incarcerated people resist the isolating and dehumanizing effects of incarceration. Tobi Jacobi 
(2011) asserts that literacy programs in jails and prisons help incarcerated women to construct 
counter-narratives that resist the dominant narratives of prison identity. Ed Wiltse (2011) 
similarly argues that prison reading groups contribute to identity and authority negotiation for 
incarcerated people. Anna Plemmons (2013) acknowledges the ways prison educators are 
complicit with the carceral institutions in which they work, but she makes the case for tactical, 
                                                          
2 In 1994, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act made incarcerated people ineligible for 
the Pell grant. Prior to 1994, there were hundreds of higher education in prison programs in the United 
States, but without the Pell grant, these programs lost their primary source of funding. Today, fewer than 
50 programs in the United States offer college credit and in-person instruction to incarcerated people, and 
fewer than 10 grant degrees.  
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creative literate practice that resists the overwhelming psychic violence of prison. Drawing from 
the work of Stephen Hartnett, she argues that “teaching in the prison or encouraging creative 
endeavors without an eye towards critical resistance (both of dehumanizing systems and personal 
processes) is in danger of continuing a long history of control and manipulation under the guise 
of ‘rehabilitation’” (43). Increasingly, scholars of prison writing are critical of the cultural logics 
of incarceration and are seeking critical, even abolitionist pedagogies.  
 The work of these scholars is foundational for my dissertation and indispensable for the 
fight for public support and funding for higher education in prison programs. These scholars 
have contributed much to the understanding of the value of a variety of educational programs in 
jails and prisons, value that cannot be reduced to something as simple as a lowered recidivism 
rate. However, these foundational studies are limited in their scope, written primarily by teachers 
about their experiences in their own classrooms. Further, because the underlying aim appears to 
be advocating for prison education to a resistant audience, these studies reify some of the 
foundational literacy myths of the field. Andrea Greenbaum (2002) argues that one of the 
fundamental ideological assumptions of composition-rhetoric is that writing instruction must 
become “a process of disruption, subverting ideological systems, all in an attempt to help 
students become aware that knowledge and the acquisition of literacy is a political act” (84). In 
other words, the field of composition-rhetoric in general proceeds from the assumption that 
literacy instruction is emancipatory, an assumption that is largely (but not entirely) unquestioned 
in scholarship about prison education. Further, Amy Wan (2014) has shown that literacy 
instruction is often looked to as a means for producing assimilation and normative citizenship in 
times of crisis. 
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 But this assumption, I argue, leads composition-rhetoric to over-estimate the effects of 
education in prison, leading to studies that focus primarily on the rhetorical agency of writing 
instructors and of education itself, rendering the students as passive recipients of knowledge. As 
Sharon Crowley (1998) has argued in her essay on the service ethic of composition, “The 
discourse of needs positions composition teachers as servants of a student need that is spoken, 
not by students themselves, but by people speaking for powerful institutions. Like the narrative 
of progress, the discourse of needs interpellates composition teachers as subjects who implement 
the regulatory desires of the academy and the culture at large” (257). Like the discourse of needs 
that interpellates first-year writers, imagined deficits in the lives of incarcerated students creates 
various deficit-model discourses about them and the value of higher education in prison that may 
not accurately reflect the lived experiences, potentials, and desires of these students. Further, 
these studies seem to assume a one-way trajectory for social change in the prison classroom, 
where the resources of the academy (not unproblematically) are deployed in order to improve the 
assumed dismal lives incarcerated people. Dylan Rodriguez (2006) provides an important 
critique of the assumed benefits of prison education and prison writing, arguing that the genre of 
prison writing domesticates the radical potential of incarcerated writers, circumscribing them 
into a voyeuristic and aesthetic gaze that, as he shows, reproduces the logics of the carceral state. 
He is equally suspicious of prison education programs, which he characterizes as new 
institutional spaces, born of a symbiosis between prison educators, prison philanthropists, prison 
staff, and prison administration, where new mechanisms of surveillance and disciplining are 
exercised over the reading and writing of incarcerated students. Certainly, education programs 
have been central elements of the reformist efforts to rehabilitate incarcerated men and women 
since the 1950s (Cummins 1994). 
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 If the field of Writing Studies is invested in understanding rhetorical agency, social 
change, and emancipatory pedagogy, then we must be suspicious of our own motivating 
narratives and literacy myths. In “Against Social Death,” I do not seek to refute that writing 
instruction has profound transformative potential in the lives of formerly and currently 
incarcerated people. These stories told herein, I believe, speak powerfully to the possibilities for 
college in prison programs to significantly impact and change lives. Rather, I seek greater clarity 
and understanding about what that potential is and what its limits are. As Patrick Berry (2013) 
notes, “I recognize that one class is just that— one class—and that students’ experiences with 
literacy and each other were shaped not only by Project Justice but also the many networks in 
which they participated both within and beyond prison” (154). To understand the rhetorical 
potential in these programs, I resist locating agency in the power of the written word alone and 
instead consider college in prison as a dynamic assemblage of actors and associations that exist 
in a network of other complex, dynamic assemblages. This dissertation situates higher education 
within the rhetorical lives of incarcerated students and seeks to understand the ways these men 
and women make use of education in rhetorical action for their own survival. 
Posthuman Rhetorical Agency 
 To reveal and analyze the various and nuanced rhetorical possibilities and constraints at 
the intersection of the prison and university, I draw on recent theories of rhetorical agency, 
particularly posthuman or New Materialist perspectives that emphasize the distributive and 
emergent qualities of agency (Edbauer 2005; Rice 2008; Cooper 2011; Rickert 2013; 
Kerschbaum 2014, among others). In “Rhetorical Agency as Emergent and Enacted,” Marilyn 
Cooper argues persuasively for a theory of individual rhetorical agency as embodied property 
that emerges from the interaction of the rhetor with her lifeworld, but it is not necessarily tied to 
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conscious intention. Drawing on the work of Bruno Latour, Cooper (2011) argues that agents 
“are unique, embodied, and autonomous individuals in that they are self-organizing, but by virtue 
of that fact, they, as well as the surround with which they act, are always changing” (425). Thus, 
order is always a provisional achievement of the collective of agents. Thomas Rickert (2013) 
defines rhetorical agency similarly, and he outlines the ways in which nonhuman actors exert 
rhetorical agency within assemblages: “We are not in a rhetorical situation so much as in a 
rhetorical lifeworld. We are jointed through the world’s latticework; we are not just builders 
rearranging the stage” (213). In other words, rhetors are neither autonomous, rational agents, nor 
are they inflexibly determined by discourse and interpellation. Instead, they are dynamic, 
embodied actants whose agency emerges from the responsive environments in which they act.  
 Thus, as Edbauer (2005) argues, the concept of the rhetorical situation is too restrictive 
and cannot capture the messy, sprawling, and networked nature of public rhetorical interaction. 
Using the virus as a conceptual metaphor, she explains that a given rhetoric is not contained by 
the elements of the rhetorical situation but carries with it the social intensities that are circulating. 
Jeff Rice similarly calls for a rhetoric of mapping, arguing that the ways we frame and create a 
place “must engage with multiple paths, complexity, and relationships when grand narratives fail 
to do anything but serve as reminders and, therefore, keep possibilities unseen” (208).  
In “Against Social Death,” these theories of distributed and emergent rhetorical agency 
provide a framework for mapping everyday rhetorical agencies that emerge relationally within 
the particular material and discursive lifeworld of the prison, thus locating possibilities for 
emergent forms of rhetorical action in the dynamic intersection of the university and the prison. 
This complicates the often simplified and unidirectional rhetorical agency that is currently the 
dominant representation in prison literacy scholarship, in which the prison educator creates 
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social change by delivering academic literacy in the unified and relatively stable rhetorical 
situation of the prison classroom to passive, uniform students. 
In addition to this model of distributed and relational rhetorical agency, posthumanism is 
a useful frame for critiquing the humanist ideals that undergird much of Western understandings 
of education in general (see Pedersen 2010) and literacy instruction in particular (see Boyle 
2016, Dobrin 2011, Yagelski 2011). Many posthumanist compositionists ground their critique of 
humanism in environmental crisis, arguing that ecological crisis is a direct result of the duality 
and autonomy of humanism, which continues to be echoed in writing instruction. I would add 
that the decline of the rehabilitative ideal, which holds that the primary function of criminal 
justice should be to reform character of people who are convicted of crimes, suggests another 
failure of humanist ideals. While it may be argued that the technology of incarceration has 
simply not yet been perfected, the devastating effects of isolation and degradation on 
incarcerated people, which have been noted since the birth of the penitentiary (e.g. Dickens 
1957), to me suggest, as well as the crisis of sustainability, a need to push beyond the 
autonomous, rational subject of humanism toward the relational, material, and nonrational 
theorist of the human.  
Social Death 
 In this study of posthuman rhetorical agency, I focus in particular on my research 
participants’ rhetorical action of resilience against social death. This is perhaps the most 
important form of rhetorical action my research participants spoke about, and the most 
ubiquitous. The concept of social death comes from Orlando Patterson’s comparative study of 
the conditions of slavery, Slavery and Social Death (1982). Patterson develops the concept of 
social death as distinct from biological death and civil death. Put simply, social death names the 
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social conditions by which a person or group of people are alienated and degraded to the point of 
being excluded from the wider society. Though it is sometimes conflated with civil/civic death, 
social death refers less to the legal exclusions from full citizenship experienced by groups of 
people and is more a way of naming social customs that exclude and degrade. In the context of 
the prison, then, social death is not legal suspension of certain rights of citizenship, though these 
legal exclusions are certainly connected to social death. Rather, it names the social, affective, and 
somewhat ineffable ways that people with criminal justice involvement come to be viewed not as 
people at all. On February 1, 2017, people incarcerated at Vaugh Correctional Center in 
Delaware rose up violently against the prison staff, and the ensuing altercation resulted in the 
death of a correctional officer. In the wake of this uprising, on March 8, the incarcerated men at 
Vaughn released a list of demands, stating that a repetition of this violence would be “inevitable” 
if the human rights violations at the prison are not addressed. In an open letter to the warden, 
Thomas Gordon, and man incarcerated at Vaughn, said: 
We, as inmates, know that when we are incarcerated, we lose certain “civil” 
rights. What we do not lose and what should not be taken away from us are our 
“human” rights. Under no circumstances should we be treated as less than human 
beings, nor shall we be expected to settle for such treatment. We do not want the 
keys to the prison. What we want is fairness, impartiality, transparency, and 
humane treatment. 
In other words, this uprising, according to Gordon, was not a revolt against the loss of liberties 
that are inherent in incarceration, but against the additional loss of dignity and humane treatment 
that is a result of social death. 
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 Many carceral studies scholars (Rodriguez 2006; Guenther 2013; Easton 2008; Heiner 
2003; Dayan 2001) who take up critical positions against the prison-industrial complex have 
found the concept of social death useful for explaining and critiquing the mechanisms of carceral 
punishment. Lisa Guenther (2013) argues that the production of personhood depends upon a 
network of various social practices, histories, and imaginaries that extend into the past and 
future, and the destruction of personhood requires “a whole network of exclusions, interruptions, 
and violation” (xx), in many ways echoing the work of New Materialist and other posthuman 
rhetorical theories. Further, the society that produces social death may not be fully aware that it 
is doing it, which results in the casual indifference toward or even invisibility of those who 
experience social death. Guenther demonstrates the devastating effects of isolation through her 
examination of solitary confinement: 
In the context of this inquiry, ‘becoming unhinged’ is not just a colloquial 
expression; it is a precise phenomenological description of what happens when 
the articulated joints of our embodied, interrelational subjectivity are broken apart 
(xii). 
This assertion that subjectivity is “hinged” and interrelational provides a basis for understanding 
the violence of isolation and confinement. This view of social death is echoed by Dylan 
Rodriguez (2006), who refers to social death as “affective alienation,” or the “liquidation of 
affective and (extended) familial ties” (30). For Rodriguez, like Guenther, the result of this 
alienation is the disarticulation of the incarcerated subject. “The contemporary regime of the 
prison encompasses the weaponry of an institutionalized dehumanization. It also, and 
necessarily, generates a material rendition of the nonhuman and subhuman that structurally 
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antagonizes and decenters the immediate capacity of the imprisoned subject to simply self-
identify” (228, emphasis in original).  
This emphasis on affective connections, identification, and the circulation of discourses 
of inclusion and exclusion suggest that social death is a thoroughly rhetorical concept, and I 
believe there is important work to be done both in rhetorical studies and in composition studies 
to better understand the alienation and degradation of particular ways of being and identifying, 
especially within a state apparatus such as the university that is meant, in part, to produce 
boundaries of inclusion inherent in the phrase “good citizens.” This dissertation, however, 
investigates the ways in which incarcerated people resist subjective disarticulation or social death 
in general, and the role college in prison programs play in supporting this rhetorical work of 
affirmative articulation in particular. Though they described it in different ways and experienced 
it to varying degrees, every one of my research participants described an effort to “hold on,” to 
resist the dehumanization and alienation of the prison in their everyday lives. 
 In Prison and Social Death, Joshua Price (2015) illuminates three elements that make up 
social death: natal alienation, humiliation, and institutional violence.  Natal alienation describes 
not only being cut off from one’s family and community, but also the sense of powerlessness to 
intervene on behalf of your loved ones.  This alienation leads to vulnerability, which creates the 
conditions for both humiliation and institutional violence. But according to Price, social death is 
not only experienced by people while they are in prison. The stigma of incarceration follows 
citizens as they return to their communities, and they remain vulnerable to legal discrimination in 
employment and educational opportunities, housing restrictions, disenfranchisement, and other 
restrictions on their freedom. Loic Wacquant (2010) similarly demonstrates that the social death 
does not end with one’s prison sentence. In “Prisoner Reentry as Myth and Ceremony,” 
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Wacquant argues that most incarcerated people do not experience reentry into society so much as 
a circulation between carceral institutions and marginalized communities. He argues, “[T]he 
conventional language of ‘transition from prison to community’ used by practitioners and 
analysts of ‘reentry’ […] presupposes a clear separation between these two worlds, whereas they 
increasingly interpenetrate one another under the current regime of hyperincarceration targeted at 
neighborhoods of relegation— not to mention that these urban wastelands present few of the 
positive social and moral features commonly associated with the word ‘community’” (611). 
Wacquant’s questionable dismissal of Black community aside, his description of this continuum 
of confinement and social isolation illuminates the scope of social death. 
Lisa Cacho (2012) uses the concept of social death to critique struggles for social justice 
that depend on the capitalist and heteropatriarchal valuation of personhood, arguing that the 
experiences of those who are criminalized and denied personhood in dominant social scripts 
provide a basis for a radical politics and ethics. Cacho asserts, “A focus on social death enables 
us to start at the places we dare not go because it enables us to privilege the populations who are 
most frequently and most easily disavowed […]” (31). However, the oppositional narratives 
found in the spaces of social death are not necessarily contingent on rhetorical or political 
success. Rather, Cacho locates empowerment in the decision to struggle against social death 
itself. This emphasis on the resistance to social death resonates with the work of Alexander G. 
Weheliye (2014), who critiques Agamben’s bare life, Foucault’s biopolitics, Patterson’s social 
death, and Mbembe’s necropolitics on the basis that “these concepts, seen individually and taken 
as a group, neglect and/or actively dispute the existence of alternative modes of life alongside the 
violence, subjection, exploitation, and racialization that define the modern human” (1-2). 
Following Cacho and Weheliye, I want to suggest that social death is horizon of possibility, 
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rather than a social fact. Certainly, social exclusions and degradations exist, but affective 
alienation and subjective disarticulation is often incomplete, and the modes of life that exist 
against or alongside the modes of social death suggest a vitality and dynamism that is not 
accurately captured by the stasis of death.  
 So, while the concept of social death is politically useful for prison reformists and 
abolitionists, it does not seem to represent the full lived experiences of many incarcerated people. 
In a conference presentation at the 2014 Symposium on Higher Education in Prison, Andra 
Slater suggests that a skewed social imaginary of prisons, a social imaginary hardly if at all 
constructed by incarcerated people themselves, may contribute to the inability of some prison 
educators to imagine rigorous and vibrant intellectual activity within a carceral setting, leading to 
lowered expectations for incarcerated student and, I would add, an inflated sense of the 
importance of educators and academic literacy. As Slater argues, “The social imaginary has 
pegged prisons as counter-productive spaces in their entirety. When educators subscribe to this 
notion, they marginalize incarcerated students outside of the realm of what it means to know.” 
He goes on to assert that some incarcerated people are engage in critical reflection and learning 
outside formal educational settings like the prison classroom, and he encourages prison educators 
to “imagine the possibility of students as teachers and self-encouraged learners.” This 
counterpoint to the dominant social imaginary of prisons and prisoners is similarly illustrated in 
the personal narrative of James Newsome, a citizen of Chicago who was wrongfully convicted 
and served fifteen years in Illinois state prisons. He writes of his legal education in prison: 
I’ve been grilled […] by some of the hardest critics, by some of the toughest 
intellects imaginable. Those are the guys I knew in prison. Everybody in prison is 
not dumb. People think everybody in prison is stupid or intellectually inferior. I 
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know some giants in prison, some intellectual powerhouses in prison. They eat 
books they know everything (118). 
 I present these counterpoints not to deny the very real problem of social death, nor to 
negate the value of formal educational experiences for incarcerated people. But these pockets of 
intellectual rigor and generosity outside the prison classroom have been largely ignored by 
literacy and rhetorical scholars who study these carceral spaces. While it would be dangerous to 
romanticize the intellectual life of prisons outside the formal classroom setting, to ignore it 
entirely creates an incomplete picture of the rhetorical practices of incarcerated students in their 
struggle against social death. In his work on African American rhetorics, Adam Banks (2006) 
argues, “This bidirectional look at both the systemic nature of the struggles we face and our own 
incredible agency and innovation in the midst of those struggles must be the focus of any 
examination of African American life, activism, education, identity, celebration, culture in this 
moment” (6). “Against Social Death” adopts this bidirectional view, investigating not only the 
ways social death functions in the lives of formerly incarcerated people, but also the various 
rhetorical tactics through which social inclusion is enacted and argued for by incarcerated people 
and their advocates, particularly the ways higher education affects and is affected by the literate 
and rhetorical ecologies these people are working within.  
Researching at the Intersection of Higher Education and the Prison 
 To access the tactics of rhetorical resilience in prison and in college in prison programs, I 
spoke with twelve formerly incarcerated individuals who participated in programs at the 
intersection of higher education and incarceration. Eight of these individuals took college 
courses for credit while they were incarcerated, and four participated in a prison-to-college 
pipeline reentry program. All twelve individuals participated in semi-structured life history 
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interviews, ranging from one to three and a half hours. This included questions about 
participants’ experiences with and attitudes toward school in their childhood, reflections on 
prison life, and their experiences with and reflections on the college program with which they 
were affiliated. In addition to life histories, I guided participants to focus on literacy narratives, 
which “foreground issues of language acquisition and literacy […] structured by learned, 
internalized literacy tropes” (Eldred and Mortensen 513). This included not only discussions of 
in-school experiences, but also the role of reading and writing in prison life. Five research 
participants also provided samples of writing they had completed while incarcerated, including 
both creative and academic work. One research participant also shared with me other 
memorabilia from his incarceration, which included crosses made from shredded cloth and 
written notes of advice he received from other men with whom he was incarcerated.   
 Participants were recruited using the Higher Education in Prisons and Jails Programming 
List, compiled by Rebecca Ginsburg and Victoria Bryan through the Higher Education in Prison 
Listserv. Using the list as a guide, I contacted directors of programs across the country who then 
passed my information along to their program alumni. This recruitment method allowed me to 
identify research participants who came from a range of program types and geographical 
locations. However, a limitation to this recruitment method is that I was only able to recruit 
program alumni who remained in contact with their respective programs. This means that my 
data reflects the experiences of those most likely to have had positive experiences and lasting 
connections with higher education programs.  
 As a white, middle-class woman with no history of criminal justice involvement, my 
positionality in relation to my research participants and higher education in prison is important to 
note, as it inevitably has impacted both the content of the interviews and the lens with which I 
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analyze them. While I claim no insider status in regards to the experience of incarceration, I do 
hold a kind of insider-outsider status (Dwyer and Buckle 2009) in relation to college in prison 
programs. In 2012, I began volunteering with the University of Illinois’s Education Justice 
Project (EJP), a program that offers for-credit undergraduate courses and other academic 
programming at Danville Correctional Center, a medium-high security men’s prison in central 
Illinois. My experience working with and listening to EJP students, witnessing first-hand the 
lengths to which they would go to support the program and those within it, that led me to the 
research questions that inform this dissertation. It is also that experience that informs its quasi-
activist methodology. While I have not actively engaged the various communities from which 
my research participants hail, as Ellen Cushman (1998) advocates, one aim of my research is to 
advocate on behalf of higher education programming in prisons, particularly rigorous and critical 
programs like EJP. I acknowledge that for many on the far left, educational programming within 
prisons is antithetical to a radically anti-racist, abolitionist project because it invests in normative 
citizenship through state-sponsored education and extends the surveillance and coercive 
technologies of the prison (see Rodriguez 2006, Meiners 2011). Still, I argue that college in 
prison programming can, and sometimes does, create radical ruptures in the carceral logics that 
dehumanize to the point of disposability, and in this rupture are possibilities for more humane 
ways of relating to ourselves, each other, and the world.  
 Additionally, it should be noted that my insider-outsider status afforded me access to 
several research participants that I may not otherwise have been able to meet. Several research 
participants, during our conversation about informed consent, said that they were willing to 
speak with me and trust me with their stories because I was affiliated with a college in prison 
program. My research participants did not receive any incentives, and some of the conversations 
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exposed them to some risk, both legal and emotional. But many participants said they would 
speak with me out of a desire to “pay it forward,” a gratitude they felt for the volunteers in their 
own college programs. 
 My approach to the interview transcripts is informed heavily by Martin Packer’s (2011) 
approach to narrative analysis of semistructured interviews: “It looks for what White called ‘the 
content of the form’: the way an account is narrated and organized so as to prefigure a world for 
the reader—and a new way of seeing our familiar world. It invites the reader to conceptualize the 
interviewee’s form of life and ‘ontological complicity’ with this form of life” (119). In other 
words, the interview reveals not objective truth, but an intersubjective, contingent performance 
of a being-in-the-world. In this study, research participants describe events in their lives related 
to education and incarceration, events that many have described as transformative. I analyzed 
these narratives for the actors and associations that create the conditions of possibility for 
change, that is, the rhetoricity of the network.  
However, I think Packer’s argument against coding is overstated. Certainly, coding 
transcripts can lead to divorcing form from content, but this needn’t be the case. Rather, I argue 
that coding can be approached dialectically as a form of attunement between the researcher and 
the interviewee, between theoretical frameworks and the situated knowing of the narrative. 
Because the narratives I have collected are so lengthy, minimal coding helped to track themes 
across the length of the interview and between interviews, and they were necessary for drawing 
attention to particularly salient parts of the transcript.   
 My approach is informed by activist methodologies (Thomas 1993; Cushman 1998; 
Sandoval 2000; Hess 2011; McHendry et al 2014) that seek to produce fair and respectful 
representations of participants and to use “self-reflexivity, dialogue, and reciprocity to bring out 
21 
 
into the open biases and to negotiate through these with participants” (Cushman 36). My 
approach is further informed by Julia Oparah’s (2014) charge that universities reproduce carceral 
logics in part because of the exploitive relationship between researchers and incarcerated 
research participants. She argues that the imbalance of power between the incarcerated research 
participant and non-incarcerated researcher is not often examined critically. While this inherent 
power dynamic may not be completely overturned, I strive to work against it by developing an 
abolitionist methodology. In other words, I am motivated by asking how I can perform research 
which does not support carceral logics and which does support the project of prison abolition. 
Taking the “Nine Perspectives on Prison Abolition” from Instead of Prisons: A Handbook for 
Abolitionists (2005) as my starting point, I will: 
• Use honest, humanizing language (incarcerated person vs. inmate, punishment vs. 
treatment, etc.) 
•  Engage with the full and complex humanity of formerly incarcerated people, rather than 
identifying them primarily by the act for which they were incarcerated or as victims of 
trauma 
• Empower formerly incarcerated research participants by engaging with them as fellow 
producers of knowledge, rather than mere objects of study.  
• Work with research participants and other stakeholders to develop research protocol 
• Engage in dialogue with currently and formerly incarcerated scholars, when appropriate 
Chapter Outline 
My first chapter outlines the historical roots of higher education in prison, tracing the 
shifting correctional and higher education ideologies that make up the contemporary rhetorical 
context for higher education in prison. While Bible studies were literacy programs that had been 
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in American prisons since the mid-19th century, the first higher education in prison programs 
were started in the 1950s, at the height of the rehabilitative ideal.  However, with the rise of the 
New Penology, college was increasingly viewed as coddling, a tax-payer-funded luxury that 
incarcerated people did not deserve. While higher education in prison is currently receiving more 
public support, the discourse is largely based in containment rhetoric (Smith 2010) that 
reinscribes incarcerated people as outsiders. Higher education in prison programs must negotiate 
a more radically inclusive approach with the need to secure funding and support by engaging in 
an ambivalent epideictic (Rivers 2015).  
Drawing on posthuman theories of rhetorical agency, my second chapter argues that 
recognition and care are vital for resisting carceral logics that produce alienation. Drawing on the 
work of Thomas Rickert (2013) and feminist rhetorical scholars (Flynn, Brady, and Sotirin 
2012), I develop the concept of resilient dwelling to describe the emergent, kairotic ways these 
two men, and my research participants in general, create a habitable way of life inside the 
dehumanizing ambience of the prison. These individuals use their college programs, including 
academic writing practices, to forge vital friendships with fellow classmates and to strengthen 
connections to loved ones on the outside.  
The third chapter examines role of metanoia in the rhetorical actions of research 
participants. Specifically, I explore the experience of time, both in the synchronic and diachronic 
sense, by research participants during their incarceration. Drawing on the work of Kelly Meyers 
(2011, 2016), I argue that incarcerated students demonstrate a form of metanoic movement, 
consisting of a feeling of shame or regret that catalyzes new forms of identification and future 
imaginaries. Here, positive affective attachments with forms of higher education lead to 
hopefulness against the ambience of the prison that produces despair and futurelessness.  
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Chapter Four critiques the literacy myths that persist in recent approaches to higher 
education in prison, namely that participation in these programs reduces rates of recidivism 
through greater employment opportunities and increased moral reasoning. Specifically, I argue 
that higher education is imagined as a mechanism through which incarcerated people can 
assimilate to normative citizenship, but in the experiences of nearly all of my research 
participants, the credential of college courses did little to combat the negative credential of a 
felony conviction. Further, I suggest that reentry should be imagined as a rhetorical process 
through which formerly incarcerated people (dis)identify and orient themselves in a normative 
society that seeks to exclude them. This rhetorical approach to reentry has programmatic and 
pedagogical implications for the future of higher education in prison.    
“Against Social Death” concludes by returning to the tension between an abolitionist 
vision and prison programming. Fidelity to the utopia of prison abolition requires a critique of 
the university-as-such (Harney and Moten 2013). I offer pedagogical interventions that can 
support an abolitionist vision, resisting white supremacist, neoliberal, and carceral logics of the 
21st-century university (Meiners 2011, Chaput 2014). Incarcerated students and their experiences 
can help educators not only better understand how to craft collaborative, responsive, and situated 
higher education in prison programs and pedagogical approaches, but they also offer frames 
through which to consider the ways institutions of higher education and their privileged practices 
are enmeshed with the carceral state and punitive logics. More than simply facilitating entry to 
the campus mainstream, though, I draw on these interviews to outline how such an approach can 
create rhetorical ruptures through which educators and students make visible and contest the 
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 In early late September 2015, the Harvard debate team, named World Champions in 
2014, competed in a debate against the Eastern branch of the Bard Debate Union, a debate team 
made up of incarcerated college students at Eastern New York Correctional Facility. The Bard 
team, which had defeated debate teams from West Point and the University of Vermont, emerged 
victorious, and the story quickly went viral, with stories in The Guardian, CNN, The New York 
Post, Huffington Post, and other news outlets. What was fueling the fascination with this story? 
Even my Facebook friends who aren’t particularly engaged with criminal justice reform or 
prison education were sharing the story. Then, on October 11, a meme began appearing on my 
Facebook feed. The meme features two panels. In the first, a group of Harvard students is 
depicted. In the second, a three Black men seated at a table are smiling. The caption reads: 
“Never confuse education with intelligence. This prison debate team went up against the 
prestigious Harvard debate team…and won.” What strikes me about this image is the 
misconception that these men had won through raw talent against the training and education of 
the Harvard students. A similar narrative emerges in the headlines of the news stories, which 
overwhelmingly employ a stark binary between prisoners and Ivy League students3, despite the 
fact that every story acknowledges that this was a team of incarcerated college students who are 
pursuing undergraduate degrees through Bard Prison Initiative.  
                                                          
3 Representative examples of these headlines include “Prison vs. Harvard in an Unlikely Debate” (Wall Street 
Journal), “New York Inmates Defeat Harvard Debate Team” (CNN), “Harvard’s Prestigious Debate Team Loses to 
New York Prison Inmates” (The Guardian), “NY Inmates Crush Harvard’s Title-Winning Debate Team” (New York 
Post), and “Harvard Debate Champs Lose to Team of Prisoners” (USA Today). 
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 The fascination with this story seems to reveal some level of cognitive dissonance when 
it comes to conceiving of incarcerated people as college students. Instead, they are identified as 
inmates first and students second, if at all. The news stories also make a point of identifying 
Eastern New York Correctional Facility as a maximum-security prison, and the men on the 
debate team as having “violent criminal records.” What is going on here? What is the assumed 
relationship between intellectual achievement, morality, and criminal-justice involvement?   
 In The Cultural Prison, John Sloop (1996) suggests that attention to the way we talk 
about punishment and people who are criminal-justice involved is important because “the 
discourse surrounding prisoners and punishment acts as a material social force that creates space 
for the current discussion of punishment, particularly alternatives to incarceration” (3). The 
virality of the debate story reveals important aspects of the politics and rhetoric of higher 
education in prison. As Mary Wright (2001) asserts, “[P]rison education is embedded in a highly 
charged political context in which questions of its efficiency, effectiveness, and justification are 
always at the center” (14). In this chapter, I argue that the public discourse around higher 
education in prison, even when positive, functions to reinforce dominant ideologies of education 
and incarceration, and to contain any potential threat to these ideologies that higher education in 
prison might pose. Further, an understanding of this public discourse about higher education in 
prison is important for thinking through the rhetorical possibilities for personal and social change 
for those people engaged in higher education in prison work. I’ll begin with a brief historical 
narrative of higher education in prisons in the US to illuminate how lines of argument about 
higher education, incarceration, and their intersection have been situated in the past. Next, I will 
analyze public discourse about the Second Chance Pell Pilot Program. I will conclude by 
considering the rhetoric employed in current higher education in prison program mission 
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statements and websites. Subsequent chapters will take up the ways alumni and instructors 
maneuver in this political and rhetorical context. 
Historical Background 
While education has been part of the American penitentiary systems at least the 1830s, 
higher education in prisons, in partnership with colleges and universities, is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, the first programs getting their starts in the 1950s during the height of 
rehabilitative penal philosophy’s wider public appeal. The rehabilitative ideal began the gain 
traction in the late 19th century, and one can discern connections between this approach to 
incarceration and the overall fin-de-siècle generation, especially its scientism and focus on 
psychology. As Alschuler (2003) explains, “Many early twentieth-century reformers doubted 
their ability to blame. They saw people as the far-from-divine products of heredity, social 
circumstances, random breeding, and Darwinian struggle. They and others also insisted that 
blame was functionless and that society should direct its efforts to more constructive goals” (2). 
This period saw two major penal reforms: probation and indeterminate sentences, both based on 
a medical model of treatment and evaluation by experts and grounded in the most innovative 
scientific discoveries. Ironically, then, the longer sentences promoted during this period were a 
response to and rejection of previously more punitive penal philosophies. The predominant 
thinking of the time was that criminal behavior was a result of genetics and social circumstance, 
rendering free-will and personal blame, and therefore retributive justice, inconsequential. 
Instead, the prevailing opinion was that through treatment and programs, prisons could reform 
incarcerated people through juridic therapeutics based in innovative behavioral science. As 
Attorney General Ramsey Clark claimed in 1970, “Rehabilitation must be the goal of modern 
corrections. Every other consideration should be subordinate to it. To rehabilitate is to give 
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health, freedom from drugs and alcohol, to provide education, vocational training, understanding 
and the ability to contribute to society” (quoted in Alchuler 8).  
The rehabilitative role of education in the medical model is perhaps most clearly 
demonstrated in the example of San Quentin State Prison, which according to Eric Cummins, 
received significant national attention for its reform rhetoric and practices under the direction of 
Warden Clinton Duffy (12). The model at San Quentin was to reform incarcerated people by 
offering “programming.” As Cummins explains, “The call went out for more ‘program’ in the 
prisons, and the prisoners became juridically paradoxical creatures: on the one hand, they were 
viewed as enemies of society, thought to have consciously rejected the social contract; on the 
other, they were presumed to want to belong to society and to achieve the conventional goals of 
the culture” (12-13). Thus, the incarcerated men were made to willingly participate in their own 
punishment, or at least appear to.  
It was in this milieu that prison education in general, and higher education in particular, 
began to flourish. Herman Spector, San Quentin’s prison librarian from 1947 to 1968, believed 
the library not only could contribute to juridic therapeutics, but that it should be central to the 
prison’s treatment efforts. While many in the prison administration remained skeptical, others 
were similarly convinced. James A. Johnston, San Quentin’s warden from 1913-1925, told the 
Committee on Institution Libraries in 1940 that “the written word is so powerful an influence in 
all our lives [that] the use of the prison library should be regarded as a potent agency in the 
training of prisoners” (quoted in Cummins 22). Reading groups were introduced to encourage the 
attitudes of the incarcerated men to conform to cultural norms. Additionally, writing was both 
encouraged and highly surveilled. Through writing, incarcerated people could perform 
(authentically or not) their penitence, which was crucial for determining rehabilitative success. 
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Cummins provides a striking example of this ideal in Caryl Chessman, whose execution on May 
3, 1960 incited protests and marked the beginning of the radical prison movement in California. 
The outrage over his execution and sympathy for Chessman was largely a result the virtuosity in 
his writing. After publishing four best-selling books, Chessman was considered by many to have 
demonstrated his rehabilitation. According to Cummins: 
Chessman's life should be spared because he was a changed man, they argued, by 
evidence of his rational eloquence. It wasn't that he was not guilty of his crime, 
his public insisted; rather, the erudition, reason, and humane tone of his writing 
redeemed him [...] The gargantuan drive to rescue Chessman can be fully 
explained only as reflecting the cultural residue of the old idea that writing 
somehow magically equals rehabilitation (52).  
This faith in the medical model, as well as the roles of reading and writing in 
rehabilitation, made the public university, the role of which was expanding at this time, a natural 
partner for penal institutions. The first records of college-level courses in prison appear in 1923 
through a correspondence course program at Sing Sing Prison by Columbia University (Silva 
22), but there was little development of postsecondary prison education until the 1950s. In 1953, 
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale initiated the first degree-granting program at Menard 
State Prison. In 1966, Delyte Morris, President of SIU, published “The University’s Role in 
Prison Education,” an article that outlines the SIU model and argues for the use of higher 
education in the rehabilitation of incarcerated people. An analysis of the rhetoric in this 
document reveals the way that ideologies about higher education as well as penal philosophy 
converged (tentatively and uncomfortably) in this historical moment.  
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During the time, a liberal arts curriculum dominated American colleges and universities, 
and Morris, like Herman Spector, reflects a belief in the connection between morality and 
literacy, as well as an American faith in education to provide opportunities for moral 
development and social advancement. In line with the rehabilitative, pragmatic penal philosophy 
of the time, Morris speculates that criminality is a result of misunderstanding and 
miscommunication, a kind of misfire between the individual and society, and “criminals” are 
those whom the American education system failed to reach. Morris explains, “The correctional 
institution, properly oriented, fills a gap in the community’s educational system which has failed 
previously to reach a portion of the adult population. Properly considered, prison education is 
adult education” (546). Thus, education equips incarcerated students with tools to comprehend 
the society and laws that, due to a failure in education, they have previously rejected, leading to 
responsible citizenship. Just as “rehabilitation is individual salvation” (Ramsey Clark, quoted in 
Alschuler 8), this social education is individualized, “in that it is organized and directed first to 
determine the inmate’s attitudes toward his family, his community, and his work and second, to 
encourage him to achieve relationships with other persons which will meet his needs and 
advance his social interest” (Morris 546).  
 Perhaps most revealing in Morris’s article is his belief regarding the origins of 
criminality. He argues that people are born innocent and become corrupted not by some negative 
influence in society, but by the failure of public institutions, such as family, school, and the 
church, to civilize them. “And of all things, certainly education is the fundamental civilizing 
element as we know it” (556). In this model, the teacher plays a crucial role, not just as an 
educator, but as a model citizen, and an important goal is to encourage the student to identify 
with “men of intelligence, skill, and balanced personalities” (553) so that they might more 
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willingly submit to authority figures (557). This is an interesting perspective on higher 
education, one that in many ways reflects the prevailing opinion of the time that higher education 
is a public good that functions to produce good citizens (Wan 2014; Ritter 2015). At the same 
time, the corrective nature of higher education in prison in Morris’s model makes it 
uncomfortably distinct from the role of traditional college education. As Silva points out, 
reduced recidivism, one of the primary goals of correctional education, is a “murky” goal, and 
that murkiness has persisted today. “It has, of course, no equivalent in measuring the success of 
college graduates who are not ex-offenders. Although the easiest variable to measure (whether 
the subject has been returned to custody), the reasons for failing this test are inconsistent and 
pernicious” (27). 
 While the SIUC model and others were certainly important for demonstrating the positive 
impacts of higher education in prison (not to mention that such programs can be implemented 
without public objection), the most important factor in the proliferation of these programs was 
the introduction of the Basic Education Opportunity grants, later renamed Pell Grants, in 1965. 
Though the proportion of Pell Grants that went to incarcerated students was small (between .82 
percent and 1.2 percent), the impact on higher education in prison was huge, accounting for the 
bulk of the funding for these programs (Wright 14). Buoyed by sustainable funding, higher 
education in prison programs proliferated through the 1970s and 1980s. By 1982, there were 350 
programs operating in all fifty states. This is not to say that prison education was universally 
accepted or that there wasn’t political pushback about using public funds to support the cost of 
educating incarcerated people at the college level. As Ossa D. Coffey noted in 1994, bills were 
introduced to restrict Pell Grants for incarcerated students every time the Higher Education Act 
was up for reauthorization. However, reduced budgets for corrections during this time led to 
31 
 
scandals over abuses of Pell Grant funds. One example was Branell College, an offshoot of 
Corrections Corporation of America, which funded its program entirely through Pell Grants. 
Florida handed over responsibility for all of its correctional education programs, including 
secondary and vocational programs, to Branell College, thus shifting the financial burden for 
these programs from the corrections budget to Pell Grants (Coffey 84). 
 Then, the 1994 Omnibus Crime Bill finally banned Pell Grants for incarcerated students. 
The result was immediate and devastating. One academic year after its passage, the number of 
college-level programs operating in prisons decreased by 40% and the number of incarcerated 
students decreased by 44%, while the overall prison population had increased by 7% over this 
same period (Wright 14). The lack of funding accounts for the steep decline, but the elimination 
of the Pell grants was the result of more than the mere mismanagement and abuse of federal 
funds. The 1980s and 1990s saw significant shifts in ideologies about both higher education and 
incarceration.  
 First, a major shift from rehabilitative penal philosophy to an emphasis to incapacitation 
and deterrence took place in the late 20th century. One contributing factor to this shift was an 
influential 1974 article titled “What Works?” and more commonly referred to as The Martinson 
Report. In it, Robert Martinson reviews the efficacy of penal rehabilitation programs and 
concludes that, essentially, “nothing works.” As Delbert Elliott and Steve Aos explain, 
"Martinson thought his work would empty prisons, that the realization that prisons did nothing to 
end crime would cause a backlash against them and a search for better alternatives” (par. 11). 
Instead, his work was used to support Tough on Crime policies, such as truth in sentencing 
policies and three-strikes laws that have contributed to mass incarceration. “They can’t be 
helped, the thinking goes, so you might as well lock them up for as long as possible" (Elliott and 
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Aos par. 11). Of course, I’m not suggesting that this article single-handedly ended the 
rehabilitative ideal, but its widespread influence illustrates the paradigm shift that was happening 
at the time. 
 What emerged at the end of the 20th century has been called “the new penology,” which 
emphasizes risk management, surveillance, and controlling those segments of the population 
considered to be dangerous. It is a penal philosophy that fits neatly into neoliberal ideologies of 
the privatization of risk and responsibility, as well as a preoccupation with security. “This 
penology regards the criminal justice system as an ever-more prominent component—indeed, the 
dominant component—of society’s response to an enduring ‘underclass’. Its focus is on system 
rationality and actuarial thinking” (Alschuler 12). In a time when “justice” increasingly meant 
“just deserts” and politicians were winning easy points for tough on crime rhetoric and policies, 
providing federal funds for college in prison became less and less politically viable.  
Containment Rhetoric and the Second Chance Pilot Pell Program 
   The is an extremely dynamic moment for prison reform, generally. “Mass incarceration” 
has entered the public lexicon, and criminal justice reform is generating bi-partisan support. In 
July 2015, Obama became the first sitting US president to visit a prison. Even the Charles Koch 
Institute is lobbying for criminal justice reform. Both leading 2016 Democratic presidential 
nominees, Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders, made criticism of mass incarceration and the 
prison-industrial complex part of their campaign strategies. While the election of Donald Trump, 
the self-proclaimed “law and order candidate,” and the appointment of Jeff Sessions as Attorney 
General has undoubtedly dampened the increasing optimism of reformers, the 2016 election may 
not have been the overwhelming blow to criminal justice reform that one might assume, as 
criminal justice reform has always been primarily a local issue. And criminal justice reform won 
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on ballots across the country in November 2016. California, Nevada, and Massachusetts voted 
for marijuana legalization, New Mexico passed a constitutional amendment that prevents people 
from being jailed simply because they cannot afford bail, and even the deep-red Oklahoma voted 
not only to reduce prison sentences but to also use the funds saved to fund rehabilitation 
programs. While the rise of Donald Trump and popular support for his carceral jingoism, evident 
in increased surveillance and detention of undocumented immigrants, as well as calls for 
increased police presence in Black neighborhoods, demonstrates the unevenness in the recent 
shifts in support for criminal justice reform, that support is still evident, even in states that voted 
overwhelmingly for trump. 
One important recent reform was the announcement in late July 2015 of the Department 
of Education’s Second Chance Pell Pilot Program, an experimental program that provides an 
exception to the federal ban on Pell Grants for incarcerated people.  Following this 
announcement were several news stories about the program and about higher education in prison 
in general by The Washington Post, Politico, NPR, Forbes, and others. While the comments on 
these posts reveal plenty of continued opposition to entitlements for criminal-justice involved 
people, the articles themselves remained overwhelmingly positive. Some articles, such as 
Politico’s “Kids Before Cons Act Aims to Fight Pell Grants for Prisoners,” highlight 
conservative claims that Obama does not have the authority to do this without the approval of 
Congress, but overall, the coverage seems to support, at the very least, that higher education in 
prison produces positive effects, not only for incarcerated students, but for society as a whole.  
However, the rhetoric in this discourse, while positive, remains troubling. What I’d like 
to call attention to is the way the rhetoric around higher education in prison, especially in respect 
to the Second Chance Pell Pilot Program, circumscribes imaginings of higher education, prisons, 
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and incarcerated students in ways that support dominant neoliberal ideology and limits 
possibilities for affirmative invention. In a recent paper given at the National Conference on 
Higher Education in Prison, Dan Olson acknowledges higher education’s potential for a kind of 
Deleuzian becoming-minor, but he draws a distinction between education, which should 
“[recognize] an individual’s power to transform in their own modes of becoming,” and 
programming, which through monitoring and moral education produces Foucauldian docile 
bodies. What is at stake here is not only the viability of higher education in prison programs that 
recognize the humanity of incarcerated students and are critical of dominant power structures. 
The public discourse around higher education in prison also reveals the complex, agonistic, and 
dynamic nature of current beliefs about things like responsibility, the role of higher education in 
American society, and what it means to be human.  
This public discourse, then, has an epideictic function. Classically defined as a 
ceremonial rhetoric of praise or blame, epideictic rhetoric has come to be more broadly defined 
by modern rhetorical scholars to include epideictic functions, gestures, or dimensions of 
discourse beyond the traditional generic approach to epideixis. Many scholars (e.g. Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyeca 2010; Rosenfield 1980; Sheard 1996;) have noted the civic emphasis of 
epideictic rhetoric, and most agree that the epideictic function is primarily conservative. As 
Kathryn Olson (2013) explains, epideictic rhetoric “coherently, elaborately, and powerfully 
promotes and justifies values, beliefs, and practices that maintain status quo power relationships, 
even when those are not its ostensible lessons” (461). Brian Vickers (1988) similarly argues that 
the power of epideictic rhetoric is in its ability to create civic cohesion by praising pre-existing 
values (55). The public discourse about higher education in prison serves an epideictic function 
by relying on pre-existing, largely neoliberal values that, I argue, limit the ability to recognize 
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incarcerated students are fully human and fellow citizens. I suggest that this rhetoric is an 
example of what Michelle Smith (2010) has referred to as the rhetoric of containment. In her 
analysis of public discourse about the Amana Society, Smith draws on the work of Elaine Scarry 
and Robert Asen to demonstrate the rhetorical power of imagining in general, and the “negative 
rhetorical imaginings that relegate a group as always already outside or marginalized in the 
public sphere” (130) in particular. Containment rhetoric, then, is a form of rhetorical imaginings 
“that contain the threat of a group considered Other” (129). The features of this form of rhetoric 
are an outsider gaze that renders the Other as part of the landscape, praise of the group that 
ultimately undermines them as viable members of the dominant social group, and a sense that the 
benefits of the group are incompatible with the dominant society. As Smith shows, these 
seemingly innocuous descriptions of marginal groups can have material consequences.  
In the articles about the Second Chance Pell Pilot Program, nowhere is the outsider gaze 
more evident than in the photographs that accompany the stories. Repeatedly, images featuring 
incarcerated people as part of the oppressive landscape of prisons accompany stories that 
describe higher education in prison programs as “extraordinary” and “unexpected” pockets of 
vitality in these brutal places. These images function to further establish prisons as marginal and 
foreign, and establishes the place of incarcerated people within such a marginal space. The first 
photo encourages a distant and objectifying gaze in the viewer. Further, descriptions of visits to 
these prison classrooms, though they are indisputably positive, display a kind of curious 
fascination, even condescension, that contributes to the negative rhetorical imagining of 
incarcerated students. For example, in “College Behind Bars: How Educating Prisoners Pays 
Off,” David Skorton and Glenn Altschuler write: 
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When visiting the program, we found students hungry for an education and 
grateful for their efforts. “These men are quite extraordinary,” said Richard 
Plenberg, a Cornell emeritus professor and award-winning teacher who taught a 
constitutional history course at Auburn. “They are very, very well behaved in the 
classroom and they ask really good questions” (par. 10). 
Similarly, in the NPR story “Why Aren’t There More Higher Ed Programs Behind Bars?,” Eric 
Westervelt describes visiting a child psychology course, where he listens to “student-inmates” 
testify to the way the course illuminated for them their own path to prison. This description 
especially harkens back to the mid-century belief in higher education’s role in juridic 
therapeutics. While these descriptions may praise the efforts of incarcerated students, they are 
identified as morally and/or psychologically deficient. Thus, while the rhetorical work of these 
articles may be to encourage programs that will help them to reenter society, they do so in a way 
that restrict their ability to be accepted as fully equal citizens. As Robert Asen (2002) explains, 
“The consequences of collective imagining appear in the doubly disabling tendencies of 
representation that absent some people from public discourse and yet present them through 
disabling images. Counterpublic agents encounter these negative images as they enter previously 
foreclosed forums” (363-364). In other words, these articles advocate against the civil death of 
incarcerated people while contributing rhetorically to their social death. 
 Another striking feature of this public discourse is centrality of recidivism rates in 
arguing not only for the Second Chance Pell Pilot Program, but for higher education in prison in 
general. The Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, NPR, Politico, The Atlantic, and many others 
feature articles that refer to the 2013 RAND report which found that people who participate in 
education programs while incarcerated are 43% less likely to recidivate. Some articles frame this 
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in terms of public safety, claiming that these men and women are less likely to commit crimes 
after they are released, and others frame it in terms of the cost of incarceration on tax payers. 
This line of argumentation acknowledges the value of higher education in prison, but it does so 
within the neoliberal logics and what Ulrich Beck (1992) calls “risk society.” In other words, 
they encourage imaginings of incarcerated people solely in terms of their potential risks to 
society, thus containing the potential for imagining them as fully complex and enriching 
members of society. For example, in an NPR story, Gabrielle Emanual interviews a man named 
Tyrone Werts, who describes his experience with education at SCI Graterford, both before and 
after the 1994 Crime Bill, as well as his observations in his current work with returning citizens. 
Werts says, “I see a marked difference between those guys who went to college in prison and 
those guys who didn’t’ go to school. They think totally different.” Immediately following this 
observation, which is rich and provocative, Emanuel adds, “A 2013 study by the Rand Corp. 
found that education behind bars greatly reduces the likelihood of a former prisoner committing 
another crime.” This containment rhetoric prevents the risk of imagining incarcerated people as 
fully human by reducing their myriad possibilities for the beautifully complexity of becoming to 
a simple analysis of risk that cannot do justice to the work incarcerated students have done and 
are continuing to do.  
 What one believes about the effectiveness of higher education in prison depends on what 
one believes about higher education, about incarcerated people, and about the reasons people 
become criminal-justice involved in the first place. The problem, of course, is that we have not 
yet arrived at a moment when then humanity and inherent worth of people who are or have been 
incarcerated does not need to be argued. More than twenty years ago, in “The Paradox of Higher 
Education in Prison,” Raymond Jones and Peter d’Errico (1994) wrote, “The issues of prison 
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higher education take shape in the attempt to make the education of prisoners appear rational 
within a social world that cannot shake the feeling that they shouldn’t be educated at all and may, 
in fact, be getting away with something they don’t deserve” (6). Certainly, this feeling has only 
intensified, as tuition has increased, state funding for higher education has decreased, and 
families are finding the cost of sending their kids to college more and more burdensome. 
Additionally, Jones and d’Errico suggest that there is a sense especially among correctional staff 
that though incarcerated people should change in some way, the correct orientation is toward 
acceptance of their “proper” place in the social order. “The good prisoners have accepted their 
fundamental lack of worth and are resigned to a life without social or economic status, during 
and after incarceration. Prisoners who strive to better themselves through higher learning are 
viewed as ‘problematic’ and ‘arrogant,’ or are accused of ‘conning the system’ by pretending to 
be something they are not” (13-14). This argument about what incarcerated people ontologically 
are and what they deserve is alive and well, and this ambivalence is what makes higher 
education in prison both possible and incredibly fraught. 
 To argue that higher education in prison reduces recidivism, the most common argument 
made in support of these programs, does not in any way challenge the punitive logic that 
incarcerated people do not deserve an education, that they cannot be agents of positive change in 
their communities, and that they do not deserve to live fulfilling lives of substance. Instead, it 
side-steps this concern by appealing, sometimes tacitly, sometimes directly to neoliberal 
concerns for public safety and government spending. Further, this line of argument, in supporting 
the value of a liberal arts education, often relies on deficit models, like the medical model of the 
mid-20th century or the cognitive deficiency model, which assumes that the liberal arts promote 
moral development in people who are lacking analytical, problem-solving, and social skills. As 
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Jones and d’Errico assert, “Education that presumes the deficiencies of those it serves may do 
more good than harm, but it clearly is not education based on respect for the individual learner” 
(8). Just as importantly, arguments for education that presume these deficiencies functions to 
rhetorically constrain the imaginings of these incarcerated students are familiar and relatable 
human beings.  
Ambivalent Epideictic Rhetoric 
 While the epideictic rhetoric of the mainstream media’s coverage of the Second Chance 
Pell Pilot Program functions to constrain possibilities for imagining incarcerated students and 
supports status quo logics of neoliberalism and the risk society, an analysis of the self-
representations of higher education in prison programs, through their websites and mission 
statements, reveals another approach to representing incarcerated college students. Drawing on 
the work of Rosenfield (1980) and Jasinski (2001), Nathaniel Rivers posits a different kind of 
epideictic rhetoric, an ambivalent epideixis that, rather than serving a conservative function, 
reveals some new truth, “a rhetoric of bringing forth the otherwise” (438). As I will show, while 
some higher education in prison programs represent themselves in ways that conform to the 
containment rhetoric described above, many are employing an ambivalent, subtle discourse that 
creates rhetorical openings for new imaginings of incarcerated people and higher education in 
general.  
 One difficulty in seeking to understand what higher education in prison programs are 
doing is that these programs continue to be disparate and disconnected, and there is insufficient 
research about the number and scope of such programs in the United States. Recently, efforts 
have been made to not only collect data about the number and types of programs, but to create a 
national coalition of higher education in prison programs for the purpose of promoting best 
40 
 
practices and organizing around political issues related to incarcerated and higher education. In 
March 2016, representatives of ten programs from eight states convened in Arizona to being 
working on the creation of this national coalition. While the ethos of this nascent coalition does 
not by any means represent all approaches to postsecondary education in carceral settings 
currently practices in the United States, they do represent the paramount voices in championing 
the cause of access to higher education for incarcerated people. For that reason, in my analysis, I 
will focus on the way this group of ten representatives4 articulates its vision of higher education 
in prison, as well as the mission statements and program descriptions of four of these 
representative programs.  
The report “Creating a National Organization/Coalition for Higher Education in Prison: 
Summary and Outputs from Visioning Workshop,” which was circulated on the Higher 
Education in Prison listserv, is notable because it is a rare collective articulation of the beliefs 
and values of higher education in prison programs that is intended primarily for those who are 
currently engaged in prison education work, rather than for funders, policy makers, and the 
general public. It is telling, I believe, that public safety is not once invoked to argue for the social 
value of these programs, and recidivism is mentioned only once, the ninth bullet point in a list of 
eleven reasons for offering higher education opportunities in prisons (3).  
Instead of neoliberal appeals to security, this report suggests that providing access to 
higher education in prison is a corrective to the inequity that is exacerbated through institutions 
of education and criminal justice: “The prison system is filled with people who have never had 
                                                          
4 The representatives in attendance at the Visioning Workshop were Mary Gould, Saint Louis University; Sean Pica, 
Hudson Link; Jody Lewen, Prison University Project; Margaret Quern-Adkins, New Jersey STEP; Rebecca 
Ginsburg, Education Justice Project; Rob Scott, Cornell University; Kaia Stern, Prison Studies Project; Kyes 
Stevens, Alabama Prison Arts + Education Project at Auburn University; Tanya Erzen, Freedom Education Project 
of Puget Sound; Bianca Van Heydoorn, John Jay College of Criminal Justice.  
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access to higher education opportunities, with the vast majority of the men and women 
incarcerated in the United States coming from under-resourced communities and communities of 
color. Access to meaningful, high quality, sustained higher educational opportunities can 
transform the lives of individuals in prison, their families and the communities to which they 
return” (2). Here, higher education is viewed as a transformative tool, but instead of framing the 
problem to be addressed as the deficient morality or problem-solving skills of individuals, it is 
the inherent inequity of American society that is to be addressed. Here, incarcerated students are 
not framed as “well-behaved” individuals with the potential to be successfully assimilated into 
normative culture, but as potential agents of change and justice. 
The overall vision represented in the report is comprised of two separate but connected 
ideals. The first is a “vision of a world in which all people, including those in prison, can realize 
their academic promise through access to meaningful, sustained, high quality educational 
opportunities” (2). Here, the developing coalition is firmly rooted in an ideology of inclusion and 
universal higher education, a tradition which gained momentum throughout the twentieth 
century. However, the report works to distinguish its vision from a purely economic basis for 
increased inclusion in higher education. Rather than focusing on preparation for the workforce, 
the report diligently defines “meaningful,” “sustained,” and “high quality” in terms that 
emphasize critical inquiry, developing leadership potential, collaboration, and creating lifelong 
learners.  This is a stark departure from the vocational programs that are generally favored by 
prison administrators and policy makers, the primary aim of which is assimilation into normative 
and legal economies. Instead, it frames higher education in prison programs as extensions of 
higher education, rather than aligning them with the missions of correctional institutions.   
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The second component of the report’s vision is more radical, imagining a world in which 
“a culture of punishment is replaced by a culture of human dignity” (2). This is a significant 
deviation from the mid-20th century medical model that advocated for higher education as a 
vehicle for much-needed discipline and rehabilitation for incarcerated people. Instead, higher 
education is an arena for practicing a culture of human dignity. Repeatedly, the report argues that 
higher education in prison programs can introduce a kind of viral dignity and respect which may 
then spread beyond the classroom to “infect” the culture of the prison, the marginalized 
communities from which the students come, the institutions of higher education that host the 
programs, and eventually, the larger society. It is not quite an abolitionist vision, but here the 
report even more directly departs from “the new penology” and its emphasis on containment, 
control, and security by acknowledging the relationship between creating meaningful 
relationships through collaboration and meaningful contact with college faculty and creating a 
culture of human dignity.  
Of course, the problem for these programs is that they exist at the discretion of 
correctional institutions, in which a culture of punishment is dominant, and public and private 
funders for whom financial investment in the dignity of incarcerated people may not be 
politically advantageous or wise. As Jones and d’Errico cautioned in 1994, these programs still 
must constantly question whether “whether, in conforming to or contesting one or another dictate 
of a prison administration, the program is likely to compromise fatally its own goals and 
objectives” (13). The difficulty, then, in representing the value of these programs publicly, to a 
broad audience with varied, sometimes conflicting ideological commitments, is in finding the 
balance between their ideal vision and securing the support of those for whom the uses of higher 
education are considerably different.  
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It is not surprising, then, that many programs continue to argue that one of the primary 
reasons to support higher education in prison is that it contributes to reduced recidivism and 
therefore reductions in both crime rates and prison populations. Bard Prison Initiative (BPI), 
perhaps the largest and most well-known program of its kind in the country, leans heavily on this 
line of argumentation: 
The criminal justice system is staggeringly expensive. As a country we spend 
$212 billion dollars annually to apprehend, try, and incarcerate prisoners […] 
Nationwide, nearly 68 out of every one hundred prisoners are rearrested within 
three years of release, and more than half return to prison. Research indicates that 
these high and expensive rates of recidivism fall to less than 22% if prisons offer 
significant educational opportunity to incarcerated men and women. Among 
formerly incarcerated Bard students, less than 2% have returned to prison. The 
estimated cost per person, per year of the BPI program is a small fraction of the 
price of continuing incarceration. It saves tax payers money, while increasing 
public safety. 
This line of argumentation is qualitatively different from the prevailing ethos of the coalition’s 
report and does little to confront, much less contest prevailing assumptions about incarcerated 
people or criminal justice ideologies that objectify them. However, the BPI website does 
highlight the fact that many of its alumni not only do not return to prison, but many go on to 
pursue careers in helping professions, including counseling and working with people with AIDS. 
This representation of their students as potential agents of change within their communities and 
people who want to contribute to the common good is a subtle but significant departure from 
prevailing assumptions about the potential of incarcerated people. By representing alumni not 
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only as successfully assimilated to normative culture, but as appropriately concerned with giving 
back, BPI subtly offers a refutation against those who would suggest that formerly incarcerated 
people should not be afforded the social capital and economic opportunities that higher education 
makes possible. It is a subtle, but important shift in the dominant representation of incarcerated 
and formerly incarcerated people.  
Hudson Link, a program that partners with five institutions of higher education in New 
York to offer higher education programming in five correctional centers, also argues that their 
program contributes to reduced recidivism, suggesting that their program “creates a population 
of empowered and rehabilitated graduates” (np). This dual approach, which appeals to both 
reformist and more radical positions regarding mass incarceration, is repeated throughout 
Hudson Link’s “Why Prison Education?” infographic. For example, while they argue that their 
program “creates a more positive prison environment, demonstrating each individual’s potential 
for success and change,” they suggest that this “makes prisons easier to manage,” thus appealing 
to the new penology’s overriding concern with security and control.  
What these two examples demonstrate is that, though gentler in tone, the philanthropic 
impulse behind many prison volunteer programs, including higher education in prison programs, 
compliments and works in tandem with the liberal humanist logics of the carceral state. Dylan 
Rodriguez (2006) has outlined one of the most extensive and severe criticisms of prison 
education programs. Rodriguez reiterates a common criticism of prison education, that is extends 
the control and surveillance technologies of the prison, but he takes this critique a step further. 
Focusing on the words of one unnamed college program director, he critiques the notion that 
prison educators must actively work to gain and maintain the trust of prison administrators: 
“Thus to suggest that prison education and other philanthropic programs are only complicit in the 
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reproduction of the prison regime as a discursive political, and institutional apparatus is to 
obscure the proliferated technology of domination that is conceived through the symbiosis 
between the prison’s resident guards/wardens/administrators and the accommodated presence of 
the teacher/tutor/volunteer/missionary/philanthropist. I’ll basically do anything to keep the 
program running” (103, emphasis in original).  
This critique of the symbiosis between prison education programs and the prison regime 
may be extended to the arguments for the value of higher education in prison and the self-
representations of these programs. It seems that by soliciting political and financial support 
through alignment with neoliberal humanist appeals to public safety and fiscal responsibility, 
higher education in prison programs engage in a conservative epideixis that breathes life into and 
sustains the punitive logics of the carceral state. However, I want to argue that while Rodriguez’s 
critique is an important and welcome reminder of the troubling and ambiguous relationship 
between prison educators and the prison administration, these programs engage in a more 
ambivalent epideixis that, as Rivers suggests, creates possibilities for new imaginings and 
narratives that depart from neoliberal humanist logics of punishment and control.  Largely, this 
ambivalent epideictic rhetoric functions by emphasizing the traditional values of higher 
education, especially universal and inclusive higher education, into the field of criminal justice. 
This epideixis productively refuses to resolve the inherent paradox of higher education in prison, 
instead tactfully and gingerly negotiating between maintaining the status quo and “bringing forth 
the otherwise,” as suggested in the rhetorical maneuvers of both Hudson Link and Bard Prison 
Initiative.  
Of course, these programs operate along a continuum of political commitments, from 
neoliberal philanthropy to prison abolition, and while many programs oscillate between 
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arguments based on recidivism and those based in social justice, some programs align 
themselves even further toward radical departure than is represented by the coalitions vision 
workshop report. The University of Illinois’s Education Justice Project (EJP), for example, does 
not appeal to concerns for public safety or recidivism rates anywhere on its website. In fact, in a 
promotional video, director Rebecca Ginsburg makes a point of saying, “Most EJP students long 
ago changed from being the teenager that they were when they committed the act for which they 
are currently incarcerated to being men, who are serious of purpose and quite intent on making 
up for what their past mistakes have cost them, cost their families, and cost their communities. 
What they seek is the opportunity, the means to be able to become that person.”  Here, the value 
of higher education in prison is represented as an extension of the value of higher education in 
general, specifically as a tool with which one becomes empowered to determine the direction of 
one’s own life and contribute meaningfully to one’s community.  EJP suggests that higher 
education is the means to achieve a “more just and humane world,” but the program does not 
define the source of injustice and inhumanity. By investing in common ideologies of higher 
education as a liberatory, transformative tool for greater social inclusion, programs like EJP 
employs an ambivalent epideictic rhetoric in which different stakeholders can imagine different 
sites of transformation, whether it is the individual students, the communities from which they 
come, or the carceral state. 
A similar rhetorical strategy is employed by the Prison University Project (PUP), which 
operates a college preparatory program and an associate of arts degree program at California’s 
San Quentin State Prison. Though PUP does rely on recidivism data to demonstrate the impact of 
its programs, noting that only 4% of PUP alumni return to prison for committing new offenses 
(as opposed to parole violations), and none of these new offenses have been violent in nature. 
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However, PUP’s mission and goals, like those of EJP, gesture toward systemic, rather than 
individual, failings that result in committing criminal acts.  
PUP’s central goal is to set a world-class example of a radically inclusive, 
academically rigorous, student-centered liberal arts college that happens to be 
located within a prison. We are above all committed to demonstrating both the 
central importance and the possibility of meeting the needs of students who often 
face a broad array of challenges that have until now caused them to be left behind. 
To achieve these goals we strive to meet each student where he is, and to provide 
the individualized support that is needed.  
Here, as with EJP, PUP is framed as a mere extension of the ideal of universal access to higher 
education. At the same time, it locates the source of the problem to be addressed and alleviated 
through education in “a broad array of challenges,” which remain unspecified. The final turn to 
individualized needs and support invoke to some extent the cognitive deficit model, which 
according to Lucien Morin (1981) dominated approaches to secondary education in US prisons 
in the late twentieth century. The cognitive deficiency model posits that criminal activity is the 
result of “free, if not always intelligent, choice” (31). In this model, incarcerated students are to 
be educated in order to develop their intellectual abilities so that they will make more rational, 
intelligent, and normative choices. However, by declining to stipulate what “challenges” it is 
addressing, PUP’s statement remains ambiguously agonistic, allowing multiple imaginings and 
commitments regarding both higher education and criminal justice.  
Conclusion 
In the short history of formal higher education in prison programs, there have been 
significant shifts and variations both in the ways the value of these programs has been framed 
and in the public support for them. The landscape in which these programs operate is changing 
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rapidly. The public support for criminal justice reform, however, is far from overwhelming, and 
support for access to free college courses for incarcerated people continues to be uneven. In 
Betsy DeVos’s Department of Education, the future of Pell grants for incarcerated students is 
uncertain at best. And yet, support for rehabilitative programs and decarceration appears to 
continue, and increased calls for free higher education for all American citizens could offer new 
rhetorical and political pathways to support college in prison programs. 
 As new reformist, even abolitionist rhetorics emerge within and around these programs, 
older punitive and security-oriented rhetorics continue to circulate as well. It is in this political-
rhetorical context, marked by significant change and agonism, that those involved in higher 
education in prison are making sense of their experiences. In some instances, programs are 
working to create new cultural meanings and associations, to imagine not only incarceration but 
higher education in new ways that center human dignity and social justice, but this approach is 
by no means a given, nor is it currently the predominant representation. While it may be 
necessary to communicate clearly the outcomes of college in prison programs that speak to the 
needs of prison administrators (lowered staff assault rates), politicians (reduced recidivism), and 
other stakeholders, these programs must also be able to communicate outcomes that counter the 
carceral logics that serve systemic inequality and oppression. Framing the work of higher 
education in prison through correctional discourses undercuts the social justice aims that many of 
them claim to support. In the chapters that follow, I offer an alternative account of the positive 
impacts of higher education in prison by centering the relationship- and identity-building work of 
the students themselves and by critiquing the emancipatory ideals of higher education and 








“If It Hadn’t Been for Writing, I Think I Would Have Lost My Mind:” Resilient Dwelling 
and Rhetorical Agency in Prison 
 
“[Those] who live in the most dire circumstances possess a complex and oftentimes contradictory 
humanity and subjectivity that is never adequately glimpsed by viewing them as victims or, on the other 
hand, as superhuman agents. It has always baffled me why those most interested in understanding and 
changing the barbaric domination that characterizes our modernity often -- not always -- withhold from 
the very people they are most concerned with the right to complex personhood.”—Avery Gordon, Ghostly 




In recent years, the crisis of mass incarceration in the US has led to an increased interest 
within Writing Studies in the role higher education and writing instruction can play in resisting 
the dehumanization and oppression of incarceration, particularly in the ways carceral classrooms 
can offer agency to incarcerated people, who are socially and physically marginalized (Jacobi; 
Coogan; Lockard and Rankin-Robertson; Berry; Cavallaro et al). In this article, I extend that 
work by examining, through five hours of interview data, the lived experiences of two formerly 
incarcerated men, Saul and Ben, who participated in separate college in prison programs. I 
suggest that posthumanist models of rhetorical agency might be applied to more fully account for 
the effects of higher education in prison programs on the conditions of possibility for and 
rhetorical actions of incarcerated college students.  
This work is motivated by an interest in understanding the students themselves, not 
simply as students or as prisoners, but as individuals actively engaged in becoming. Through 
these stories, I demonstrate that, rather than introducing agency to otherwise passive subjects, 
higher education can supplement and support the vital rhetorical action that incarcerated people 
are engaged in on a daily basis as a matter of survival. In the sections that follow, I discuss social 
death as the context for Saul and Ben’s rhetorical action. Next, I develop the concept of resilient 
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dwelling to describe the everyday rhetorical resistance of incarcerated people. Finally, I trace the 
way higher education and writing instruction contribute to Ben and Saul’s efforts to create 
mutually supportive, loving relationships, which are the bedrock of their resilient dwellings. 
Meeting Saul and Ben 
On his suggestion, I met Saul at a fast food restaurant with a cheeky prison theme in a 
large Midwestern city. The owner makes an effort to employ formerly incarcerated people, and 
the walls are covered in graphs and statistics about recidivism and mass incarceration. Saul 
doesn’t work here, but he knows folks who do. “I thought you’d get a kick out of this place,” he 
tells me. Saul smiles wryly as he speaks, as if everything he’s telling me is darkly funny. Or 
maybe it’s the idea of trying to explain his experiences to me, a middle-class, well-meaning 
white woman with no personal history of criminal justice involvement. He speaks deliberately, 
and I can hear the backspace in his voice as he pauses, reaches for a better word, always revising 
his language, repeatedly delivering lines that every qualitative researcher dreams of. He wants to 
get it right. An African American man in his mid-thirties, Saul grew up in prison, serving almost 
twenty years from the age of 15, and he tells me, with his signature smile, that he is woefully 
unprepared to be an adult in the world. This, despite the fact that he exudes a warmth and 
sturdiness that I suspect comes from hard-won self-awareness. He says he didn’t know what he 
would do when he got out, but he knew what he wouldn’t do. He won’t go back. He knows that 
much for certain. During the nearly two decades he spent locked up, Saul earned his GED and 
enough college credits for an Associate’s degree. Over time, his interest in these classes waned, 
mostly because he felt the courses were not challenging and the instructors were not engaged, but 
reading and writing continued to be important to him throughout his life. Then, during his final 
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year of incarceration, he joined a college in prison program that offered accredited upper-
division undergraduate courses through a nearby public university.  
 On the surface, Ben has almost nothing in common with Saul. A white man in his early 
fifties, Ben had been out of prison for only two months when we met, and this was his sixth time 
getting out. We met at a picnic shelter in his small Midwestern town’s public park. Looking a 
little nervous and fiddling with his plastic water bottle, Ben introduced himself: 
I can’t say I’m your average person walking down the street. I’ve spent a lot of 
my life incarcerated, and I don’t think that’s probably average. But I don’t think 
I’m necessarily a bad person. I try to help people. I try to be kind and courteous. 
I’m just someone trying to make my way through life.  
Ben has four children, and from what he tells me, it seems they are adjusting to him being in 
their everyday lives again. He tells me that his youngest daughter has been over to eat supper 
with him, though she had sworn she never would again. “Why do I keep going back if I hate it so 
much?” he asks. I say nothing. “It doesn’t make a lot of sense. Nothing makes a lot of sense, I 
guess.” But he says he feels like he stands a better chance of staying out this time, and that this 
change in outlook is due in large part to taking classes with a college in prison program operating 
at the medium security facility where he served his most recent sentence. Run by a private liberal 
arts college, this program offers both non-accredited classes and an accredited program that 
approximates the first year of college. Even before he was accepted to the program, throughout 
his many years of incarceration, he spent his time as an avid reader and autodidact, pursuing an 
eclectic curriculum from music theory to the theory of relativity. “When you are in prison, it is a 
complete waste of life,” he explains. “I think I was doing it so I’m not just wasting.”   
52 
 
Saul and Ben are different ages, different races, have different family circumstances. 
They come from different states with different departments of correction and different prison 
cultures where they served different sentences. Despite these differences, their stories also reveal 
similar perspectives about their struggles to survive in prison and the role higher education 
played in doing so. 
Higher Education in Prison and the Question of Agency 
 Since the 1970s and gaining over the past five years, several Writing Studies scholars 
have drawn on their teaching experiences in carceral settings to demonstrate the ways higher 
education, particularly writing instruction, creates transformative, emancipatory potential within 
the harsh restrictions of prisons and jails. For example, drawing on her experience facilitating 
writing workshops for incarcerated women, Tobi Jacobi (2011) argues that prison classrooms 
offer these students the opportunity to craft narratives that counter media-driven representations 
of incarceration and incarcerated people (41), as well as reclaiming control over one’s sense of 
self (45). Patrick Berry (2013), referencing a course he taught in a medium-security men’s 
prison, similarly argues that the prison classroom functions as a third space in which students 
engage in acts of self-making (152). While the theoretical frames, methodologies, and political 
allegiances vary, composition scholars who teach in prisons and jails have overwhelmingly 
suggested that formal writing instruction offers possibilities for rhetorical agency to incarcerated 
students, especially in their ability to craft identities that resist the dehumanization of 
incarceration.  
My scholarly and pedagogical approach to prison education as social justice work is 
heavily informed by these scholars. My perspective on agency relative to prison education, 
however, shifted at the 2014 Symposium on Higher Education in Prison, where Andra Slater 
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presented a paper on the damaging ways prison educators imagine incarcerated students, 
underestimating their capacities. To my surprise, Slater, who had been a student in the college 
prison program for which I volunteer, used as an example a quote I myself had given in a radio 
interview about the program, in which I had not expected to have “some of the best 
conversations I’ve ever had in my entire life.” As Slater (2015) has argued in a subsequent 
article, “The response of surprise is a natural one, but it reveals a deeply problematic and 
unspoken assumption: incarcerated people are not capable of deep analytic thinking, at least the 
kind that exceeds your imagination” (Castro et al 24). Though this callout was uncomfortable, 
and while I may disagree a little with the interpretation, this moment provides an opportunity to 
reconsider the ways prison educators and Writing Studies scholars represent their students and 
frame rhetorical agency as they argue for the value of their work.  
Humanist models of rhetorical agency, by framing agency as something possessed and 
granted and through privileged institutional practices of higher education and emphasizing 
absence of agency in the oppressive prison, can obscure the tactical actions of incarcerated 
college students, thus further marginalizing the very people whose exclusion and oppression are 
at issue. As Slater suggests, many incarcerated people are engaged in critical reflection and 
learning outside of formal educational settings. “The social imaginary has pegged prisons as 
counter-productive spaces in their entirety. When educators subscribe to this notion, they 
marginalize incarcerated students outside the realm of what it means to know” (Slater). Patrick 
Berry, echoing Slater, notes that his students’ experiences with literacy extend beyond a single 
class and are shaped “by the many networks in which they participated, both within and beyond 
prison” (154). The perspectives of composition scholars who teach in prisons have made 
significant contributions to the way the discipline imagines possibilities for writing instruction in 
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the lives of marginalized people, but they largely privilege the space of the classroom and agency 
that seemingly originates in writing instruction.   
Posthuman theories of rhetorical agency offer a useful framework for conceiving these 
wider networks incarcerated students inhabit and the role of formal education within them. 
Christian Lundberg and Joshua Gunn (2005), using the metaphor of the Ouija Board, suggest that 
rather than being possessed by agents, agency “possesses” them (97) and might be better 
conceived as “a rhetorical affect instead of as a point of origin for rhetorical effect” (98). Marilyn 
Cooper (2011) argues persuasively for a theory of individual rhetorical agency as an embodied 
property that emerges from the interaction of the rhetor with her lifeworld (443), but does not 
originate in conscious intention (421). Thus, order is always a provisional achievement of the 
collective of agents (424). Jeff Rice (2008) calls for a rhetoric of mapping, arguing that the ways 
we frame and create a place “must engage with multiple paths, complexity, and relationships 
when grand narratives fail to do anything but serve as reminders and, therefore, keep possibilities 
unseen” (208). Rhetors, then, are neither autonomous, rational agents, nor are they inflexibly 
determined by discourse and interpellation. Instead, they are dynamic, embodied actors 
possessed by an agency that emerges from the responsive environments and relations in which 
they act.  
In what follows, I apply this approach to rhetorical agency to the experiences of Ben and 
Saul in order to better understand how carceral spaces create strict conditions of rhetorical 
possibility, the ways Ben and Saul take rhetorical action within these limitations, and the ways 
higher education is conscripted into these rhetorical practices to positive effect. I argue that what 
makes writing and higher education so vitally important for the formerly incarcerated students I 
interviewed is that the prison classroom and its attendant practices and possibilities support their 
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everyday tactical struggles to resist social death and build what I call resilient dwelling. I present 
this counterpoint not to deny the very real ways that prisons are violent, humiliating, and 
traumatic3, nor to negate the value of formal educational experiences, but to recover the 
rhetorical actions of incarcerated students and to illuminate the networked and emergent nature 
of rhetorical agency in higher education in prison.   
Social Death and the Ambient Rhetoric of Prison 
According to Ben, prisons are designed to belittle. For him, this effect was produced both 
through interactions with correctional officers, who “treat everybody like the same piece of 
crap,” and through design elements of the prison he was in. He describes the shower area, wide 
open and separated from the noisy common area by transparent glass. There is no privacy. He 
concludes, “I think prison, for the most part, is just hell.” Saul’s account is strikingly similar. He 
says that incarcerated people are viewed as “less than human,” which justifies inhumane 
treatment by the staff. I asked Saul what that inhumane treatment looks like, and he explains that, 
while there are instances now and then of more grossly inhumane treatment, most often it’s that 
everyone is treated exactly the same, “cookie-cutter,” without regard to their individual 
differences and needs.  
What Ben and Saul describe here are ways the prison produces what many prison 
scholars (e.g. Price; Guenther; Rodriguez; Dayan) call social death, generally defined as the 
social practice of exclusion or domination of a person or a group to the point that their social 
status is radically changed. In her excellent book Solitary Confinement: Social Death and Its 
Afterlives (2013), Lisa Guenther examines not only the mechanisms of alienation that produce 
social death but also the way those exclusions refigure subjectivity for incarcerated people. She 
argues that the production of personhood depends upon a network of various social practices, 
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histories, and imaginaries that extend into the past and future, and the destruction of that 
personhood requires “a whole network of exclusions, interruptions, and violation” (xx). She 
demonstrates the devastating effects of isolation, arguing that “‘becoming unhinged’ is not just a 
colloquial expression; it is a precise phenomenological description of what happens when the 
articulated joints of our embodied, interrelational subjectivity are broken apart” (xii). Though 
neither Ben nor Saul discussed solitary confinement, they certainly experienced alienation from 
the networks that produced and supported their senses of dignified personhood. The “cookie-
cutter” treatment, like prison numbers and uniforms, paired with the constant threat of violence 
and humiliation, work against one’s ability to “hold on.”   
This assertion that subjectivity is “hinged” and interrelational, which provides a basis for 
understanding the violence of alienation and confinement, has resonance with the constellation 
of rhetoricians (e.g. Edbauer; Miller; Graham; Rivers and Weber; Hallenbeck) engaged with 
materialist, networked, ecological, and distributed notions of rhetoric and agency, for whom 
meaning and action emerge in relation to human and nonhuman actors. For example, Thomas 
Rickert’s theory of ambient rhetoric, which, to put it in overly simplified terms, refers to the way 
an environment is not just background to rhetoric but complexly interwoven with it, speaks 
directly to Guenther’s assertion that alienation and sensory deprivation can result in the 
disarticulation of one’s identity. As Rickert puts it, “Human beings are in multifold fashion 
hardwired and ‘softwired’ into each other, making individuation an achievement never fully 
realized, since the affectability already implicit in human being is never lost, shed, or 
abandoned” (161). This suggests that social death is not simply dehumanizing discourses that 
alienate incarcerated people. It is an attunement, a being-(degraded-)in-the-world, or, put 
differently, a becoming-inmate. Thus, the ambient rhetoric of the prison, according Saul and 
57 
 
Ben’s experiences, includes elements such as architectural design, disgusting food, strict habits 
of relations, discourses about incarceration and incarcerated people, and more, but it cannot be 
reduced to a simple aggregation of these elements. Ambient rhetoric names their weaving 
together to produce the conditions of habitation for incarcerated people, that is, how they 
constitute and are constituted by their environment. Here, it is important to note that “the prison” 
as I refer to it is not an autonomous entity exerting violence against incarcerated people, but a 
complex, conflicting network of actors, including the incarcerated people themselves, who may 
contribute in intentional and unintentional ways to the social death of others.  
In Prison and Social Death (2015), Joshua Price suggests that alienation from loved ones 
is perhaps the key element of social death. Alienation creates vulnerability, which creates the 
conditions for both humiliation and institutional violence. It is apparent in my interviews that this 
alienation results in a struggle to maintain hope and humanity, a struggle that is constant and 
conscious. Saul says that for him, the biggest part of that multifaceted struggle is maintaining 
hope that things would get better and that he would make it out of prison “unscathed, you know, 
physically, mentally, emotionally.” And the prison makes this struggle especially difficult by 
creating rifts between incarcerated people and their loved ones. Saul describes once going seven 
years without receiving a visit, as well as long stretches without letters or phone calls. When 
asked why maintaining connections to loved ones is so important, Saul explains, “It’s almost like 
recognition, to realize that someone else sees you, almost like validation that you exist as a 
human being.” And though both men describe a struggle to hold on, to maintain their humanity, 
Ben and Saul describe different consequences for failing to do so. Saul describes loss of 
humanity by offering this story as an example: 
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I’ve seen people lose their humanity and behave as the animals that they were 
thought of and treated as. I’ve seen a guy, close to his out date, stab a guy in the 
neck over an argument about a sandwich. Now you’re not gonna go home for 
another ten years…over a sandwich? You have had to have lost something to be 
able to do that. 
The way Saul frames this story, as an example of a failure to maintain one’s humanity, suggests 
that he believes this is what could have happened to him, had he not worked to hold on to his 
sense of self. In contrast, Ben doesn’t talk about violence, but specifically mentions depression 
multiple times (“If you’re not just completely depressed, you’re having a good day.”), and this 
depression is particularly fueled by guilt and alienation from his family: “Some days you wish 
you’d get a visit and are glad to have it but then it sucks so bad when they leave that you almost 
wish you didn’t get visits.” For Ben, the struggle is against giving in to the despair of those low, 
dark days that come from being alienated from the meaningful network of connections that make 
up his life.  
Both Ben and Saul struggle to maintain a sense of dignity and humanity, and for both, the 
primary way the prison creates the imperative to “maintain that humanity” is through alienation. 
In the section that follows, I investigate this struggle to maintain humanity against social death as 
a vital and often overlooked form of rhetorical action in the lives of incarcerated people. As I 
will show, for Ben and Saul, the agency that emerges in prison classrooms depends upon and 
bolsters this fundamental form of rhetorical action. 
Resilient Dwelling and Love-Rhetoric  
 He never gushes, but Saul does believe his experience with the college program was 
important, just perhaps not in terms of course materials or activities. He tells me that having 
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taken college classes in prison doesn’t do much for him in any immediate material sense. It 
hasn’t helped him to secure employment, and it didn’t carry any social currency within the 
prison. But the quality of interactions he had in the college program, the mutual recognition and 
respect, mattered. “It increased my ability to withstand all of the negative treatment. It’s like, I 
remember that I’m a human, and as a human, I deserve to live.” Saul goes on to define “living” 
in this way: 
 [As] long as I keep living, that’s the priority, that’s most important […] Living is 
surrounding yourself with people you love, people you care about, laughing, 
eating good food, and assisting those people who need assistance, you know what 
I mean? It can manifest in a multitude of ways, but just being willing to help 
someone else. Because at the end of the day, I ask myself, can I really be ok if my 
neighbor isn’t?  
 Here, Saul defines living, the thing that is most important to him, primarily as a practice 
of relating to other people, especially through service to those who are in need. He didn’t learn 
this from the college program; Saul was only in the program for one year, and his narrative is full 
of examples of how he put this philosophy into practice long before he entered the program, 
including teaching cellmates to read by helping them to read letters from home. Saul and Ben, 
along with millions of other formerly incarcerated people, managed not to identify with the 
image they felt the prison defined them as, the dehumanized figure of the delinquent (Foucault). 
They both see themselves as people who came home with their humanity, perhaps not unscathed, 
but intact. This suggests a kind of rhetorical agency at play, one that pre-exists and exceeds the 
prison classroom. If incarcerated people are engaged daily in a conscious and constant struggle 
to maintain their sense of humanity and dignity, as my interviews suggest, then any conversation 
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about what prison education and literate practice do in terms of increased agency for incarcerated 
students’ needs to be viewed in the context not only of the seemingly monolithic authority of 
prison policy, but also the everyday lives of the students.  
What Saul calls “living,” the struggle to make prison habitable and to negotiate a 
complex, affirmative personhood is what I, again drawing from Thomas Rickert (2013), call 
resilient dwelling. Rickert, who takes up the concept from Heidegger, defines dwelling refers as 
“how people come together to flourish (or try to flourish) in a place, or better, how they come 
together in the continual making of a place; at the same time, that place is interwoven into the 
way they have come to be as they are” (xiii). In other words, it names the dispersed nature of 
agency across an assemblage of actors that brings forth the conditions of possibility for being. 
For Rickert, Heidegger is a bit too persnickety in his treatment of dwelling, with his nostalgic 
complaints about modern city life. Instead, he urges against privileging the provincial. “Despite 
much of what Heidegger himself might say, dwelling is possible anywhere, in the city or even in 
a digital or other realm that challenges current conceptions of ‘whereness’” (248, author’s 
emphasis).  
While Rickert’s update of Heidegger’s concept pushes dwelling beyond the idyllic and 
nostalgic, his framing does not suggest how dwelling might be possible in inherently violent 
spaces designed for systemic control, discipline, and oppression. The prison is not intended for 
flourishing. If dwelling is the fundamental core of thriving human being-in-the-world, how might 
dwelling be possible in such a place? That dwelling would be, I believe, of a quality that is not at 
odds with Rickert’s definition, but may not fit easily with the largely halcyon language used to 
describe the concept. Resilient dwelling is my attempt to articulate the unique quality of dwelling 
under duress, a simultaneous attunement to both the immediate environment of the prison, 
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including one’s own body, and imagined or invoked environments, like home, school, or the 
street.  It isn’t simply ignoring the reality of incarceration. As my research participants 
repeatedly remind me, forgetting where you are is profoundly dangerous.  
In the context of the prison, resilient dwelling names not out-and-out resistance to prison 
policy or staff, nor is it a social movement against the prison-industrial complex. My focus is not 
the kinds of rhetorical action that create possibilities for change in systems of oppression that 
support the carceral state, but the ways people create meaningful lives in spite of daily denial of 
their humanity or, as Ralph Cintron (1997) has put it, how they “create respect under conditions 
of little or no respect” (x). It is a way of life that is tactical, in Certeau’s (1984) sense of the 
word, in that it refers to creative, kairotic acts of resistance by people who are trying to build 
something more meaningful and sustaining than bare life, including a self-concept that is more 
complex and more affirming than what the prison tells them they are. Flynn, Sotirin, and Brady, 
in the introduction to Feminist Rhetorical Resilience (2012), define resilience as a communal, 
relational, and social rhetorical response with transformative potential: “For us, resilience is not a 
state of being but a process of rhetorically engaging with material circumstances and situational 
exigencies” (7). Its aim is not a change in circumstances, but “in the way a life is lived” (7). 
Rachel Wolford (2016) argues that resilience is an important component of diachronic rhetorical 
agency, which is “both a strategy for survival and a principle for living with long-term hope” 
(11).  As these scholars show, resilience is not a personal quality but a relational rhetorical tactic. 
In this article, I explore the ways this rhetorical resilience is enacted in order to create a habitable 
way of life in the narratives of Ben and Saul.  
And resilient dwelling is not a triumphant notion. It is not a permanent solution to 
oppression or suffering. Rather, it names the way, a life is lived, fleetingly, against social death. 
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In my conversations with Ben and Saul, they both describe a conscious decision to “hold on,” 
“maintain humanity,” and “stay human.” Saul explains it this way: 
It’s definitely a conscious choice to accept or to embrace yourself. Because if you 
want more, if you want to maintain that humanity, you want to be more than the 
prison number, […] you have to hold onto that. […]  At your core, you have to 
hold on to your desire to be seen and treated and recognized as a human being to 
keep from losing it […] Because I lost, you know, there were pieces chipped 
away over the years, but I held onto enough of it. So, that, along with the 
encouragement of some of the guys I grew to, you know, love and respect in 
there.  
Saul asserts that that recognition must be reciprocal. He tells me that, while he was unwilling to 
put himself out for people who were unwilling to help themselves, he always believed strongly in 
“being even with everyone, allowing them to feel like there’s a place for them,” and showing 
them that they don’t deserve to be mistreated.  
The importance of recognition, of being treated with dignity and respect, which resonates 
in Rickert, Guenther, Price, and across my interviews, suggests that one of the most crucial 
aspect of resilient dwelling is love. Jenkins and Cisneros (2013) define love-rhetoric not so much 
as a feeling of affection but as a form of communicative and constitutive labor: “contingent 
actions that are constitutive of subjectivities, affects, and connection” (96). Like rhetoric, love is 
a labor that must be remade on a daily basis and is intrinsic to social connection and thus, too, to 
subjectivity. In the narratives of Ben and Saul, resilient dwelling refers to building loving 
connections, practices, and identities, even imaginary ones, in a violent, hypermasculine 
environment where love is dangerous, difficult, and even criminalized. 
63 
 
Though Saul acknowledges the mostly emotional (and sometimes physical) risk of care, 
hope, and vulnerability in prison, he underscores the importance of forming loving relationships 
with “positive” people inside of the prison in order to survive. He describes these people as the 
ones who would actively try to “keep you afloat” by asking how he was doing, giving 
encouragement, and even setting aside a few dollars for him to buy ramen if he needed it. 
They’re the ones who would try to intervene to keep him from hurting himself when he was “in a 
mood.” Ben also spoke of the enduring importance of these friendships, even now that he’s 
home: 
I try to stay in touch with them now. I’m not supposed to, because I’m not 
supposed to write them, I’m not supposed to nothing4 […] I try to talk to [one 
particular friend] every day. At least say hey, how are you, I’m thinking of you, is 
everything ok. One of them I hadn’t heard from for a couple weeks and I’m 
getting kinda worried about him, like, uh, I hope he didn’t get in trouble. But then 
I heard from him today and so I feel better. 
Reflected in this passage is the way loving, supportive connection between (formerly) 
incarcerated people is not just risky in terms of one’s vulnerability to other incarcerated people, 
but also because prison policy prohibits certain forms of communication between these 
individuals.  
While prison literacy scholars have focused on the prison classroom as a space that 
creates rhetorical possibility through reflection, expression, and collaboration, my conversations 
with formerly incarcerated people reveal something a little more complicated. What I want to 
suggest is that what makes writing and higher education so vitally important for incarcerated 
students is not that prison classrooms offer an opportunity to express oneself and collaborate 
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with others in a (relatively) safe space (though at their best, they do), but that the prison 
classroom and its attendant actions and agencies support the everyday tactical struggle to build a 
resilient dwelling through loving connections. In the narratives of both Saul and Ben, higher 
education and even academic writing are means through which supportive, caring relationships 
are built, expressed, and maintained. 
 Saul tells me he first started taking college classes just to get off the wing, to help break 
up the day, and he doesn’t ascribe much value to those community college courses. He felt they 
weren’t challenging enough and that the instructors were not invested in his learning. So why did 
he go out of his way to join that higher education in prison program in his final year of 
incarceration, a time that can be particularly stressful? He says that he decided to join the 
program after he was “brow-beat” by other students in the program. When I asked why they 
were brow-beating him, he said, “It’s that whole notion of being around people for so long, some 
of those people you get close to. And it’s like, ok, we’ve been cool for over a decade, you know, 
I wanna see you do something good. There’s something good over here, you should try that out.” 
And those caring relationships, which found expression in part through the college program, had 
profound importance in Saul’s life, providing him a sense of recognition as well as an arena in 
which to recognize others.  
Creating positive relationships in prison classrooms is taken up by Cavallaro et al. in their 
assertion that collaboration acts as an intervention in the rigid hierarchical operations of the 
prison, an intervention that is “hugely subversive, potentially offering our students a sense of 
agency in an environment that is designed to deny it to them” (par. 22). Rob Garite, one of the 
article’s co-authors and an alum of the University of Illinois’s Education Justice Project, 
develops the concept of the Carceral Communication Framework (CCF), which names the 
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assemblage of prison policies and practices that create stringent, narrow channels of 
communication “that are manufactured to isolate, silence, and contain” (par. 3). Garite explains 
that the CCF divides incarcerated people from one another and affects the ways they “come to 
know themselves and relate to the world. This self-knowledge includes the internalization of 
oneself as a criminal in need of reform and the acceptance of loss of liberty due to incarceration” 
(par. 23). However, their framing privileges the importance of collaboration inside the prison 
classroom, whereas my research participants spoke at length about their collaborations outside of 
the classroom. My interviews indicate that, despite their considerable efforts, prison 
administrators and staff have not, in fact, secured “absolute control over rhetorical practices that 
occur within carceral space” (par. 25). Collaboration and critique receive some institutional 
cover when it is implemented as pedagogical activities, and this is no small thing, but the 
classroom is not the only place where collaboration happens in a prison. I do not mean to refute 
the assertion that organized collaboration in prison classrooms creates new possibilities for 
rhetorical action. But as I have been arguing all along, rhetorical agency is severely limited but 
not foreclosed by the prison, and it is important to recognize the ways incarcerated people are 
already engaging in tactical resistance if we are to understand the impact of higher education in 
the lives of incarcerated students.   
Writing as a Practice of Relating 
 Ben says he wishes he could write. He wants to write fiction, though he’s intimidated by 
character development, plots, subplots, all the constitutive parts of a story. In fact, his first 
experience with the college program was through a non-accredited craft of fiction course. But for 
Ben, writing in his everyday life was important for crafting and maintaining meaningful 
relationships before he took any college classes. Probably the most important example is his 
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relationship to his girlfriend. They were arrested together, and because they weren’t married, 
they weren’t permitted to be in contact while they were both incarcerated. Ben describes keeping 
a notebook where he wrote to her, not every day, but a couple times every week until she was 
released, about a year before him. When she got out, he sent her the letters he’d written in the 
notebook, one by one, and he began receiving letters that she had been writing to him all along. I 
asked Ben what that was like, trying to not only maintain a long-distance relationship through 
writing, but to have that long delay between the writing and the receiving: 
I think a lot of it goes on faith that it’s still there […] And both of us, probably at 
about the same time, wrote things like, well, I don’t know if you’ll ever get these 
or if you’ll even still be there at the end of all this. But I think both of us wrote 
that we were writing just as much for ourselves as for the other person. I wrote to 
her because I needed to, I needed to, even though she wasn’t getting it and I didn’t 
know if she ever would get it. I needed to write for me because it made me feel 
like I was still in touch with her […] So, yeah, I think if it hadn’t been for writing, 
I think I probably would have lost my mind, probably, a lot of times. 
Here, writing acts as a medium through which a relationship is enacted, but not necessarily 
through its communicative function, but through its asignifying operation (Davis; Muckelbauer), 
that is, writing not to produce meaning and understanding, but to perform a constitutive relation 
between lovers, though the arena of the relationship is internal. Practicing this imagined 
connection, he believes, keeps him from “losing his mind.” By maintaining that connection in 
the face of prison policy that creates rifts between loved ones, Ben describes having been able to 
put into practice not only his romantic relationship, but also a sense of self that depends on the 
recognition and love of another, even if that person is absent.  
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In “An Attempt at a ‘Practitioner’s Manifesto,’” Casey Boyle (2015) asks, “How might 
writing be understood as a practice of relating?” (210)  He suggests that, rather than the 
reflective, “purifying process” that much of composition studies takes writing to be, Latour’s use 
of notebooks for producing “risky accounts” offers an alternative conception of writing as 
“something done with practice” wherein accounts are multiplied and versions (of subjectivity, of 
relating, of ontological politics) are practiced. In the way Ben describes his own notebook, then, 
I see Ben practicing, as Boyle puts it, “sensitivities for cohabitation” (216), a loving relation that 
is constitutive and a crucial component of his resilient dwelling.  
But for composition scholars, what might be most remarkable is Ben’s description of his 
academic writing practice and the role of mutually supportive friendship in that endeavor. He 
tells me that he and his friends would workshop each other’s papers and encourage each other all 
the time, not because they were required to by the instructor, but because they wanted to help 
each other succeed.  
First off, we were all so proud of ourselves for getting in. And then you’re proud 
of your buddy for getting in. You’re proud of him because he got an A on his 
paper or you’re proud of him because he got a C and then we get to do a revision 
and he brought his up from a C to an A-. […] Which is, you were talking earlier 
about how you stay human? That’s part of it, is you have people you care about 
and you have to feel that you’ve got people that care about you. Or else you can 
just go into a really dark place that’s not a very fun place to live.  
Workshopping their papers and encouraging each other in their academic pursuits, then, became 
another way for Ben and his friends to practice recognition. In practicing habits of the academy, 
they also practice love-rhetoric. Matthew Heard (2014) urges composition scholars to attend to 
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the affective dimension of sharing in writing classes, arguing the intimacy and vulnerability of 
sharing affects the experience of writing and the ways students, in Boyle’s terms, practice ways 
of relating through writing. Heard proposes that we “try beginning from the assumption that 
sharing is an act of cleaving, an act that can create room for writers to change their habits in 
response to the potentially jarring and disruptive consequences of contact” (par. 24, emphasis in 
original). Heard is concerned primarily with the way sharing is framed and practiced in 
composition instruction, but his work gestures to the ways Ben and other incarcerated students, 
in making themselves voluntarily vulnerable to each other, contribute to the conditions of 
possibility for resisting social death through affirmation and care.  The practices of revising his 
college essays and of creating positive, loving relationships are inextricably entwined. 
 Friendships were not the only relationship in which the practice of academic writing 
played a role for Ben. The very first thing Ben told me, when I asked him to tell me a little about 
himself, is that he’s a father. His kids, three daughters and a son, come up repeatedly in our 
conversation, and every time, his guilt is palpable. When he describes how his experience in 
prison this time was different from the first time, he says: 
I’ve got my kids and I’m anxious to get out and spend time with my kids and 
watch my grandkids grow up and do this and do that, but I know how much easier 
it would be if I didn’t. Because I feel so bad. Cause they’re like, Dad, not again. 
And I’m missing so many things, and I know that it just tears them up. 
Ben struggled with how to be a father from prison. He tells me you don’t really get to parent 
when you’re incarcerated. He felt that he had lost the moral authority to tell his kids what they 
could and couldn’t do, and while he wanted to be there for his kids and offer support, for the 
most part, he felt they weren’t interested in receiving it. But he did have a good relationship with 
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his oldest daughter, who decided to make the effort to stay in touch with him over email and the 
phone during his last bit. She graduated recently with a degree in journalism and was the first 
person in her branch of the family to go to college. Her support and encouragement played an 
important role in Ben’s decision to apply for the college program. He tells me that they would 
talk about school often because it was something they had in common. When he was deciding 
whether to apply for the program, she encouraged him to apply, saying she would feel better 
telling people her father was going to college than telling them, “oh, my dad cuts grass at the 
prison.” And, like his relationships with his friends, academic writing plays a role in the 
relationship he works to maintain with her.  
I used to think when I was in high school or whatever that I can write. I can spell. 
And I know what a paragraph is, and I know what a sentence is. I know where to 
put a period, and I know what an exclamation point means, and I don’t always 
know where to put a comma, but I know kinda what they represent and 
everything. So, what’s the big deal on it? But then we started writing our papers 
and I start using transitions and all that kinda thing, you know? So then, even 
when I would write emails to my oldest daughter, I would practice my writing 
with her. I’d try to make everything proper and correct, and I would practice my 
stylistic stuff on her, and I would practice using transitions. I would just practice 
my writing in writing letters, which, I think amused her. 
 Ben says one of the most valuable things he got from his experience with the college 
program was confidence, because he wasn’t sure he was smart enough to be successful in an 
academic program. Even when he was getting A’s, he questioned his ability, and he turned to the 
authority of his daughter for her honest opinion. He describes the way she put him at ease 
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reporting that she had seen worse papers get the grades he was getting and assuring him he 
wasn’t a bad writer. Though Ben was uncomfortable assuming the role of authoritative father 
from prison, he used the practice of and discourse around academic writing to connect with his 
daughter through a common experience in which she is clearly the authority. 
 Saul, on the other hand, doesn’t talk much about academic writing, and when he does, his 
view is a bit more cynical: 
You present me with information, and you ask me to critique the information in 
such a manner. And I go back to the cell, I write a paper, and I give it to you for 
your critique of my opinion of the information that you presented to me. You 
know? What is that? Outside of, you know, all the things that orbit that, which is 
your desire for me to look beyond the experiences I’ve had before this program, 
and attempt to express myself in a manner of total openness and without fear of 
retribution for expressing whatever opinion it is I have.  
For Saul, then, it isn’t the course material or the assignments themselves that have significant 
value, but “all that orbited it,” which was the quality of interactions in the classroom, the 
reciprocal recognition of humanity, and his belief that the instructors wanted him to express 
himself without fear. Though he is a bit dismissive of the practice of academic writing, Saul 
places great value in the asignifying, affective aspects of his courses, which orbit the writing.   
Conclusion 
When advocating for marginalized students, we must be thoughtful about the ways we 
frame agency to avoid rendering those students passive recipients of the predefined benefits of 
writing instruction. This is not merely a matter of how incarcerated students are represented, but 
a matter of generating greater understanding about how rhetorical agency emerges and circulates. 
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Writing Studies needs more stories that move beyond the privileged spaces and practices of our 
discipline, stories that can bring clarity about the sometimes beautiful, sometimes troubling, 
always messy and relational ways people make meaning, especially as it relates back to those 
privileged classroom practices. Paul Lynch (2012) similarly advocates that compositionists 
concern themselves not only with giving students voice or agency, but also with bringing more 
things and voices and accounts into what constitutes Composition. In this article, I have offered 
new stories about resilient rhetorical action and new perspectives on the relationship between 
writing instruction, rhetorical agency, and survival. In response to Ben and Saul’s stories, I 
suggest that the role of higher education in their lives is less about rhetorical agency that 
originates in reflection, self-expression, collaboration, and critique in the classroom than it is a 
matter of providing institutional cover for agential action that is already being practiced and 
providing an arena for those actions to multiply, intensify, entangle, and develop in new ways. 
As composition practitioners attempt to theorize the rhetorical, agential possibilities for writing 
instruction for marginalized people, we must not occlude the fact that these individuals are 
already agents. This rhetorical agency, while deceptively simple, is rhetoric at its most 
fundamental, illustrating an elemental affectability and relationality, as well as a tenacious will to 
survive.  These students are building in fits and starts resilient dwellings. Without romanticizing, 
without becoming complacent to oppression, we must recognize that they practice in innovative, 
risky, kairotic maneuvers a habitable being-in-the-world. They cultivate loving connections in 
their everyday lives. They craft lives that matter, even if only in imagined ways, even if only to 
themselves.  
In several of Ben and Saul’s most important relationships, they used the college program 
and writing to create loving, constitutive connections in their lives, to build resilient dwellings in 
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a place that could have crushed them. But higher education is not the only basis of these 
relationships, or even necessarily the most important one. I asked Ben, when he told me about 
practicing his academic writing with his daughter, if he ever used the notebook he kept for his 
girlfriend for that purpose. He smiled: 
No. Because I tried to give all that time to [her]. And so, I just let everything else 
go, and this was just all hers. I didn’t want her thinking I was thinking about 
something else at the same time. So, I didn’t really try to practice it there, just 
because it became a free-for-all, just to let her know that, you didn’t hear from 






A Shiny Thing in a Gray Place: Education and Metanoic Movement 
 
The terror of the prison regime is its mundane rendering of the anomalous into the everyday. State power, 
according to Ray Luc Levasseur, works within the temporal logic of endless sameness—a grinding 
repetition of motion, sound, and vision that convinces the imprisoned that their very subjectivity is in 
question – Dylan Rodriguez, Forced Passages 
 
I think a lot of people are just like me as far as not seeing—our futures are very linear. When we’re out 
there committing crimes and stuff, we of course envision the rest of our lives doing that. I mean it’s not 
very realistic for us to believe that we can do other things […] And education, you know, once it gives 
you those tools of self-belief, you do see other possibilities. You see a very panoramic view of your 
future. And not only that, but you have this belief in yourself that you can go out and be part of that. And 
that’s amazing, compared to that little small razor of a life that you had thought you’d be able to live 
beforehand.—Clay 
 
At the time of our interview, Francisco had just finished teaching his ESL course at the 
community center where we met. It was the last class session with this group, and in fact, it was 
Francisco’s last class for the foreseeable future. He had recently been told that if he wanted to 
continue teaching, he would need to complete his bachelor’s degree, so his plan was to enroll at a 
local university in the large Midwestern city where he lives and get whatever degree would be 
quickest to complete. It was June when we met, so he said he’d need to get some kind of job 
immediately, then start school in August. Despite the significant upheaval and immediate 
uncertainty in his life, Francisco seemed to be in good spirits, and there was no question that his 
life seemed to have a forward momentum that is so difficult to achieve after prison, especially 
for someone who had been out for less than a year. During our conversation, Francisco seemed 
to anticipate my questions about just how, exactly, he was so buoyant.  
Francisco: It’s funny that you say, how did you come out of prison not…fucked 
up, basically. 
  Maggie: That’s basically what I’m asking. 
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Francisco: It’s funny because, like I was kind of mad. For a while I was mad. And 
I was like, what am I gonna do when I get out? I know that in order not to come 
back to prison you have to be like this, you have to be like that, you can’t do 
certain things, but then I was conflicted because I was like, when I get out, if I’m 
this person who people say, like, wow, look at Francisco, then they would credit 
prison. I had a hard time with that. And I was mad, I was like people are gonna 
say, well, he went to prison so now he’s like this, but I am the person I am despite 
being in prison for twenty years, not because of it. 
In other words, Francisco was frustrated by the realization that, if he were to be a law-abiding, 
successful person upon his release, people would assume it was because prison had been a 
positive experience for him, providing the kind of rehabilitation that the penitentiary was 
designed to compel. That the prison, of all things, might get credit for his own hard work was 
frustrating enough that Francisco seems to question whether it is even worth it to be a law-
abiding citizen at all.  
 Rather than the rehabilitative ideal, Francisco’s experience echoes the literature about 
American penology in the age of hyperincarceration. 
It warehoused me. It kept me there. That’s all it did. And that’s when I realized 
early on, that I was just sitting there. I used to say to myself that I’m on pause. 
Like someone hit the pause button on me. I can’t do anything, and I’m watching 
everything else happen, like my sisters grow up, my parents get older, this is 
happening, and I wasn’t able to do anything. At times, I wasn’t able to go to 
school, I wasn’t able to work, I was just eating, showering, and sleeping. That’s, 
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like, the life for periods of time. So you’re not really living, you’re just existing, 
you’re just there. 
This description of time-out-of-time, of one’s sentence as something apart from one’s 
real life, raises questions for me about the way time is experienced in prison, and the relation of 
time to one’s identity in the sense of change or growth over the course of one’s life, especially 
when a great deal of that life is spent behind bars. In this chapter, I argue that an important 
component of my research participants’ resilient dwelling is the management of prison time and 
its effects on their identity. Their experience of time, both the phenomenological experience of 
the passage of time and the projection into the past and future that constitutes one’s narrativized 
identity, is a crucial aspect of the ambient rhetoric and dehumanization of the prison. Here I 
engage with metanoia, which refers to transformative potential in feelings of regret, as a focal 
concept, to show that my research participants’ participation in with college in prison programs 
became a way to generate positive affects and exert some control over their experience of time. 
By introducing new experiences and ways of being, college in prison programs contribute to the 
conditions under which new future imaginaries and aspirational identities can be constructed. 
Prison Time 
It's difficult to overstate the salience of time in prison. As Foucault (1995) has argued in 
Discipline and Punish, the regimented control of incarcerated people’s time is an important 
mechanism of control within the prison. Time passes, for the most part, in predictable monotony, 
and one has very little autonomy in determining how one’s days, weeks, and years will unfold. 
Perhaps more than violence, my research participants describe boredom as the biggest threat in 
their everyday lives.  
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 In his study of the phenomenology of prison life, Thomas Meisenhelder (1985) argues 
that in the modified life-world of the prison, time takes on an important salience. Here, time is a 
problem to be addressed. One’s sentence “hangs ominously over every prison experience. Every 
action is affected by the ubiquitous sense of having to wait for world time to pass so that one can 
finally return to the ‘outside’” (44). This split between “prison time” and “world time” is an 
important point to understand, and it recalls Francisco’s feeling that his life was “on pause.” 
Time was passing, but it was not his life. Those twenty years of his life, as he saw it, were gone, 
paid against his debt to society. While in prison, he was waiting for the time to pass so that he 
might be reunited with his life. In the meantime, he watched, detached, as time progressed for 
those he loved.   
 This is not to say that Francisco’s experience is as universal as Meisenhelder might seem 
to suggest. Mark, for example, thought about his time very differently. Incarcerated at 19, he 
describes that teenage version of himself repeatedly as a “homeless drug addict who burned all 
his bridges.” In marked contrast to Francisco, Mark does not describe his life as being on pause, 
nor does he describe watching as the lives of his loved ones progressed. Rather than partitioning 
his sentence from his life, Mark felt strongly that the twelve years he spent in prison was part of 
his life: 
I had kinda family, but I burned all my bridges. Homeless drug addicts tend to 
burn bridges. And, no problem. This is where I live now. I was already hanging 
out with longtermers, I live here now, right? All the outside world becomes an 
abstract idea and all this becomes the clear picture I’m looking at. 
Rather than feeling left behind, Mark describes leaning into his new home and life. But 
Meisenhelder also suggests that this might be a strategy for coping with the unbearable burden of 
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prison time. And this introduces a second important aspect of prison time, the way that prison 
life produces futurelessness.  
Meisenhelder, drawing on the work of Husserl and Heidegger, argues that human being is 
“temporally structured through and as a casting of oneself toward the future” (42). But one of the 
ways that the prison produces a distorted life-world is by degrading incarcerated people’s ability 
to attain or imagine a viable future. This futurelessness is created in part by the unthinkability of 
the future for incarcerated people, for looking toward one’s life in the free world just makes time 
inside the prison pass more slowly, making one’s sentence that much more difficult. Further, 
Mesenhelder suggests that there may be a psychological withdrawal from a future that is 
uncertain or unavailable. “Even if the [incarcerated person] has conventional goals for his life, he 
may reasonably conclude that there exists no connection between his present situation and those 
future goals outside the prison” (46). So, by detaching oneself from the outside world, 
incarcerated people find some relief from “watched pot syndrome.” Mark speaks to this directly: 
That’s why people have a hard time doing time, because they’re trying to live out 
there like they were, and they can’t. They can’t no matter how hard they try, and I 
came to that realization pretty quick. I don’t live out there anymore. By choices I 
made and now the actions taken upon me, I don’t live there anymore. The big T in 
my life is that I live here now. 
While their experiences are all different, several of my research participants share some version 
of this strategy in their stories. When Francisco first got to prison, a maximum-security facility, 
he had already decided he wanted to get his GED. While in the county jail, he had taken the Test 
of Adult Basic Education and scored a 12.9, the highest possible score. A GED teacher had told 
him that because of his score, he might be able to just take the GED test without taking the 
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classes. This bit of academic success was encouraging, but then he was transferred to prison, and 
his plans were interrupted. Upon arriving at the maximum-security prison, he shared his plans 
with another incarcerated man.  
Basically, everybody told me there, what do you wanna go to school for? And I 
was like, well, I wanna get my GED. And they’re like, what for? Like, what’s it 
gonna do for you in here? It’s not gonna help you fight better, it’s not gonna get 
you bigger or stronger, that’s not gonna help you. You should go to the yard and 
lift weights. And at that age, I was like, hmmm. Maybe they’re right. Maybe I 
should start going to the yard and lifting weights, and that’s what I started to do. 
Because at that point, education becomes something that, you don’t see any 
benefit in it at that point, you know? You have to be in prison for twenty years, 
you’re like, yeah, what is a GED or college diploma gonna do for me in here? I 
have to make sure I get out of here first, I survive, so I need to invest my time in 
what’s gonna help me make it out that door. 
Though education and exercise both present opportunities to make time pass, education’s value 
is in a distant and uncertain future, and like Mark, Francisco makes the choice to focus on the 
immediate present of his life’s circumstance. Without a meaningful connection to a future in the 
real world, investment in a future-oriented pursuit like education becomes meaningless. David 
shares a similar perspective: 
Seeing my family, that’s cool, but I’m thinking of myself. I’m doing time. I need 
to survive. I gotta do what I have to do. I look at it like, it could have been worse, 
because of the stuff I’ve seen, a lot of people had it worse. Plus, I could hold my 
own. I’m not saying I’m Billy Badass, but you do your time like a man, people 
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will treat you like a man. Even though I was young, I’m still a man. I always had 
a way to stand on my own. That’s what I mean by being a man. Not showing 
weakness, because people exploit that. 
Here, David equates one’s ability to survive in a violent environment with little support from the 
outside with manhood. He contrasts this with people he would hear on the phone, begging their 
mothers, girlfriends, or wives to send money for commissary. While these stories are useful in 
that they clearly demonstrate a choice to momentarily abandon future-oriented activity, it would 
be a mistake to overly moralize this choice, or to assume that there is a clear distinction between 
the choice to educate oneself, among other productive and positive ways to pass the time, and the 
choice to pass time in more present- and prison-oriented endeavors. Clay, for example, began 
taking college courses early in his sentence, before the Pell grant was taken in 1994, but, as he 
put it, “even though I was doing positive things, I was doing negative things too. I was selling 
dope, I was doing dope, I was making shanks and selling them, running gambling parlays, 
running stores, loan sharking, all this stuff.” He does describe this as “living a paradox,” which 
became difficult for him to manage. Everyone in prison is finding ways to manage the relentless 
awareness of time. Mark describes in terms of quantity, saying, “There’s a lot of time in there, 
and you can occupy it however you like.” He goes on to say that most people occupy time by 
wasting it and with finding ways to negotiate a way of life within a total institution. 
“Everything’s against the rules, and most people try to find the rules they can break and still be 
ok.” 
 When Mark was first incarcerated, he started writing poems, not frequently, but 
occasionally. At first, he describes it as a way to pass time when there was nothing else to do, 
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when there was nothing to read or nothing good on TV and no one to talk to. But then, in 
addition to this explanation, he offers this insight: 
You’re changing a lot sometimes. So sometimes it’s uncomfortable? Sometimes 
you need to get something out but you don’t have anyone to talk to. So maybe 
you’ll write something down, talking about what’s hard. Sometimes you don’t 
have any other outlet for all the societal changes, all the emotional changes. You 
just went through this thing where, like, my mom was crying at this jury trial and 
now I’m in prison and now I gotta deal with it. I can’t talk to my family. What am 
I gonna do about it? I’m gonna internalize it, maybe act bad, or—you’ll see, 
there’s a lot of big dudes that you wouldn’t even imagine has a whole secret stash 
of writings that they’ve written. It’s very emotional shit, and they’re not gonna let 
anybody ever—they’ll burn ‘em as soon as they get the chance. But it’s an outlet, 
you know? Even if it’s crappy writing, you have to write it down because a lot 
just happened to you. You’re still human.  
My research participants don’t often address these emotional challenges of incarceration, but 
here Mark is describing not only a way to pass time, but a way to do so that connects him to his 
humanity. Writing presents itself as a way to process the changes in his life, as well as changes in 
himself, in spite of the alienation of incarceration.  
 This prison produces futurelessness in more institutional ways as well. As Foucault, 
Andrew Dilts, and others have argued, the prison produces the figure of the delinquent by 
binding the incarcerated person’s identity to the act for which she is incarcerated, conflating the 
past with the present and foreclosing any future-oriented becoming in which the incarcerated 
person might grow, change, repent, or simply distance herself from that criminalized act. This 
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suspension of time is evident in the labels used to address people with criminal justice 
involvement, such as “offender.” As Meisenhelder puts it, “The prison is built on representations 
of the [incarcerated person’s] past […] And, for the prisoner as for all of us, the past is a world of 
facticity where one exists as an object completely determined by what has been, rather than as a 
subject open to the future. This, it seems, is one important key to the alienating and 
dehumanizing nature of the prison experience” (47). In other words, if projecting into the future 
is a fundamental aspect of human being, then foreclosing one’s future is a significant and 
effective means of dehumanization.  
 Of course, this experience of time is not quite as universal and monolithic as 
Meisenhelder’s treatment might suggest. In my conversations with my research participants, it 
seems that time is experienced differently for people with shorter sentences than those with 
longer sentences, though time certainly presents itself as a problem for anyone “doing time.” It is 
also experienced differently depending on what is going on in a person’s life and at what point 
they are at in their sentence. The closer to the end of the sentence, the slower time moves for 
most people.  
 What I see emerging in Meisenhelder’s work, then, is an articulation of not only the 
synchronic (making time pass) and diachronic (bound to the past and denied a future) problem of 
time in the prison, but as ways these two are connected. In “’It’s No Time or High Time’: Young 
Offenders’ Experiences of Time and Drug Use in Prison,” Nina Cope (2003) argues similarly 
that time is the primary problematic in prison life. She argues that macro changes in time, such 
as changes to work time in late capitalism, influences individual experiences, and she suggests 
that one of the primary contradictions that incarcerated people must learn to manage is 
uncertainty, which is produced by the fact that the prison is only selectively routinized. Some 
82 
 
experiences are predictable while others are uncertain. Her project, like mine, is ultimately 
concerned with the agency of incarcerated people and how they manage and resist the 
debilitating and dehumanizing experience of prison time. Building on Meisenhelder, Cope 
describes “suspending time” as a strategy for manipulating time, in which incarcerated people 
view their time in prison as having no impact whatsoever on their development, maturation, or 
even aging. “Fundamentally, the [incarcerated people] coped with their sentence by creating a 
‘time vacuum’ where the sentence was not part of their lives, but a ‘couple of years off it’” (165). 
Here again, incarcerated people are coping with the futurelessness, the hopelessness of their 
present condition by leaning into it, in order to, paradoxically, make the time move faster in 
order to reach their (uncertain) future freedom more quickly. David’s description of his 
experience in prison is a clear example of this notion of suspended time and the uncertainty of 
the future: 
You do any and everything in front of everybody. You always gotta watch your 
back because there’s no guarantee whether you’re going to come home or you’re 
not, you know? I want to see my people, I have to wait until the weekend on a 
visitation day, if I’m not in trouble. And it’s like, damn, everybody’s different, but 
at the same time, it’s like, shit, you’re just wasting time. I look at it like, from 
seventeen to twenty-three, I missed the best social years of my life, that I gave to 
the penitentiary system. I can’t ever get that back. That’s why I refuse to go back. 
Here, six years of David’s life are considered lost, or, more accurately, given in payment of a 
debt. He experienced those six years, but they are not years of his life.  
 In terms of resilient dwelling, my research participants were finding ways to make time 
pass as well as maintaining a careful, precarious balance of hopefulness.  Saul spoke perhaps the 
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most directly about the need to maintain hope and its connection to identity, while at the same 
time alluding to the dangerousness of allowing oneself to hope too much: 
Because I've seen people who let those things go. I've seen people who—you 
know it's one thing to turn your hope volume down and not expect things to a 
great degree but, at your core you have to hold on to your desire to be seen and 
treated and recognized as a human being to keep from losing it. Because I've seen 
people lose their humanity and behave as the animals that they were thought of 
and treated as, you know what I mean? I've seen a guy close to his out date stab a 
guy in the neck over an argument about a sandwich. Now you're not gonna go 
home for, you know, another ten years...over a sandwich? You have had to have 
lost something to be able to do that.  
For my research participants, a crucial component of their practice of resilience consisted of 
ways of managing the crushing force of prison time, which stretched out ahead of them as a vast 
and unrelenting gray uniformity. They never identified themselves, as the criminal justice system 
did, wholly with the act for which they were incarcerated, nor did they identify too strongly, at 
least at first, with an uncertain and seemingly irrelevant future. However, despite these tactics of 
suspending time, my research participants, especially those who were incarcerated as teenagers 
for long periods of time, did experience changes in their sense of self and in their hopefulness for 
the future. 
Metanoia, Agency, and the Production of Hope 
 One common theme in the narratives of my research participants, especially those who 
were incarcerated for long periods of time, is a kind of turning, a pivot in identification and 
worldview that is either instigated or accelerated by their experience in their college in prison 
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programs. This shift creates and is created by a change in the way they experience and think 
about time in their everyday life, as well as higher level changes in the way they come to view 
the projection of their identities back toward the past and into the future, resulting in the 
production and transmission of hope  
This pivot can perhaps be best explicated through the rhetorical concept of metanoia, 
especially as theorized by Kelly A. Myers (2011). Less utilized in rhetorical studies than its 
partner concept, kairos, metanoia is traditionally understood as the regret or repentance that 
results from the missed opportunity, the failure to seize the kairotic moment, “the price that must 
be paid when a moment is seized incorrectly” (“Transformation” 4). But as Myers argues, 
metanoia has as much to offer theorizations of agency and rhetorical action as its more 
ubiquitous partner. Rather than a regret that paralyzes, metanoia is productive in Myers’s 
formulation. Connected to but distinct from kairos, metanoia is an affective dimension that leads 
to internal transformation. The scale of transformation varies from minor changes in opinion to 
major conversions of belief, which often results in new action (2). 
It would be an oversimplification to conflate metanoia with regret, however. For Myers, 
reflection is a critical component without which metanoia cannot exist. Regret in and of itself 
does not produce change. It is only through reflection on the scene of regret that one can arrive at 
new knowledge. “Such reflection often brings an emotional response, such as the regret of a 
failed attempt or the guilt associated with a poor decision, but regret and guilt are only part of the 
overall experience of metanoia. In fact, in metanoia the emotional response that comes with 
reflection is often a motivating force that leads to a transformation” (8). Not merely a function of 
intellection, metanoia is “a change of mind and heart” (8, emphasis in original).  
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Myers’s formulation of metanoia is useful for understanding the way my research 
participants produce new identifications and affects in relation to their pasts and futures, as well 
as the way future-orientation becomes possible for them despite the prison’s production of 
futurelessness, and this is a crucial piece in understand the rhetorical action of incarcerated 
college students. However, Myers’s formulation of metanoia is deeply invested in an 
autonomous subject and humanist notions of agency. As Myers’s explains, metanoia requires 
that action be taken. “In other words, for the internal transformation of metanoia to become 
external, a person must make choices—and those decisive moments are kairos” (10). While this 
conception of individual agency through taking direct, decisive action after a period of reflection 
is certainly observable, I want to make space for a more distributed, nonrational, and 
posthumanist conception of metanoia, one that better accounts for the way the elements of belief, 
affect, regret, and transformation work in my participants’ narratives to produce a change.  
I am also acutely aware of the fact that this concept of metanoia maps easily onto the 
rehabilitative ideal and the correctional ideology that gave rise to the penitentiary in the first 
place. The emphasis on individual agency echoes the emphasis on personal accountability that 
pervades the criminal justice system. Several of my participants spoke passionately and at length 
about the problems with the prison system, such as how Francisco described the internal conflict 
he experienced related to his personal growth and potential future success, insisting that he is this 
way not because of prison, but in spite of it. Clay says the prison is indicative of a “give-up 
mentality,” especially when minors are tried and sentenced as adults. I do not mean to suggest 
that personal accountability does not have an important role to play in the way we think about 
and address social harms, but the view that criminalized activity is engaged in due to internal 
deficits and corruptions in the individual, which can be address through reflection, penitence, and 
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rehabilitative programming, ignores the larger, systemic, and historical forms of violence that 
also contribute to criminalized action. Further, it would be a mistake to assume that the changes 
experienced by my research participants support the notion that prisons can successfully 
rehabilitate incarcerated individuals. 
 The temporal and affective components of metanoia seem clear, as it is propelled by 
feelings of regret over past actions, but what seems to follow from Myers’s formulation is that 
metanoia is essentially future-oriented, and I suggest that an equally crucial affective component 
is hope. As Ben Anderson (2006) puts it in his theory of affect, because hope anticipates the not-
yet become, it “enacts a future as open to difference” (734), while at the same time revealing the 
present to be unfixed and partial. But Anderson’s project is less interested in defining hope than 
in understanding how it emerges. Taking an affect theory approach, he argues that becoming 
hopeful involves transindividual affectivities that change capacities to affect and be affected, 
creating a sort of will to live (743). He writes, “Hopefulness, therefore, exemplifies a disposition 
that provides a dynamic imperative to action in that in enables bodies to go on. As a positive 
change in the passage of affect it opens the space-time that it emerges from to a renewed feeling 
of possibility: this is a translation into the body of the affects that move between people in 
processes of intersubjective transmission to make a ‘space of hope.’ Feeling hopeful, in this case, 
is characterized by a yearning to live and to experiment as part of the tendency without end that 
is set in motion as one effect of what Bloch (1986) terms a transpersonal ‘hope that hopes’” (744 
emphasis in original). In other words, hope is an affective response that emerges in the relation 
of bodies (not necessarily human or intentional) that results in a feeling of possibility that things 
might change, and that this future is worth sticking around for. In his conversation with Mary 
Zournazi, Michael Taussig (2002) similarly posits hope as a kind of “subliminal sense,” 
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something akin to the sense of hearing or smell, but unconscious. Both Anderson and Taussig 
seem to be gesturing toward the notion that hope, rather than being one among many emotions, is 
in fact a kind of ur-affect, connected as it is to our very affectability, our ability to touch and be 
touched, to change and be changed. Taussig connects this to Bakhtin’s carnival: “I’ve always felt 
[Bakhtin] was suggesting that carnival was open-ended, and that it could extend into something 
else. So that the spirit of laughter, which was very important to him, combined with this yearning 
for freedom, was kept alive through carnival” (46).  
 Of course, the carnival is temporary, and this is another important aspect in both writers’ 
conception of hope. As Anderson points out, because hope is by definition the anticipation of the 
not-yet arrived, a potentiality, it is not in itself a happy ending. It may be necessary for human 
being, which is essentially future-oriented, but it is not a guarantee of better things to come. As 
Taussig puts it, “It’s like going to the theatre where you suspend your disbelief and you become 
full of hope, but there’s another part of you which says it can’t last forever. So that seems to me 
what human beings are about—that level of complexity, the ability to hold opposite ideas at 
once—and I think that is where I would really be most comfortable talking about hope—in a 
field where hope and lack of hope are organised [sic] into a sort of dynamic mix” (47). And it is 
this not-yet that makes hope, and therefore metanoia, complicated in the prison. Hope is hard to 
come by there, and where it can be found, it is profoundly dangerous. The prison produces 
hopelessness as a matter of course, and the binding of one’s identity to a past action would seem 
to foreclose the possibilities for metanoic transformation, and repeated disappointment makes the 
capacity to hope not just futile, but emotionally dangerous. One protects a minimal amount of 
hope, enough to go on, by not opening one up to the possibility of disappointment. 
 I Always had a Good Heart 
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 In my conversations with my research participants, regret emerges almost as an aporia. 
Even when participants spoke about past actions for which they are not proud, even when those 
acts are denounced, regret is always only implied, never expressed directly. This may be in part 
because I didn’t ask directly, but I believe it may also be a protective response to the way the 
stigma of a felony conviction, as discussed earlier, works to collapse one’s identity to the act for 
which one was incarcerated. This protective resistance is further evidenced by the fact that all my 
research participants, without exception, make a point of telling me, in different ways, that they 
always were good people. They may not have always done good things, but they were not bad 
people. David’s explanation is particularly instructive: 
I always had a good heart. But you know certain things, when you do something, 
you go all the way with it, and…I don’t really know how to explain it, to be 
honest with you. You can have a good heart, but you also got, certain actions and 
certain things, you know, you have to live by a certain way, you know? And the 
things I was doing, the lifestyle I was living, inside especially, a good heart will 
get you late, and by late, I mean out back. In a situation you don’t want to be in.  
Two things strike me about this exchange. First is David’s insistence that he always had a good 
heart, that his desire to help people and do good things in his life is not new. That’s not the 
change of heart that his metanoic movement refers to. If he was doing things that were harmful, 
to himself or others, it was not due to a failure of moral reasoning but a very reasonable response 
to his living conditions. The second thing that is striking about this passage is the incredible 
amount of periphrasis therein. What exactly David means by “certain actions,” “certain things,” 
and “to live by a certain way” is ironically uncertain, seemingly intentionally so. In my various 
conversations with people who are or have been in prison, this way of speaking is familiar, and I 
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suspect it is, at least in part, a habituated, tactical way of communicating that avoids providing 
detailed information in a hypercontrolled, hypersurveilled environment.  However, I also 
suspect, given David’s outright refusal to disclosure the nature of his conviction or length of his 
sentence, that this periphrasis is a refusal to be identified with those actions. Later in our 
conversation, David tells me, “My past ain’t that good, so it’s just like, I don’t want to associate 
with anything that’s not that good, if that makes sense.” But I also wonder if, in addition to not 
wanting to be associated with these acts and circumstances, my research participants also just 
don’t want to think about them. I get the sense that these stories contain the black hole of trauma. 
I can’t see it directly, but I suspect I am seeing its effects. There is just so much that doesn’t get 
said. David says to me: 
Keep it real with you, my past only gets brought up for the college reentry 
program, or if I want to talk to somebody and confide in them to try to let them 
know I know what they’re going through. Sometimes I don’t want to be thinking 
about time or things like that, unless I actually stop to think about it. I try to stay 
busy. I try to avoid it at all costs. 
 Clay similarly asserts that he always was a good person: “I always thought something 
magical would happen and I would live my life right. I’d start making the right decisions and I’d 
be helping people. I always wanted to help people. But I was doing such horrible things. It was 
such the opposite, because I was a coward.” Unlike David, Clay identifies a kind of moral failure 
in himself at the time, while also maintaining that he wanted to be better. In our conversation, 
Clay speaks in vague terms about trauma and chaos in his home life as a child. At times, he 
identifies this trauma as the origin of the hopelessness and fear that led to a lifestyle marked by 
drug use and violence. Change seemed impossible, so much so that it would take “something 
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magical” to make it happen. At the same time, Clay’s insistence that he was “a coward” suggest 
that he takes responsibility for his actions.  
 Francisco shares very little about his life prior to incarceration, and he provides no details 
about specific activities he may have engaged in. Be he speaks frankly about his life at the 
beginning of his incarceration. He describes his arrival at the maximum-security prison. He says 
before he arrived, while he was still in the county jail, members of the gang with which he was 
affiliated contacted individuals at the prison he was to be sent to, letting them know that 
Francisco would be arriving and to take care of him. But their support was not unconditional. He 
says they were also concerned with making sure he was the kind of person they would want to be 
around: 
Here are some knives, and don’t take shit from anybody, especially not the police. 
So, the expectation of being able to take care of yourself and be violent when 
necessary is immediate, or at least it was for me right there. So, coming into that 
maximum-security prison at seventeen, I quickly realized that I was expected to 
be able to hold my own at seventeen against grown men, so that’s what I had to 
do and that’s what I did. 
This ability to “be violent when necessary” sheds some light on what David likely meant by 
“certain actions,” and they both similarly treat this expectation of violence as a matter of fact, 
related to me with little or no emotion. And yet there is some trace of, if not regret exactly, then 
ambivalence in the refusal to be identified by those violent acts, as well as the insistence that 
engaging in these acts was a matter of necessity and survival, a result of the living conditions of 
the prison (and gang life, presumably), and not indicative of an essentially violent nature.  
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 What emerges in these stories, then, is less an expression of regret and more indicators of 
shame. According to Eve Sedgwick (2003), shame is essentially relational and reflects something 
about oneself. She argues that shame is “the place where the question of identity arises most 
originally and most relationally” (37). Where guilt or regret is connected to what one does, 
shame reflects who one is, arising from a disruption of identification, an awareness that one is 
identified outside of cultural norms. Significantly, shame is related to one’s inability to provoke 
positive reactions from others, an inability to inspire identification.  
 Francisco does speak explicitly about feeling shame. He says that one of the hardest 
things for him to get used to in prison was being looked at by the guards as less than human. It is 
telling, I think, that he describes this in terms of how he is perceived, rather than how he is 
treated, as what is really at issue is the way he is regarded, identified, and defined as subhuman. 
He tells me, “That’s part of the prison experience that I didn’t really—I got so used to it that until 
I got out, I didn’t realize how much it becomes part of you. It’s almost like a shame.” I asked 
him to elaborate on this feeling of shame: 
Well, the shame starts with the whole thing with your parents. They feel that you 
let them down, right? And I come from a traditional Mexican family, so any time 
something happens, like where you go to jail or prison or the police are involved, 
that brings shame, quote unquote, onto the family. So that part, that shame kind of 
transferred over, like I felt a bit ashamed that they were ashamed of me. Then on 
top of that, like in the actual prison, you don’t feel that shame with everybody else 
that’s there in prison with you. You feel it more when people who aren’t living 
there, people who work there, the way they treat you and the way they talk to you. 
A lot of times they do it with disdain. They feel superiority over you. 
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Here, Francisco’s sense of shame is a result of the way others regard him, from a knowledge that 
regardless of how he regarded himself, others identified him with an act or acts that are taboo.  
In addition to Sedgwick’s notion of shame as an inability to provoke positive feelings and 
identification from others, these narratives suggest that a component of shame for my research 
participants also derives from an internal contradiction, a conflict between outward performance 
and inner narrative and self-perception. Clay shared with me a story in which he explicitly says 
he felt shame. Early in his incarceration, long before his participation in the college in prison 
program, Clay took classes through another college with the aid of a Pell grant. He relates to me 
a story about his public speaking course, saying that all semester, he would just get up and wing 
it, and every time, his speeches were terrible. Finally, for his last speech of the class, he 
prepared, used notecards, and did pretty well. I asked what made him finally decide to do that. 
I was embarrassed. I was ashamed. Because I try to be real with myself and see 
what bravery and cowardice really is. I wouldn’t take that class seriously because 
I was scared. I was. I just kept getting mad at myself I was like, man, just do it. 
Just go up there and do your best. Represent.  
Education and Metanoic Movement  
After three years in a maximum-security prison, Francisco was transferred to a medium-
security prison where there were more programs, including educational opportunities. This 
meant there were more people around who were taking classes. 
I remember seeing one guy, he had this associate's diploma like with tape on his 
wall. You know like what people have in an office? He had it with tape, it was 
just sitting there. And I remember sitting there looking at it, and I was like wow, 
that was like huge to me. I was like he's got an associate's, like oh shit, he's 
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fucking smart. And I remember just looking at him, the dude had glasses. So that 
whole, like, that whole image like stuck with me, you know, like he's sitting there 
with glasses and he's got books on his shelf and he's got his associate's diploma 
like plastered on the wall, like showing it off, and I was like, wow, he's smart and 
like, I think I could probably do, like, I wanna do that, I wanna get my associate's 
degree. So, I got back in school, got my GED right away and started taking 
classes.  
While Francisco was telling me this, I chuckled a little at the idea that wearing glasses means a 
person is smart, and while Francisco smiled good-naturedly, he was insistent about the 
significance of this moment in the trajectory of his life. What I think is so telling about this story, 
including the details about the diploma on the wall, the glasses, the books is that this person he 
encountered was performing an identity contrary to the identity if the futureless and deviant 
offender, and that identity is instantly appealing to Francisco. Additionally, a possibility opens 
within the relentless sameness of prison life, an opportune moment, a mentanoic turn. 
 In his description of himself as a child in elementary and middle school, Francisco says 
that he was not internally motivated. He was easily distracted and tended to be the class clown, 
and when he was in a private Catholic school, the teachers would go out of their way to make 
sure he stayed on task. He said that those teachers were motivating him. But when he went to a 
public school, he felt his teachers gave up on him quickly. One teacher, he tells me, would put a 
detention slip on his desk before he even arrived at class, because she knew he was going to do 
something to earn it during class. Francisco is quick to tell me that it’s not those teachers’ fault 
that he ended up in prison, that it’s his own fault, but it’s interesting to me that he makes that 
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connection at all. He connects his incarceration to prison again, as we were talking about his 
experience getting his associate’s degree: 
During that time, I motivated myself. I was like, man, I could have been doing 
this before I got locked up. I could have been going to school and paying attention 
and I wouldn’t be here. That’s how I felt. So, I was doing it more for myself, to 
prove to myself that I could do it, to prove to myself that I was smart. That I, well, 
I wanted to prove it to myself that I wasn’t’ how people view people in prison. 
Two things are important to note here. First, Francisco is primarily motivated to go to school by 
his disidentification with the label of “offender” or “felon.” The shame he feels in the way he is 
regarded by others motivates him to act, to perform a different kind of identity. Interestingly, this 
identity performance is inwardly directed, an attempt to deny that version of himself to himself.  
 But just as importantly, Francisco feels that his performance in school could have 
prevented him from becoming incarcerated. Clay makes a similar claim: 
You take anybody, you ask them what their biggest regret is, a lot of people will 
tell you I wish I would have done better in school. I wish I would have handled 
myself better in school. It always comes back to school. Because I think that’s a 
huge turning point in people’s lives. I think we forget how important school is. 
Whether it’s negative or positive, it makes a huge, huge impact on a kid’s life. A 
lot of these guys in prison that are older think, man, if I had done better in school, 
anything would have been possible. And on some level, that says a lot. 
In terms of metanoia, this connection between school, possibilities, regret, and incarceration is 
fascinating. For both Francisco and Clay, there is a direct correlation between how one handles 
oneself in school as a child and whether one winds up in prison later. Both Francisco and Clay 
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were incarcerated at the age of sixteen, and it seems they are identifying a choice they made, 
consciously or not, to prioritize other activities over education, and this choice led to their 
incarceration. But on a deeper level, it also speaks to the way educational pursuit is moralized, a 
kind of literacy myth that connects advanced literacy not only to social and economic betterment, 
but also to moral betterment. This belief, in fact, is the only reason obtaining an associate’s 
degree is a viable resistant identity performance for Francisco. To deny the way people might 
view him, he must prove to himself, not that he is good, but that he is smart.  
 Francisco started taking college courses roughly a decade before enrolling in the college 
in prison program, and in that time, he couldn’t take classes continuously. As he explained, there 
weren’t enough jobs nor enough classes for everybody, so he was faced with time that was 
relatively unoccupied. But when he was in school, he immersed himself in it. “I felt like I was 
growing as a person. I felt like I was doing something.” So, in addition to rejecting the offender 
identity, Francisco was making his time meaningful. At the same time, his experience in the 
community colleges that offered credits toward an associate’s degree was not meaningful in the 
way the college in prison program would be. I asked him to describe how the community college 
experience was different for him. 
I was learning facts, that’s it. I felt I was doing something as far as accumulating 
credits, right? So, it was something, it was better than doing nothing. But when I 
was in the college program, I did feel like I was growing. I think during those four 
years that I was there, I grew a lot as a person, and being in prison, in general, it’s 
hard to grow because you’re not experiencing things. You grow based on your 
experiences, life experiences, things that happen, conflict or resolution and this 
and this and that and that. So, you grow, you become stronger, you become more 
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dependent on yourself, more independent, and you gave confidence that you can 
do things. So, the college program helped that. 
Confidence is a practically ubiquitous theme across my interviews. Nearly everyone says that the 
most important thing they gained from taking college courses in prison was confidence. At the 
time of the interviews, I thought confidence was an unsatisfactorily squishy notion, the kind of 
thing you might say you got from an experience because you can’t think of anything else to say. 
But in thinking about prison time and the production of futurelessness, I want to suggest that 
confidence is, in fact, a crucial component to the production of hope, a background affective 
response to the opening of possibilities. Confidence suggests a belief in one’s ability to be 
effective in the world, to achieve success in a variety of situations that might otherwise be 
intimidating. Without confidence, there are no possibilities, no hope, and vice versa. Francisco 
describes this confidence in some detail: 
Before I [went to the prison with the college program], I read an autobiography by 
Nelson Mandela. And that made me want to do something. Like, man, this dude’s 
awesome. I wanna help somehow. How can I help, what can I do, where can I 
start? Then I was like, well, I’m just a prisoner, when I get out I’m gonna be an 
ex-felon, so the odds of me helping anybody—people aren’t going to let me help. 
So then, when I got to the program, they encouraged leadership and they wanted 
people to kind of be active in their communities when they get out. And as I 
started to learn this, I felt during that time that education wasn’t just about getting 
a degree so I can get a job. It was, I was growing as an individual, I was educating 
myself about what’s happening in the world, and I was going to try to do 
something about it, right? But at the same time, I understand how the world works 
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and that I need to get a diploma to continue doing what I want to do, which is 
teaching. I just taught a full semester of English. Had it not been for the college 
program, I would have never had the balls to even teach some shit like this, let 
alone would someone give me a job teaching, right? So, the experience I gained 
from the program, the confidence that it gave me allowed me to do what I’m 
doing now, and now I have to abide by the rules of job-getting to get a degree, 
papers that say, look, here, these are my papers that show that I’m not stupid, 
please give me a job. 
Though he was not able to obtain a bachelor’s degree while incarcerated, Francisco sees two 
ways that the college program helped open possibilities for him. First, it provided him with a 
venue in which to practice skills that he was later able to translate into a job, at least until the 
funders of the community center decided they could no longer employ a teacher without a 
bachelor’s degree.  But more importantly, it provided him a way to connect with the part of 
himself that wanted to “help,” to be an agent of change in the world. It’s also important to note 
that Francisco’s desire to change the world for the better was not something the college program 
gave him. As David might say, he always had a good heart. The college program, I would argue, 
provided a space for hope, a community of people who were future-oriented and engaged in 
building both a positive community and positive identifications. When I asked for a specific 
example of how this worked, Francisco described participating in a reading group on mass 
incarceration. The group read Michelle Alexander, Loic Wacquant, and Michel Foucault, who 
Francisco described as “pretty good.” 
So, you start to realize, ok, what is a prison? Because you’re in it, but you don’t 
really know the history of it and then you start to realize why it was invented, 
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what it’s designed to do, what it’s supposed to be doing, what it’s not doing. So 
that helped me come to the conclusion that I was right the whole time. I was like, 
I’m right, prison is not doing what it’s supposed to be doing. So, I felt like when I 
come out and say, yes, I am this person, but I am this person despite being in 
prison because prison is not the one that did this. And I can articulate this and this 
book says this, instead of just saying, well, prison sucks. It sounds like whining 
when people say it that way. 
Francisco always had this critique of the prison, but through his reading, he was able to more 
confidently assert his critique, not from a position of personal experience of discomfort, but 
through weaving his personal experience with the published scholarship of intellectuals. This is 
what helps him to distinguish a valid critique from “whining.” Here, Francisco is either 
imagining or reflecting on a conversation where is he can more successfully assert his 
disidentification with the prison, including his vehement denial that the good in him has any 
origin in the prison.  And, perhaps not coincidentally, Francisco’s perception of time changed 
when he was in the college program: 
The thing that I realized was that the three hours went by so fast. And I’d always 
tell that to the new incoming students. I would tell them you’re going to notice the 
difference in how fast the class goes. You’re going to want to stay in there as 
opposed to [whining] what time are we leaving? Other classes, you’re always like, 
uuuggghhh, where’s the clock, oh, five more minutes, uuuugggghhhh. But in the 
college program, it would be like, it’s time to go, like, what??? Oh my God, I 
didn’t even get a chance to ask what I wanted to ask. Or you wanted to stay a little 
bit longer because it was so interesting in there.  
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 Like Francisco’s encounter with the man with the glasses, David’s metanoic turn in 
relation to college is similarly spurred by a sudden encounter with the material signifiers of 
higher education. After he was released from prison, David moved thousands of miles across the 
country to live with his sister. He was working construction when he was contacted by the 
director of the college reentry program, asking if he was interested in joining. At first, David’s 
motivation was practical: he didn’t like working construction and he hoped that this 20-week 
program, which ends with a job fair, would lead to a new job. But in the first half of the program, 
during which the participants spent time on the campus of a local university, David’s motivations 
began to shift. 
I went to college before, when I was seventeen, but I had other things that I was 
prioritizing in life, so college wasn't really my thing at the time. But actually 
seeing a university, especially one as big as [public polytechnic, about 24,000 
enrolled], that was just different. Like it was a good vibe, you know. But I 
enjoyed it. Just being somewhere that's out of my element, out of my comfort 
zone, you could say. That was my first time really seeing hundreds of students 
walking around and, I don't know, feeling like they had purpose.  
This idea of being “out of [his] comfort zone” is significant in David’s story. He told me, “I 
knew, for real for real, that was my way of getting out from what I was used to. I wanted to do 
something else with my life.” David goes so far as to say that he sees this as a second chance 
given by God to do something with his life that is a clear break from his previous life. Being 
around people with purpose inspired in David a desire to organize his life similarly, and he 
speaks frankly about the fact that, in the early months after his release, it would have been easy 
for him to slide back into older habituated ways of being, though he doesn’t explicitly name what 
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those things might be. Because he didn’t want to go back to prison, he saw this other world, one 
that was strange to him, as clear path to a new life, and he seized the opportunity without 
hesitation.  
 David also went out of his way to create a relationship with the director of the program. 
The director mentored David, encouraging him to work on the way he carried himself and 
interacted with people, but the thing that David talked about the most was the way the director 
would repeatedly put him on the spot in front of people, so David was forced to talk to people he 
didn’t feel comfortable around, especially college students and professors. 
I laugh now because practice makes perfect. But it's the thing, though, he put me 
on front street in front of all them, and they turned around and was real positive 
with the reception. Every single one of them got up, shook my hand, all this, 
introduced themselves. That was a connection because I was like, this is cool. 
Meet new people, become social, not hardened criminals or gang members or 
things that I'm used to being around. Like, legitimate, squares you know? People 
that are not in the streets or anything like that. But that transition, like them 
being...you keep the kind of people around you that you want to be like, I believe. 
And like I said, I wasn't going back to what I used to do, and meeting them helped 
me to establish what I wanted to do, you know? I knew no matter what, I can do 
this college thing, I can do this for real this time, you know? It's not going to be 
easy, but I can do it. So that's why it was college for me, even though I went in 
there with the intention of just getting a job. 
For David, the experience of being around “real squares,” especially those who were warm and 
welcoming, helped him to see a place for himself in higher education, a place that was a 
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deliberate turn away from gang life. And those relationships created the sense of possibility, that 
he could succeed where he hadn’t been able to succeed before. There remains for David, 
however, a kind of ambivalence in his identification with “real squares.” In our conversation, 
David tells me three times that he’s “covered in tattoos,” a comment that is especially significant 
because I was sitting across from him and could see the tattoos on his face, neck, and arms for 
myself. He didn’t need to point them out to me, but he mentioned them repeatedly as a kind of 
shorthand for the ways he imagines other people on campus might view him and the assumptions 
they might make about the kind of person he is. Still, he goes out of his way to be social, a way 
of being that is itself a deliberate turn away from the alienation and distrust that became habit 
while in prison.  
 While Francisco and David could both point to specific moments when education 
presented itself as an attractive possibility in their lives, Mark and Clay’s metanoic turns took 
place over longer periods of time. Mark in particular had less to say about how his involvement 
with the college program impacted him directly. Instead, the hope and possibility that Mark 
experienced had more to do with what he saw in the demeanor and lives of his fellow students. 
This may be because Mark and Clay both helped to administer the college program on the inside, 
taking on leadership roles that shifted their relationship to the program. Of the four participants I 
focus on this chapter, Mark is the only one that is not currently enrolled, nor has immediate plans 
to enroll, in college courses on the outside. His identity is far more wrapped up in his position as 
a supervisor at the packaging plant where he works, as well as his role as a father and soon-to-
be-husband. Still, his investment in the college program while he was there is evident, though it 
didn’t happen immediately. 
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I had a fresh quarter and I was young. I didn’t give a shit. I was selling pot, I was 
doing other nefarious things on the side. I was gambling. I had a store going, you 
know what I’m talking about? Doing a bunch of things on the side and, you know, 
I guess there’s not a definitive point where I can say, this is where I stopped doing 
this and started doing this. But that just gradually faded away? I didn’t have time 
for it because I was deeply invested with these positive things because I could see 
that they had more benefit to me and others as time went by. 
In a way, this process of slow transition from one way of occupying his time to another echoes 
David’s experience in that there is a period where he is not fully identified with the “positive 
things” he is doing in the college program. Initially, he only takes a class because his friend talks 
about it with him so much that he agrees to go just to get him to leave him alone, and the second 
class is also just to get his friend off his back. But after a couple of classes, he becomes invested, 
not because it changes his life, but because he sees it changing the lives of his fellow students. 
I could see it on their faces. These big burly dudes were like, wow, really? And 
they'd be really talking about something and you could see how they wished they 
could be when they're talking in discussion. A lot of people would come to class 
excited for just how they wish they could talk, maybe to their family? Maybe to 
their wife or kids or whatever? How they could articulate themselves, and just the 
overall change in demeanor was just awesome to see. 
 As Mark became more invested in the program, he started to change the way he thought 
about the time he was doing. Before going to school, he said he was just occupying himself, 




So, there was more motivation to occupy myself and my time, and really analyze 
how I utilize my time. You live where you are, you know? Wherever you’re at, 
that’s where you live. And you can make the most of it, or you can wait and waste 
all of that time while you’re waiting to live out there. You live in here now, even 
if it’s only for a year. This is where you live for a year. So why waste the time 
you got now waiting on something else, and you don’t even know what that’s 
gonna be. And in DOC, it’s kind of ambiguous when you’ll get there. So why not 
utilize the time you got now, to do whatever you’re gonna do, and then why not 
make it positive? 
This is a completely different approach to prison time than what has been theorized by 
Meisenhelder or Cope. Rather than trying to make time pass, Mark starts to view his time in 
prison as an opportunity, and he sees possibilities for creating a meaningful, positive life, even 
behind razor wire. In addition to changing the way Mark thought about his time, school also 
changed the way he experienced it. He tells me he would advise new students in how to be 
successful in the program, warning them that they’re going to have to organize their time 
differently. “Are you gonna watch tv, you gonna go work out, you gonna go play cards, you 
gonna hang out with your buddy, or are you gonna do homework? Pretty important.” This litany 
of activities that are so ubiquitous to prison life is contrasted with this new way of organizing 
one’s time, and while it is a kind of sacrifice to give up these ways of passing time, there is an 
implication that this different approach to time comes with both consequences and possibilities 




 Though their experiences are similar, Clay speaks less about the way the college program 
changes the way he experiences time and more about how it produces futurity. Even before the 
college program, when he was taking classes with the Pell grant, he describes the way 
hopefulness created a momentum in his life after taking classes. 
Possibilities. Once I saw the difference in possibilities, I had a completely 
different view of myself and what I was capable of. Cause literally, as corny as it 
sounds, I was like, wow, I can do anything. I can do anything. […] And once I 
was completely trusting and opened myself up, then I really found out what I was 
about […] And just to see the impact [of the college program], the inspiration in 
such a gray, monotonous place. It’s shiny. It’s a shiny thing. It really is. Prison, 
you could sit there for seven years with no change in stimuli. That’s what kills 
animals in the zoo [laugh]. But then you bring this other view, this stimuli. That’s 
why it’s so bright in that environment.  
Like Mark, Clay’s turn took some time, but it was primarily fueled by this sense that the future 
was not foreclosed, which radically shifted the way he perceived himself and his place in the 
world. Like Francisco, he was inspired by the possibility of being an agent of change with 
limitless potential. But after he participates in the college program, the inspiration changes 
slightly. Just as Anderson argues, affect operates in part through contagion, not originating 
within a body but emerging between them. What Clay seems to be describing with the college 
program is a space where hope is generated and circulated between bodies. In his discussion of 
hope and the carnivalesque, Michael Taussig mentions Peter Lamborn Wilson’s concept of 
“temporary autonomous zones,” or TAZ. “The idea is that there are moments, hours, weeks, 
months or even years whereby groups of people get it together to test freedom […] And then it 
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collapses—so these experiments, these temporary autonomous zones, are bound to fail […] and 
these are expressed in all sorts of ways: through history, actual revolts, marginal people who 
have been able to find some autonomy away from their families or communities or the state or 
whatever it might be” (47). In Clay’s description, the classroom becomes a temporary space 
where the relentlessness of the prison is suspended, possibilities become apparent, and new ways 
of relating to one’s self and others emerge. Clay calls this freedom: 
When you give people the skills, like confidence, social skills, a belief that 
something can be better, a direction to go through to get there, that these kinds of 
programs give people—they give people their dignity. And when you give 
somebody their dignity, they transcend the confines of their environment and find 
freedom behind razor wire, behind bars. That’s real freedom. 
Conclusion 
 Though lip service continues to be paid to the notion of rehabilitation in the American 
prison system, my research participants here attest to the reality of The New Penology, which 
focuses on, as Francisco puts it, warehousing individuals and results in, as Clay puts it, a “give-
up mentality.” In this chapter, I have argued that the production of futurelessness, in particular 
the relentless, empty sameness of everyday prison life, is an important aspect of social death for 
incarcerated people in that it significantly reduces the potential for new experiences and hope for 
future possibilities. If people are fundamentally future-oriented, then this systematic erosion of 
the future is a powerful mechanism of social death. Combined with legal rightlessness, this 
material production of nonpersonhood creates, as Lisa Cacho argues, a space of social death in 
which “any and every option is unthinkable” (145). As their stories attest, several of my research 
participants inhabited these spaces of social death long before entering prison.  
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 Higher education programs, in their potential for new affective attachments and, thereby, 
future-being, produce new ways to counter, in tactical and fleeting ways, the materialization of 
social death in everyday life for incarcerated students. Specifically, the concept of the metanoic 
turn suggests a kind of movement, propelled in one direction by regret or shame and in another 
by hopefulness and new identifications and experiences. Importantly, this metanoic turn is not 
merely a result of inward reflection but produced through the embodied, material, and relational 
practices of higher education. This production of hope, however, is in no way a given when 
introducing college courses in a carceral setting, nor is it necessarily the only or best way to 
create these new conditions of possibility. In what follows, I will examine some of the inherent 






“An Investment in Pain:” Citizenship, Exclusion, and the Cruel Optimism of Higher 
Education in Prison 
 
“For the longest time, I thought about what it would feel like going home. Like, I wanna go home, I wanna 
go home, I wanna go back out to the world. But I found that once I got home, all I thought about was prison. 
And that was a bit of a wake-up call for me, in the sense that I had to consciously attempt to plant myself, 
my roots, in the soil of the world.”—Saul 
 
“In other words, we must be careful not to do more harm than good by encouraging students to reinvest 
uncritically in an economy of narrative pleasure, an economy that is indisputably one of the central forces 
at work in a culture dominated by the military-entertainment complex. This economy ensures that the 
everyday realities of racism, sexism, and economic disenfranchisement—what I might call the 
“macropolitics” of traumatic experience—go unrecognized for what they are.” –Lynn Worsham, 
“Composing Identity in a Posttraumatic Age” 
 
I met Rhett at a coffeeshop in a southern college town. A white man in his 60s with a 
thick lolling drawl, Rhett brought a stack about five inches high of syllabi and multiple drafts of 
papers he wrote for the classes he took in prison. The material was dense: Althusser, Freud, 
Marx, Fanon, Crenshaw. This was no watered-down curriculum, and Rhett describes, as so many 
other research participants have, the camaraderie that developed in the classroom between men 
who struggled to engage with these arduous texts. He describes with matter-of-factness how he 
quickly became an important presence in the classroom and in the program as a whole. The 
program director even asked him specifically, he tells me, to sign up for a first-year writing 
course so that he might act as a model for the other students, and Rhett says enjoyed helping 
several men with their writing, academic and otherwise. He never says directly that he is proud 
of the work he did in those classes, but judging from the stack of papers between us and the pride 
in his voice when he talks not about his own successes, but those of the students he tutored and 
mentored, it is clearly meaningful to him to have his academic skill acknowledged and valued by 
people he respects, especially the program director.  
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 But when Rhett was released, he was in his early 60s with no college degree and a 
criminal record. He serves on the program’s advisory board, is well-connected to academics and 
activists in his town, is active in local politics, and is one of the most astute people I’ve had the 
pleasure of having a conversation with, but he says he can’t even get a job as a greeter at Wal-
Mart. He lives in his friend’s RV because he can’t afford rent right now, and he gets by on his 
small social security check and by selling a controlled substance to a small number of trusted 
clients. “I really didn’t want to go back into selling anything. I didn’t even think I’d smoke again, 
I had such a distaste for it. Sitting in my own living room, minding my own business, and people 
I’ve been good to go out and tell stuff about you […] But that’s it in a nutshell, I just persevere, 
persist. That’s all I can do.”  
 As someone who believes resolutely that higher education should be accessible to 
incarcerated people as a matter of social justice, I am troubled by stories like Rhett’s, stories that 
challenge the notion that higher education in prison makes a meaningful impact in the lives of 
incarcerated students. Saul’s words that open this chapter haunt me. They haunt this research as 
well. After growing up in prison, spending more than half his life behind bars, he tells me that 
when he finally got out, he didn’t know how to live in the free world. The transition out of 
prison, known commonly as reentry, echoes dissonantly through my interviews as a point of 
tension between the promises and realities of a second chance. In our conversations about the 
value of higher education for agency and liberation, it is most often in participants’ stories about 
reentry where this liberatory narrative falters. In this chapter, I argue that the crisis of mass 
incarceration has created uncertainty about the place of formerly incarcerated people in the 
democratic imaginary, opening for debate which individuals deserve to participate in civic life. 
In response, higher education is increasing being called up on to address the diminished 
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citizenship and employment prospects of formerly incarcerated people and, I argue, serves to 
credential formerly incarcerated people not only for future employment but for inclusion in 
American citizenry. However, for prison educators to, at the very least, successfully prepare 
incarcerated students, we must more critically examine our own assumptions about the value of 
higher education in prison and the pedagogical choices that stem from them. By analyzing 
moments when the stigma of incarceration, including internalized shame, frustrate efforts to 
integrate into normative society, I hope to offer insight into possible areas of intervention for, as 
well as the limitations of, rhetorical education for incarcerated people. I begin with a discussion 
of the shifting boundaries of inclusion for formerly incarcerated people in American civic life. 
Next, I explore the role higher education and literacy training for participatory democracy. 
Finally, drawing on the lived experiences of reentry of five research participants, I argue against 
the pedagogy of disclosure that is so ubiquitous in prison literacy scholarship, suggesting that 
increasing students rhetorical savvy does not adequately address the systemic nature of their 
exclusion and continued social death. I conclude with pedagogical implications of these findings 
as well as a critique of higher education as a supplement to the systemic problem of exclusion, 
reentry, and social justice.  A full account of the rhetorical education my participants received 
and the transfer (or lack thereof) of knowledge and skill is beyond the scope of this project. My 
aim, rather, is to call attention to the ways inclusion, exclusion, and agency are invoked, and to 
urge writing studies scholars to more critically address the question of advanced literacy and 
citizenship training for marginalized students. If increased access and participation is a goal of 
higher education in prison, as I believe it should be, then we must grapple with the unique and 
shifting ways citizenship is both practiced by and denied to formerly incarcerated people, even 
those with advanced literacy. 
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The Figure of the Felon in the Democratic Imaginary 
 The United States is currently witnessing a striking shift in ideology about criminal 
justice, which was brought about both by the important activist work of organizations like 
Critical Resistance, Prison Policy Initiative, The Sentencing Project, and others, but also by the 
economic and social crisis of mass incarceration. The United States simply cannot afford to 
continue locking people up at the current rate, and increasingly, states and municipalities are 
being forced to reckon with the unsustainability of overly punitive logics and rethink what to do 
with people once they are released from prisons and jails. A February 2016 article in The 
Washington Post described the release of thousands of incarcerated people, following changes in 
California’s sentencing laws, “a grand experience, an act of mass forgiveness unprecedented in 
U.S. history” (n.p.). This notion of mass forgiveness is a useful way to frame the problem of 
shifting boundaries of inclusion as the nation moves away from tough-on-crime rhetoric that 
reached a fever pitch in the mid-1990s. Hannah Arendt (1958) theorizes forgiveness as “the only 
reaction which does not merely re-act but acts anew and unexpectedly, unconditioned by the act 
which provoked it and therefore freeing from its consequences both the one who forgives and the 
one who is forgiven” (241). If past actions are projected into future identities for formerly 
incarcerated people, forever binding them symbolically to an act or series of acts of non-
normativity, then forgiveness is the mechanism through which an individual may be disidentified 
with the act for which she was incarcerated and included in the demos.  
 The crisis of mass incarceration has produced what appears to be a controversy of 
forgiveness, as the assumptions of who should be forgiven, by whom, and to what extent remain 
largely uncertain. While calls for criminal justice reform, including increased access and support 
for formerly incarcerated people, has gained significant and increasing support, the 
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enthymematic arguments for these reforms continue to rely on a logic of relative innocence 
through reference to what Marie Gottschalk calls the “non-non-nons,” that is, people convicted 
of non-violent, non-sexual, non-serious acts. Increasingly, these individuals are gaining relative 
acceptance and inclusion within the democratic imaginary and in public discourse, but legal and 
material inclusion continues to lag behind. Further, this relative forgiveness and inclusion of the 
non-non-nons takes for granted that those who fall outside this relative innocence are deserving 
of long, harshly punitive prison sentences and permanent exclusion from employment, education, 
and other areas of public life. While the notion of a second chance is gaining traction, the 
question of who gets a second chance is still very contentious.  
 In this book Punishment and Inclusion, Andrew Dilts (2014) theorizes the figure of the 
felon through an analysis of felon disenfranchisement, the practice of revoking voting rights 
from people with felony convictions while they are incarcerated, for the duration of their parole, 
or permanently. Dilts asks what it means that we as Americans have “insisted again and again 
that the right to participate in collective self-government should be limited to people without 
criminal convictions” (3). Just as Foucault demonstrates the way the figure of the delinquent is 
produced by the penitentiary technique, Dilts argues that disenfranchisement fabricates the figure 
of the felon. Just as prison removes the person with a felony conviction from physical society, 
disenfranchisement removes her from the imagined one. Dilts suggests that because this liminal 
figure of the felon is a kind of productive failure of the democratic ideal of inclusion, the 
exclusion of the felon is nearly permanent. “Disenfranchisement, more than the retributive or 
protective punishment of incarceration, conflates past action and future identity, determining 
subjects as things outside their own control and determining the subject as merely an object” 
(45). In other words, just as the delinquent substitutes a biographical narrative of the individual 
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for a criminal offense, disenfranchisement assumes a stable, known subject whose exclusion 
from political participation produces (white supremacist) normalization, order, and unity. It is 
through their exclusion that others may be marked both as innocent and as full citizens (44). 
 Felon disenfranchisement is undoubtedly a serious problem, affecting about 5.8 million 
Americans, a disproportionate number of which are people of color hailing from already 
politically marginalized communities. However, not every person with a felony conviction in the 
United States experiences permanent disenfranchisement. In fact, in Maine and Vermont, the 
right to vote is never revoked, and incarcerated people can vote from prison. In eleven states and 
Washington, D.C., people with felony convictions have their voting rights restored upon release 
from prison. Though disenfranchisement offers a unique lens through which to consider the role 
of the felon in the democratic imaginary, I argue that the exclusion of people with felony 
convictions is not solely enacted through legal exclusions. As Price (2015), Guenther (2013), and 
others suggest, civil death and social death are intimately linked, but they are not the same. Price 
argues, “Ending civil death would entail restoring (or granting) the rights accorded to citizens. 
The remedy is consistent with liberal individualism and a civil rights agenda. Ending social death 
is not so easy or straightforward. Overturning social death would require changing categories 
such as ‘felon’ and ‘ex-con.’ It would mean transforming the social relationships on which these 
categories depend, including relationships that have been institutionalized not only by law but 
also encoded in language and sanctioned by custom” (19, emphasis added).  
 Here, I extend Dilts’s critique of the tension in democracy between membership and 
exclusion for formerly incarcerated people by considering the social, rather than legal, exclusions 
that create diminished citizenship and social death for formerly incarcerated people. I argue that 
inclusion into democratic citizenry cannot be fully accounted for by considering one’s legal 
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status nor participation in narrowly defined acts such as voting. As Robert Asen (2004) suggests, 
citizenship should be recognized “as a fluid, multimodal, and quotidian process” (203), and this 
formulation of the relationship between the citizen and citizenship allows a reformulation of 
“who may be and what it means to be a citizen” (204). Danielle Allen (2004) similarly defines 
citizenship as “basic habits of interaction in public spaces” (5). She goes on to show that order is 
maintained not only through institutions, but through social and cultural “’deep rules’ that 
prescribe specific interactions among citizens in public spaces” (10). These paradigms of 
citizenship suggest ways to consider the practice of citizenship beyond privileged acts, such as 
voting, but they also point to the ways that exclusion from full citizenship is enacted in everyday 
ways. As Ediberto Roman (2010) points out, “The typical point of demarcation or basis for 
distinction—national borders—was not the basis for and does not adequately explain the 
subordination of some groups within those national boundaries” (10). If citizenship is created in 
social interactions through habitual practices, it is an emergent, tenuous, and uneven citizenship 
whose borders, while entrenched through custom, remain unfixed. Thus, Robert Asen’s notion of 
citizenship as a mode of engagement, for example, which emphasizes agency and the multiple 
and vernacular ways individuals practice citizenship engagement, suggests that it is also in these 
everyday acts of democratic engagement that stratified citizenship is practiced, marked, and 
reaffirmed. Just as Dilts argues that disenfranchisement is a “civic disability” (171), I suggest 
that formerly incarcerated people, even when their legal status is restored, continue to be marked 
and excluded in a myriad of disabling ways, and their role in the democratic imaginary remains, 
for now, a productive exclusion. 
Higher Education and Participatory Citizenship 
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 In a recent CCC article, Chase Bollig (2015) traces the contours of the recent debates of 
the value of higher education, noting the question of whether college is “worth it” generally 
surfaces during crises of confidence in economic upward mobility. He writes, “In light of the 
vocational orientation of many of our students and policymakers, and the specifically economic 
terms of the ‘worth it’ debate, we in composition should reflect on how aspects of vocationalism 
can be appropriated to advance a reflexive, flexible vision of the relationship between higher 
education, composition, and the economy” (154). Bollig takes aim at the dep and abiding faith in 
literacy myths that unquestioningly link advanced literacy with upward mobility and increased 
civic and social agency. In times of crisis, assumptions about higher education’s value are 
thrown into relief and opened for debate.  
 In the field of higher education in prison, this direct engagement with and critique of the 
assumed value of higher education is less immediately apparent. For example, on June 10, 2016, 
the White House announced the Fair Chance Higher Education Pledge, which aims to reduce 
barriers to higher education for formerly incarcerated people. Institutions of higher education 
who take the pledge commit to examining ways to increase access for formerly incarcerated 
people, encouraging community action (e.g. by supporting faculty who teach in prisons and 
jails), and setting examples for their peer institutions. The press release announcing this initiative 
explains, “Too often, a criminal record disqualifies Americans from being full participants in our 
society—even after they’ve already paid their debt to society. This includes admissions 
processes for educational institutions that can make it difficult if not impossible for those with 
criminal records to get an education that can lead to a job.” This initiative, as well as the 
Department of Education’s Second Chance Pell Pilot Program, indicate a belief in the connection 
115 
 
between literacy and economic advancement, and that an investment in higher education for 
currently and formerly incarcerated people will lead to increased access and participation. 
 Amy Wan (2014), like Bollig, questions this assumption about education and economic 
success. In Producing Good Citizens, Wan demonstrates the ways literacy instruction is used to 
produce habits of citizenship during times of heightened societal anxiety. She argues, “We 
should not regard literacy as having a deterministic association with citizenship (in other words, 
assuming that literacy will always yield citizenship), but at the same time we need to recognize 
that literacy has been used as a way to reorder, redistribute, and recalibrate” (37). Thus, Wan 
locates in literacy training a possibility for students to gain useful tools for civic participation, 
she urges us to move away from the assumption that achievements of advanced literacy will 
necessarily lead to a better life and fuller inclusion.  
 In writing curricula, literacy is largely framed in connection to participatory citizenship, 
that citizenship is achieved through the literacy practices that are learned in school. However, 
Wan argues that this deeply held belief in the relationship between literacy and citizenship 
without critical attention to the ambiguity of the terms results in what she calls “ambient 
citizenship,” which assumes an unspoken agreement about the definition of citizenship where 
there is none. Further, this notion of literacy leading to increased participation assumes that full 
citizenship is a matter of an individual’s volition and is equally accessible to everyone. 
“Participation through literacy skills allows for the sense of being equal, maybe even the illusion 
of equality. But I wonder if it is possible that an investment in this narrative is dangerous because 
we imagine the equality and full citizenship can be accessed via classroom-cultivated literacy” 
(31). In other words, without attending to the fact that different forms of participatory democracy 
are available to different students, composition practitioners perpetuate the myth that full 
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citizenship is available to anyone who puts forth the effort to acquire the skills and habits 
associated with literacy, and any diminished or denied citizenship is an individual failure.  
 In my conversation with Rhett, I asked him to speculate on what higher education in 
prison programs could do to mitigate the forms of exclusion he was experiencing. I wondered if 
these programs might make efforts to extend their work and support beyond the prison walls, but 
Rhett seemed skeptical. We discussed the fact that many teachers in college-in-prison programs 
are prohibited from continuing to communicate with their former students after they are released. 
The extent to which these prohibitions are enforced varies widely, but for most of the programs I 
worked with for this study, there was some rule in place discouraging continued contact. But, of 
course, to recruit these individuals for my study, they necessarily had some continued contact 
with their respective programs. I asked Rhett if he might speculate about this, about why this 
prohibition was in place and why he was an exception.  
His answer reveals an interesting tension. Rhett describes seeking out a continued 
friendship with the program director, who had taught a sociology course that Rhett had taken and 
thought highly of. He tells me that the program director also sought him out to serve on the 
program’s advisory board, and eventually they developed what Rhett describes as a genuine 
friendship that happened incrementally, which Rhett says was wise on the director’s part. “I hate 
to put it this way, but a lot of [incarcerated people] are predatory in nature, and they’ll always be 
predatory in some sense, and it would not be wise to keep a connection with them, for them as 
well as you.” Two things strike me about this statement. First, it reflects the belief, explicated by 
Dilts, that the felon is unchangeable and deeply manipulative and untrustworthy. Rhett goes on 
to suggest that no more than 3% of those students would be people with which it would be worth 
having continued contact. It’s unclear at this point if he is referring to a continued professional, 
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supportive relationship, or a personal one, as he describes having with the program director. Still, 
he seems to suggest that 97% of incarcerated people are fundamentally unredeemable and 
untrustworthy. No doubt Rhett has first-hand experience that supports this belief, just as Saul, for 
example, probably has first-hand experience that informs his belief that incarcerated people are 
not fundamentally different from people living out in the free world.  
But what I found especially interesting was Rhett’s suggestion that continued contact 
between prison education programs and their students might be harmful for the students 
themselves. I asked if he could elaborate on that: 
Gives you false expectations beyond what reality is going to give you. You’re still 
going to be outside looking in. You might permeate that bubble for a bit, but 
when you come back out of that bubble, you know, you’re back in the reality of 
where you’re living. I think it’s better to, like, to make an analogy? You go over 
here and do some heroine, then you leave and the heroine wears off. It’s 
diminishing returns, or an investment in pain, so to speak. The reward you get for 
that short period of time is more than decimated by the withdrawal from it 
afterwards […] But when you see someone that has potential, or that drive, 
sticktoitiveness, yeah, give them a shot. But do it in a measured, calculated 
fashion. Don’t give it to them too easy. A lot of times, they’ve had things too 
easy. 
This is an awfully bleak outlook. This insight follows a moment in the conversation when Rhett 
shares his feelings that higher education in prison doesn’t actually do much for people once 
they’re released. Basically, by continuing a person’s contact with the program, he feels it would 
only be giving those individuals false hope, “an investment in pain,” because they simply will 
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have neither the opportunity nor the inner resources to use their experiences with an education 
program to create a better life for themselves. 
 Put another way, Rhett’s warning is an implicit critique of higher education in prison’s 
“cruel optimism,” what Lauren Berlant (2010) defines as “a relation of attachment to 
compromised conditions of possibility whose realization is discovered either to be impossible, 
sheer fantasy, or too possible, and toxic” (94). For Rhett, the object of desire, “the good life,” is 
an unattainable fantasy due to, ironically, the assumptions about incarcerated people that he 
himself believes and helps circulate. Maintaining a connection to that fantasy, though it may 
have helped him to survive prison, is as noxious as heroine. As Berlant explains, “What’s cruel 
about these attachments, and not merely inconvenient or tragic, is that the subjects who have x in 
their lives might not well endure the loss of their object or scene of desire, even though its 
presence threatens their well-being; because whatever the content of the attachment is, the 
continuity of the form of it provides something of the continuity of the subject’s sense of what it 
means to keep on living on and to look forward to being in the world” (94). Hope is a common 
theme around which prison educators rally, desiring to instill a sense of purpose and agency for 
their students for whom stark despair is never far. What Rhett is suggesting, then, is that this is 
precisely the benefit of college in prison programs, providing a fantasy of acceptance, 
community, and recognition that, in reality, will never come.  
 Rhett’s experience and perspective, however, are a bit anomalous in my study. Heeding 
Amy Wan’s warning about the unevenness of access to full inclusion, Rhett’s experience is 
important to consider. However, I do not share his melancholic stance, in large part due to the 
fact that while most of my research participants are struggling or have struggled through their 
transition from prison, their exclusion from “the good life” is not absolute. Instead, Rhett’s 
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experience is, for me, an imperative to look critically to the ways higher education in prison 
invests in a cruel optimism, not because inclusion is impossible, but because the inclusion which 
it purports to provide through literacy is a toxic one, an assimilation into a field of social 
relations based in inequity and historical oppression.  
Rhett argues that higher education in prison is still worth it, though, because even if the 
experience is just something fun that is quickly forgotten, it is still an opportunity to make 
contact with positive people, if only briefly.  While I may disagree with his conclusions about the 
possibilities for higher education in prison, Rhett’s notion of “an investment in pain” does offer 
an important counter to under-examined assumptions about higher education as a tool for 
increasing agency, access, and inclusion for formerly incarcerated people. I agree that it is 
important for prison educators and college in prison programs not to promise more than they can 
deliver, but I also argue that for higher education to be “worth it,” it must offer more than 
fleeting feelings of companionship and temporary escape from the monotony and 
dehumanization of everyday prison life.  
If the purposes of higher education attend primarily to the emotional needs of 
incarcerated students while they are inside, these programs risk becoming mere supplements to a 
white supremacist carceral regime that trades in cruel optimism. While I agree that higher 
education in prison can and should aim to increase inclusion and participation in democratic life 
for currently and formerly incarcerated people, we must be attentive to the unique forms of 
barriers to participation experienced by formerly incarcerated people. Of course, I am not 
suggesting that higher education should attempt to solve all social problems, nor that it is 
reasonable to expect that incarcerated students will never struggle after their release from prison. 
My worry is that our well-intentioned concern for increasing agency for incarcerated students is 
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focusing on increasing individual rhetorical savvy, especially through strategic deployment of 
personal narratives, rather than addressing the systemic exclusions that individual action may 
mitigate but is unlikely to transform. If we do not inquire into the lived experience of reentry and 
incorporate this into the design of college in prison programs and curricula, there is a danger that 
our pedagogy merely produces a sense of increased agency within the classroom, rather than 
substantial empowerment and change. 
 Patrick Berry (2013) similarly calls for prison educators to attend to the lived realities of 
incarcerated students. He persuasively suggests that rather than focusing on some imagined 
future in which students’ constraints will be loosened and they can put their academic skills to 
use, educators can use classroom space to address the everyday problems of the students and 
increase their capacities to act in what he calls the “contextual now” (155), by acknowledging the 
values of literacy even for currently incarcerated students. I agree, and I also suggest that this 
same rigorous attention must be paid to our students’ experiences of reentry if we are to craft 
education programs that offer more than a balm for those struggling to survive prison. 
Supporting survival is no small thing, but it is not enough. By attending to the rhetorical 
challenges of reentry, including formal and informal exclusions, prison educators may craft 
curricula that more directly address the rhetorical complexities our incarcerated students must 
navigate to successfully integrate into civil society. However, I remain wary of humanistic 
orientations that invest in ideologies of personal responsibility, and while higher education 
certainly has a role to play in addressing the stratified citizenship experienced by marginalized 
people, it is inadequate to fully resolve this problem. 
Writing in the Wake of Trauma 
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 Grace is the only one of my research participants who mentions trauma directly, 
referencing her experiences prior to incarceration, particularly regarding her home life. 
Otherwise, it is conspicuously absent from the transcripts. And yet, there remains a wake, the 
perceptible ripples emanating from some invisible source that is, if not trauma, then trauma-like. 
One research participant, after I turned the audio recorder off, asked if I had noticed that he had 
been shaking when our conversation began. One participant tells me not that he was suicidal, but 
that he told a guard that he was feeling suicidal at the beginning of his incarceration, and that the 
experience of the suicide watch they put him under was so physically and mentally excruciating 
that he decided he just wouldn’t tell them again how he was feeling. Another research participant 
mentions in an offhand way the he contemplated suicide after his release from prison, but then he 
immediately moves on to describe how much better he’s doing now. There are stories of parental 
neglect. There are stories of witnessing violence, and there is the heavy silence around the 
violence some of the participants have committed.  
In her work on composition and trauma, Lynn Worsham (2006) argues that composition 
as a field invests in a pedagogy of disclosure in which the writing of personal narratives is 
believed to be both therapeutic and a means to bear witness to injustice. She suggests that this 
moment in history, post-9/11, is marked by a posttraumatic culture in which people are 
reckoning with overwhelming and irreconcilable catastrophes, which produces a crisis of 
subjectivity. Drawing on the work of Cathy Caruth, Worsham suggests that it is not only the 
event itself that is traumatic, but that survival is itself a kind of crisis in which one’s continued 
existence appears to be impossible.  
 Perhaps unsurprisingly, writing instruction in prisons tends toward pedagogies of 
disclosure as well. For example, Tobi Jacobi (2011) argues that her writing workshop at a 
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women’s jail, in which incarcerated women write personal narratives, creates a space for 
resistance and agency by producing and circulating counter-narratives about incarceration and 
incarcerated people. Lila McDowell (2014) describes the use of academic language in the 
personal narratives of incarcerated men as a means of identity reconstruction. These are 
representative examples of prison literacy pedagogies that locate agency in the ability to narrate 
one’s story in order to heal, take responsibility for one’s actions, and to counter dominant 
narratives that contribute to their social death. 
While exceedingly common, this pedagogical approach is not without criticism. In his 
analysis of the autobiographies of incarcerated people, Simon Rolston (2011) argues that the life 
writing of incarcerated people is heavily influenced by the conversion narrative, which “develops 
through a linear pattern—descent into darkness, struggle, moment of crisis, conversion to new 
beliefs and worldview, and consolidation of a new communal identity” (104). While not 
discounting the possibility of truth behind conversion narratives, Rolston questions their 
ubiquity, asking in what ways incarcerated people are reproducing “the vocabulary of conversion 
that is central to the discursive project of the American prison” (106). In other words, in what 
ways does the pedagogy of disclosure serve not (or not only) the needs of the incarcerated 
student, but also the discursive needs of the very institution that oppresses them? Rolston 
suggests that the legibility of the personal narratives of incarcerated and formerly incarcerated 
people demands, to some extent, this conversion narrative. One writer that resists this imperative 
is Jack Abbott who, in his autobiography In the Belly of the Beast, repeatedly insists that he will 
never “come out of prison a better man” (quoted in Rolston 114) because his life is 
circumscribed by a total institution that demands stasis, despite his own remarkable autodidactic 
practices. Abbott’s story, then, “troubles the very premise of rehabilitation in prison whilst also 
123 
 
questioning the belief, shared by many well-meaning educators, artists, philanthropists, and 
religious organisations [sic], that education transforms prisoners—presumably into subjects who 
can reintegrate into civil life” (113).  
 Though the field of composition generally continues to invest in pedagogies of 
disclosure, Worsham argues that “a concept of experience (or “lived experience”) as the 
“ground” of and authority for knowledge; a concept of identity that, however much it may 
gesture toward social constructionism, postmodernism, or Bakhtinian dialogism, nonetheless 
remains resolutely tied to liberal humanist notions of self, agency, and authentic self-expression; 
and a concept of narrative that is invested with the authority and appeal of “the personal” and 
“personal voice” as the ultimate and original frame of intelligibility” (177). The problem with 
this belief in liberal humanist notions of self-expression is that there is no obvious connection 
between narrative and healing, and as Worsham shows, personal narrative can just as easily 
obstruct healing by presenting the illusion of wholeness and resolution.  
David Coogan’s (2014) article, “Assembling for Agency: Prisoners and College Students 
in a Life Writing Workshop” provides a good example of the way personal experience is often 
used as a way to encourage reflection and to encourage a kind of openness to new forms of 
identification is prison writing workshops. Here, Coogan describes a workshop that brings 
together traditional college students and people incarcerated in a local jail for a writing workshop 
that asks all participants to write and share personal experiences with violence. He argues 
persuasively that agency necessarily emerges from the assemblage of the workshop, but Coogan 
seems particularly invested in an expressivist ideal that locates agency in vulnerable responsivity 
to authentic expressions of regret. “In this way, the workshop asks writers to stare directly into 
their own choices in order to open themselves to a range of emotions, including regret […] if we 
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see metanoia as an opportunity to reflect on a lost opportunity, it can be transformative” (22).  I 
am sure that this workshop approach creates powerful, transformative experiences for some 
participants, but I am wary of claiming that one classroom experience can result in participants 
being “cultivated to become better citizens with the rhetorical arts” (27). Thus, while Coogan 
locates the emergence of agency in assembling, the aim of that agency remains individual 
transformation and civil action. Such a focus on regret and civil discourse locates the problem of 
incarceration in the personal volition of individuals. While I absolutely agree that individuals 
must be held accountable for their actions, this approach ignores the systemic causes of mass 
incarceration, including poverty, trauma, addiction, and over-surveillance, which all 
disproportionately affect society’s most marginalized members. Boyle (2016) similarly cautions 
against a focus on individual agency, arguing instead that “a posthuman practice as an ethic does 
not impose moral ideals but works within a given situation to develop good practices” (548). 
Alexander and Rhodes (2014) that this “politics of voice,” which emphasizes personal narrative 
that reveals shared humanity has what they call a “flattening effect,” in that they erase radical 
alterity in favor of the comfort of inclusivity. “Multicultural pedagogies frequently rely on 
narratives of inclusion, which often seek to contain difference in order to make it legible, 
identifiable, and thus acceptable to a normative readership. In the process, the ‘other’ is tamed as 
a known entity” (431). Though Alexander and Rhode’s theoretical frame is queer theory rather 
than posthumanism, their call for pedagogical approaches that encourage irresolution shares and 
affinity with Boyle’s posthuman practice, Cooper’s pedagogy of responsibility, and Lynch’s 
apocalyptic turn in that they are wary of the liberal humanist concepts of agency and autonomy 
and advocate instead for practices ways of being with others and being with that which exceeds 
normative narratives.  
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Instead of the comforting narratives of coherence and resolution, Worsham argues that 
what is needed in response to trauma is mourning. This work involves crafting narratives as well, 
but instead of aiming for resolution, narratives of mourning dispose of the liberal humanist 
notions of agency and autonomy and instead “opens up the space for mourning by confronting 
readers with the truth of an unspeakable event and the truth of its incomprehsibility” (179). 
Further, Worsham implies that the work of mourning must take into account not only individual 
injury, but also the larger systemic forces that create and sustain the posttraumatic culture (i.e., 
the military-industrial complex) (181). Following Worsham, I am concerned that the pedagogy 
of disclosure may distract from the crucial work of identifying the prison as a tool of systemic 
oppression and state-sanctioned violence, and the production of conversion narratives by 
incarcerated students may sustain a (white) savior narrative of prison education that obstructs the 
coalitional work of constructing a more just world.   
Stigma and Felony Disclosure 
Another problem with focusing on personal narrative as a means to rhetorical agency is 
that felony disclosure is a tricky, potentially dangerous thing. Disorientation and habits of being 
that no longer work is only one barrier to inclusion and participation for formerly incarcerated 
people, and for many, it’s a temporary one. A much thornier issue is the stigma associated with 
incarceration. In her field-based study of the everyday rhetorical performances of people with 
mental illness, Cathryn Molloy argues that rhetoricians are uniquely positioned to study the ways 
people facing stigma work to recover credibility in their everyday lives. Her concept of 
“recuperative ethos,” or the appeals to ethos stigmatized people make in their day-to-day 
interactions. However, formerly incarcerated people face a very different stigma in relation to 
their rhetorical abilities. Because the stigma and exclusion experienced by formerly incarcerated 
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people is based on a logic of unchanging untrustworthiness, their rhetorical virtuosity can 
actually make them an object of suspicion. If their motives cannot be trusted, then their ability to 
be persuasive can be used as evidence of their dangerousness. For example, implicit in Rhett’s 
warning about the predatory and manipulative nature of some incarcerated people is the belief 
that they do not lack persuasive skills. I was told numerous times by the correctional officers I 
encountered in my own prison education work that I was wasting my time, that these men would 
never change and they were simply deceiving us.  
Consciously or not, my research participants engaged in recuperative ethos tactics that to 
some extent sidestep this rhetorical stigma by relying on the endorsement of other, more credible 
individuals. Molloy points to displays of strong human connection as an important component 
for recuperative ethos. In many of my interviews, participants pointed to relationships with 
people in positions of authority, especially former instructors or program directors, but also 
parole officers and other member of their community who are highly regarded. Through their 
endorsement, they establish credibility. Their ability to form and rely on these connections, then, 
seems to be important for their rhetorical practice, at least in the early part of their transition out 
of prison.  
Francisco tells me that when he got out of prison after two decades, the shame he had felt 
at the beginning of his sentence came back. He says he was conscious of the stigma of having 
been just released from prison, so he “didn’t go around telling everybody.” I asked him how he 
made that determination, whether to disclose that information. He tells me that some of his 
colleagues know and some do not. He says that when he first started working at the community 
center, he and his colleagues did “one-on-ones” where they would share their experiences and 
what has brought them to this point in their lives. He says that in some of those conversations, 
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when the person and the conversation felt “genuine,” he felt comfortable sharing that information 
about himself, but when the person didn’t seem to be opening up to him or was just going 
through the motions, he decided not to share with them. But he says none of his students know 
that he’s been to prison. “I thought about that before, like, how would they view me. Would they 
lose respect for me, would they see me as not being as qualified to teach them? I don't know.” As 
the controversies around James Kilgore, Bill Ayers, Kathy Boudin, and other people with felony 
convictions who teach at universities demonstrate, teaching is considered by many to be a 
position of public trust, and while the public is increasingly supportive of offering a second 
chance to people with felony convictions, that second chance for many comes with limitations. 
Interestingly, no one has yet questioned Francisco’s authority to teach, but he imagines and 
projects the ways the stigma of incarceration may impact his encounters with others. He says 
that, in his day-to-day social life, it isn’t quite as big of a deal. He says that being Latino in the 
city he lives in means that most people he encounters knows someone who is or has been 
incarcerated. For Francisco, it’s the length of his sentence to which people react most strongly. 
Still, he is cautious when and with whom he discloses his background. He says that when he 
meets new people, he is always concerned that they are seeing him in terms of his felony 
conviction. He describes an interview he had with one of the funders for the community center 
where he works. Francisco’s immediate supervisors were aware of his background and hired him 
anyway, but the funders were not told. He asked if he should disclose during the interview.   
They were like, ummm...I wouldn't say anything unless he asks. I was like, what 
does that mean? Like, is he gonna literally say, “have you been to prison?” So, I 
took that as I don't say shit […] So, at first, I was like ok, I can dive a few 
questions and answer them in a way where I'm not really saying where or how 
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[…] But unless he said have you ever been convicted of a felony, I would have 
been like, yes, I have, but he didn't ask it. But the questions he was asking, I had 
to answer very carefully so that I didn't give away that I was in prison but that I 
wasn't denying it either, in case it ever came up, um, he couldn't say well like, you 
lied to me. I'd say no I didn't, you asked me where I went to school and I told you 
that I went to [community college at high medium security prison] and I took 
some classes through [university] through a program that they had there in that 
area and blah blah blah blah blah, so that was difficult. Those two hours were 
kind of rough. And then anybody else in general that I meet, like other teachers, I 
deal with a lot of teachers, um, being in those meetings, I always think to myself, 
like what would they think of me if they found out that I was in prison before?   
Francisco’s story is important to consider because in some ways, he exemplifies the success 
story of higher education in prison. He was able not only to secure employment, but also to put 
his college experience to immediate use in his profession as an ESL teacher. However, this 
incident exposes the tension between the value of the higher education as a credentialing 
institution and the anti-credential of a felony conviction. In this situation, he cannot be sure that 
his college education or his years of experience teaching other incarcerated men while he was in 
prison will mean more than the fact of his felony conviction, and highlighting the former makes 
it very difficult not to disclose the latter.   Ultimately, Francisco was told that until he earned his 
bachelor’s degree, he could not continue to teach, and when we spoke in June 2015, he was 
preparing to enroll in a nearby university to complete his degree.  
Grace tells me that when she got out of prison, she had no intention of telling anyone 
about her incarceration. She wanted to keep her head down, do her parole time, and leave the 
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state as soon as possible. She felt she hadn’t been treated fairly by the criminal justice system 
there, and she imagined going to some new city on the east coast where no one knew who she 
was or what had happened. Shortly after she was released, though, Grace was invited by an 
instructor from her college in prison program to come to campus and speak to her criminal 
justice class about her experience in prison.  
So, I did it that once, and so then I felt like, oh, maybe I could use my experience 
to help other people understand what it's like. Because so much of what people's 
perception of prison, and not only just prison, but who is incarcerated in prison, is 
shaped by the media […] So I thought, maybe I can tell my story and it will help 
other people understand what it's like, especially criminal justice students. They 
should know what it's like. 
While her initial instinct was not to call attention to herself and to conceal her past as much as 
possible, she recognized her potential to create change in the way people think about prison and 
criminal justice involved people by offering counternarratives from her own life.  So, when a 
student from the class asked if she would speak to her mother, a journalist for the local 
newspaper, Grace saw an opportunity to engage with a wider audience.  
In her study on rhetorical agency and disability disclosure, Stephanie Kerschbaum (2014) 
argues that despite the stigma associated with disability, disclosure can be advantageous.  “Such 
self-disclosures occur in many settings and are highly fraught and often contested. Deciding to 
openly talk about disability is not always an easy decision to make. And because disclosures are 
so contested, they are a key site for exploring how rhetorical agency operates” (56-7).  Grace’s 
recognized that her experience in prison and ability to speak thoughtfully about it endowed her 
with a kind of fraught expert status. As Kerschbaum reminds us, audiences and speakers attribute 
130 
 
different meanings to disability, and this is certainly also the case for criminal conviction as well, 
making criminal conviction disclosure another site of contested identity claims.  Grace ultimately 
decides that coalition-building, or at least increased public understanding and empathy, are 
important and require that formerly incarcerated people start sharing their stories and making 
identity claims. Grace’s first experience with public disclosure, however, was painful for her.  
[S]he did this article in the newspaper, and I was not at all prepared for that. I 
mean I agreed to it, I knew what was happening, but I was still very naive. They 
were just beginning their online thing, so the story was online and the comments 
were just awful. I was not prepared for that at all […] Like, you know, she killed 
somebody, she should never be allowed out of prison. This is what's wrong with 
America, people like her. You know, I literally just sat in my room and cried for 
three days. I was not at all prepared for how brutal these people were who didn't 
even know me, you know? And I thought at the time I was doing a good thing, 
you know, trying to share my story? And that just completely backfired and I was 
just devastated by that.  
Grace learned the hard way, as Kerschbaum reminds us, that “claiming an identity is not a 
singular accomplishment is a mutual accomplishment performed by speakers and audiences” 
(62, emphasis in original).  But with time, the experience made Grace even more convinced that 
she needed to convince people to reconsider their assumptions about formerly incarcerated 
people, especially those convicted of violent offenses. She now speaks regularly about her 
experience, but she has a more specific goal in mind. She says there will always be people who 
will dismiss her immediately because of her background, and she says she doesn’t even bother 
with trying to convince them anymore. Instead, she focuses on the people who maybe open 
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minded but lack information or engagement with the issue of punitive incarceration. “And I 
think, if people who have been in prison just continue to be quiet and fade into the background, 
then those media stereotypes are the only thing that's out there. So, it's tough, I think, when 
people judge you, but I've learned to develop a thicker skin about it. I have to be pragmatic about 
it.” Kerschbaum suggests that individuals learn how to manage identity disclosures, “motivated 
by past experiences as well as by their short- and long-term goals for identity construction and 
social interaction” (63). Over the past twelve years since that experience, Grace has developed a 
few strategies that both protect her emotionally and make her disclosures potentially more 
effective. She says she has developed a cohort of supporters who are “on this extreme” of the 
issues related to incarceration, and they offer emotional support and the practical support of 
endorsement. She has also taken more control over who gets to hear her story and when. She 
tells me about an experience she had when she spoke at a Sunday school and later found out the 
pastor had used her story, including her real name and image, at a conference without her 
permission. Before she agreed to speak with me, Grace and I exchanged several emails 
discussing the purpose and scope of my project, how her story would be used, and what level of 
control she would have over how I used her words.  When we met for the interview, she brought 
a colleague to sit in the interview with her. He may only have been present for emotional 
support, but his presence also clearly communicated to me that Grace is a person with strong 
social bonds.  
While Grace has become much savvier in her use of her experience for the advocacy of 
incarcerated and formerly incarcerated people, her experience with higher education after her 
release suggests that she may be less willing to disclose her status in everyday interaction in 
ways that would benefit her. Of the twelve individuals I spoke with, Grace was the only one to 
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earn a bachelor’s degree while incarcerated, so in the same year that she was released from 
prison, she enrolled as a non-degree seeking master’s student at a nearby university. But the 
transition from the college in prison program to attending college on a traditional campus was 
more difficult to navigate than she had imagined. She realized that the expectation for 
prospective graduate students is that because they have undergraduate degrees, they must be 
familiar with campus culture and the bureaucracy of higher education. “But, when you're in 
prison it's all taken care of for you. They fill out the financial aid forms for you, they do all the 
enrollment. They tell you what classes you're going to take. They order the books for you. 
Literally every single thing is done for you. So, you don't know how to function in that world 
when you get out.” She describes the feeling of being on the campus, unable to figure out where 
to park and feeling overwhelmed by the size of the place. Like many people incarcerated in the 
1990s during the rise of the internet, her digital literacy confidence level was low, so the online 
admissions and financial aid processes were intimidating. She was expecting class sizes to be 
comparable to the classes she had taken in prison, which were capped at about 15 students, but 
when she arrived on the first day, she found that the class had about thirty students enrolled.  
I literally had a panic attack on campus. Walked out the door and was like, I can't 
do this. I couldn't breathe. I couldn't even drive home. I had to call my 
grandparents to come get me. All those people, I just felt so intimidated. I felt like 
everybody's going know I was in prison. And I'm not smart enough to be here. I 
don't know what I'm doing. So, I also didn't understand that if you're not going to 
go, you actually have to drop those classes. Just not going completely screws you 
for the rest of your life. So, I paid for the classes, paid in full for the classes, but I 
didn't actually drop them, so I had three Fs on my record to begin with.   
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As I listened to Grace relate this story to me, I can’t help but wonder why Grace didn’t seek out 
help. But what emerges from her story, implicitly and explicitly stated, is that from her 
perspective, there is “such a stigma around college campuses against people who have been 
incarcerated before.” She continues to be shocked that there is a separate admissions review for 
people who have criminal backgrounds. In “Going Public—in a Disabling Discourse,” Linda 
Flower (2013) argues that our field’s celebration of rhetorical empowerment through critique, 
self-expression, and advocacy fails to recognize the risk associated with publicly disclosing that 
one identifies with a marginalized group (137). In her inquiry into the identity disclosure of 
students with learning disabilities, Flower finds that the decision whether or not to disclose “pits 
the option of getting the help and accommodations they may need against the socially hazardous 
outcomes of being labeled LD” (138). Grace, keenly aware of stigma, seemed reluctant to 
identify publicly as formerly incarcerated in this instance, and she tells me she knows people 
would tell her that she can’t expect special treatment just because she’s been in prison. Also, 
given her lack of knowledge about the workings of universities, the risk associated with 
disclosure was likely greater than the possibility that it would get her the help she needed. As 
Flower points out, disclosure is intensely rhetorical by nature and “demands not only self-
expression but also understanding rhetorical situations, constructing new meanings, and creating 
a dialogic relationship with others” (147). Grace didn’t know to whom to appeal, much less how 
to construct a successful argument in that situation. Years later, she tried once again to earn her 
master’s degree in criminal justice, but she says that a series of health problems and her struggles 
with statistics (she tells me it was only after failing the course twice that she learned that the 
campus had a math tutoring center she could have utilized) led to her dismissed from the 




Producing participatory democratic agents is the raison d’être of most higher education in 
prison programs. But as these case studies suggest, the credentialing and normative functions of 
higher education do not necessarily lead to increased inclusion, nor does academic literacy 
necessarily translate to successful rhetorical practice and attunement in the process of reentry. 
For composition scholars and practitioners, this suggests a need to, as Wan suggests, directly 
confront unequal access in our pedagogy and acknowledge the limits of personal volition in 
achieving full citizenship. “In order for writing classrooms to enact citizenships that matter, we 
need to recognize the ways that our idealized notions of citizenship are complicit in the 
citizenship that already exists” (178).  One way to do this is to begin to divest from humanist 
orientations that assume a stable autonomous subject that through mastery of rhetorical concepts 
exerts control over an objective world. With an eye toward to the realities of reentry, we might 
begin to develop ecological and posthuman writing pedagogies that encourage invention through 
serial encounters.   
Ultimately, however, I argue that if compositionists are concerned with the full inclusion 
of marginalized students, as I am, then it is not enough to address this inequality by investing in 
the rhetorical education of our students. As Ben Kuebrich (2015) writes, “To counter these 
narratives will require developing an analysis that is not separate from a critical view of history 
and an understanding of power relations. And we will need to think about our roles as not just 
writing or teaching about social movements but directly supporting, joining, and building them” 
(567). Those of us engaged in prison literacy work must support initiatives that address the 
debilitating stigma of incarceration itself, particularly by creating opportunities and rhetorical 
education for college in prison program students and alumni to themselves advocate for change. 
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We might begin by challenging the prohibitions against continued contact with alumni after their 
release, a practice that is based in corrections ideology and not the best practices of higher 
education, and by advocating for greater inclusion and support for formerly incarcerated students 






“In the clear, critical light of day, illusory administrators whisper of our need for institutions, and all 
institutions are political, and all politics is correctional, so it seems we need correctional institutions in the 
common, settling it, correcting us. But we won’t stand corrected. Moreover, incorrect as we are there’s 
nothing wrong with us. We don’t want to be correct and we won’t be corrected. Politics proposes to make 
us better, but we were good already in the mutual debt that can never be made good. We owe it to each 
other to falsify the institution, to make politics incorrect, to give the lie to our own determination. We owe 
each other the indeterminate. We owe each other everything.” –Stefano Harney and Steve Moten, The 
Undercommons: Fugitive Planning & Black Study 
 
“I said to my soul, be still, and wait without hope 
For hope would be hope for the wrong thing; wait without love 
For love would be love of the wrong thing; there is yet faith 
But the faith and the love and the hope are all in the waiting. 
Wait without thought, for you are not ready for thought: 
So the darkness shall be the light, and the stillness the dancing.” –T.S. Eliot, “East Coker” 
 
 
As a way of wrapping up our conversations, I asked research participants to tell me what 
they would like for me to do with their stories. It was no small gesture to relive their experiences, 
to identify again with that place, even for just a couple of hours, even with a Nice White Lady 
such as myself. I could see what it took out of them. I could hear in their voices the line in their 
memory they would walk right up to but never cross. So much they didn’t tell me, about 
violence, trauma, shame, despair, fear, and while I’ll never know exactly the shape of those 
things, I could feel their enormity as their wakes rippled in the space between us. So, I wanted to 
know why, why were they there, what were they hoping for that they would voluntarily and with 
no compensation relive some of the worst times of their lives. And every one of them said the 
same thing. They wanted their stories to be a beacon of hope for those still locked up, telling 
them, “Just don’t give up. No matter what, don’t give up.” 
 What a simple message, so lovely and so human. And under this rubric, what a failure is 
my work. Dissertations don’t circulate that way, and even if they did, I’m not sure a message of 
hope is what pervades this one. But I feel something like a Levinasian obligation to this desire of 
theirs to reach out, to hope. So, while my obligation to participate in the production of resilience 
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in prison will be addressed, and never quite fulfilled, in other ways, I want to reflect on and pull 
together a few threads that to me are important for understanding the possibilities for hope and 
resilience in college in prison, and the role of rhetoric and composition in that hopefulness.  
 In a time when “Black lives matter” is treated as a controversial statement, when we are 
seeing escalations of violence and hate speech, when trans women of color face unparalleled 
rates of murder and suicide, rhetorical production of nonpersonhood is increasingly a matter of 
concern well beyond the issue of criminal justice reform. Incarcerated people are by no means 
the only ones productively excluded from the democratic imaginary, subject to state violence, 
and treated as superfluous and disposable. But I argue, along with Erica Meiners, Andrew Dilts, 
Dylan Rodriguez, and others that the same carceral logics of punishment and control, of security 
and exclusion, these hallmarks of neoliberal risk society are shared across a host of various 
modes of exclusion. This is what Erica Meiners (2011) refers to as a “punishing democracy,” 
marked by a shift in the state’s resources from education and empowerment to incarceration, thus 
“exacerbating longstanding inequalities,” particularly for Black Americans. So, while the 
alienation, humiliation, and violence experienced by incarcerated people may appear to be 
extreme examples, the tactics of rhetorical resilience described by Saul, Grace, David, and the 
others may not be all that different from the way folks are making do against other, interrelated 
mechanisms of social death. 
 But at the end of this phase of this project, I am increasingly wary of a kind of liberal 
humanist faith in the power of circulating humanizing narratives and representations of those 
whose lives (biological, civic, and social) are threatened. Of course, it is important to me that 
readers grant my research participants what Avery Gordon (1997) calls “complex personhood,” 
to see them as fully and dynamically human, full of contradiction and inherent worth. At the 
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same time, just as many are suggesting that the circulation of images of Black suffering and 
death at the hands of police does little to mobilize new political economies that might dismantle 
white supremacy, I am skeptical of prison literacy programs that emphasize telling one’s story 
for therapeutic expressionism or to circulate counter-narratives as a form of political agency. Of 
course, self-representation is a kind of agency, but the notion that an appeal to empathy and 
shared humanity is the path toward a more just approach to social harms feels naïve at best. Life 
writing by incarcerated people has been circulating for as long as there have been prisons, and 
we’ve known about the tortuous conditions of isolation at least since Charles Dickens wrote 
about his visit to Eastern State Penitentiary in the mid-19th century. As Dylan Rodriguez argues 
in his treatment of the white humanist outcry over the carcerality of the Middle Passage, “[The] 
Middle Passage situated the enactment of the subhuman and nonhuman as a site of productive 
rather than destructive embodiment, that is, it assumed the practical and theoretical challenge of 
constituting a category of subhumanity/nonhumanity that would permanently remain (rather than 
deteriorate or vanish) as the embedded ontological counterpoint to a globalizing, colonial, 
European ‘humanity’” (235).  
 In other words, the calls to recognize our shared humanity in the liberal repulsion over 
the material conditions of incarceration and its enduring stigma do nothing to address more 
fundamental and invisible ways the logics of incarceration produce sub/nonhumanity. Further, as 
scholars such as John Sloop and Michelle Brown have argued, penal spectatorship, rather that 
producing identifications with incarcerated people, act as a kind of public pedagogy that instructs 
citizens in the “appropriate” relation to power and the law. Instead, I agree with Alexander and 
Rhodes (2014) in their suspicion of the narrative mode and “the subtle (and sometimes not-so-
subtle) erasures of difference that occur when narrating stories of the ‘other’” (431). They go on 
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to argue that “it is one thing to include diverse identities and stories; it is quite something else to 
undertake the systemic analyses that complicate our understanding of how people experience the 
world differently—both rhetorically and materially” (434, emphasis in original).  
 Liberal composition pedagogy, as Sharon Crowley points out, “insists that students’ 
identities are the subject of composition,” (227), and certainly in my conversations with my 
research participants about their experiences in college in prison programs, I do hear them 
describing the ways that the literate practices of the academy contribute to changing practices of 
self-making. But I fear it would be easy for a casual reader to understand my research 
participants’ stories as evidence of the tenacity of the human spirit, stories of individuals who 
overcame harrowing circumstances because they believed in themselves. That’s partly true, and I 
have enormous respect and admiration for every one of them. But that tenacity, that resilience 
does not appear to support a kind of introspective, autonomous model of subjectivity and 
rehabilitation. Rather, what I see repeatedly are people in the process of becoming, and that 
becoming proceeds relationally. What I want to suggest is that they are engaged in acts of 
encounter, of attunement, of self-making as an iterative process. Rather than a humanist politics 
of representation, I see people embedded in a complex and dynamic network of actors and 
affective economies who are responsive to new relations, habits, and material and discursive 
conditions. These moments of encounter and response is an iterative process of attunement, in 
Rickert’s sense of the word, of self-making and dwelling.  
 In Liberating Minds: The Case for College in Prison, Ellen Condliff Lagemann (2016) 
argues for many of the same benefits, individual and social, of college in prison that I address in 
Chapter 1. She suggests that participation in higher education in prison programs increases 
confidence, provides greater options for students after their release from prison, and greatly 
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reduces recidivism. And, like the vast majority of the cases for college in prison, Lagemann 
frames the university as an inherently benevolent institution and college in prison as a service 
that addresses crises in both higher education (demonstrating the value of the liberal arts) and the 
America prison system (high recidivism rates). This suggestion that the university can act as a 
kind of corrective or alternative to the problem of mass incarceration, however, ignores the ways 
in which the university, as a state institution, is fundamentally implicated in the punishing 
democracy. As Erica Meiners puts it: 
Juxtaposing the Fighting Illini and Tamms [former supermax prison in southern 
Illinois] opens up a chilling comparison of how the state chooses to allocate its 
funds and resources, for these parallel public institutions—prison for the worst of 
the worst and university for the best of the best—are intertwined, planned 
pathways created by the state. That is, these institutions do not merely reflect 
existing structures of power but reproduce and even exacerbate them: Studying 
the relationship between prison and schools thus enables us to dive into the 
structural question of how the state invests in punishment, how it disinvests in 
communities hit hard by crime, and how its economic and educational policies 
therefore fuel the prison-industrial complex (18). 
This is the role of the university in the punishing democracy, and while any college in prison 
program offers ways to mitigate the brutality of everyday prison life, the university does not 
inherently address the mechanisms of control and production of sub/nonhumanity, the less 
visible workings of social death. The university is, at its core, a gatekeeping institution whose 
function in society is to determine which ways of knowing and being are most valuable, 
maintaining a middle-class status quo. Writing Studies has struggled with this tension, between 
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literacy as emancipatory and literacy as a form of violence, from its beginnings. As literacy 
sponsors, departments of correction and college in prison programs are not neutral and are often 
serving the needs not of the students, but of normative society.  
 So, in order to heed the obligation to my research participant’s desire to offer hope and 
support, I want to argue for a more narrowly defined conception of college in prison, one that 
takes as its object of concern not incarcerated individuals, but the institutions that create and 
sustain a punishing democracy and the carceral logics they circulate. There is nothing inherently 
abolitionist or even reformist about college in prison programs, and many have argued that it is, 
in fact, inherently antithetical to the abolitionist project to invest energy and resources in these 
programs. Dylan Rodriguez has argued persuasively that these programs, while they may offer 
glimpses of possibility for those participate in them, they also expand the surveillance and 
coercive technologies of the prison. But beyond that, it’s important not to be lulled into a false 
narrative in which the university is a neutral or even virtuous institution in contrast to the 
dehumanizing prison.  
But, as I have tried to show, there is something else going on here. In the nexus of these 
two state institutions, both of which serve white supremacist capitalist patriarchy and mutually 
reinforce carceral logics of domination and exclusion, I find the unlikely makings of an 
abolitionist undercommons, of fugitive coalition-building that recognizes the ways in which 
those on either side of the razor wire are entangled in the mechanisms of social death. As Fred 
Moten (2013) puts it, “The coalition emerges out of your recognition that it’s fucked up for you, 
in the same way that we’ve already recognized that it’s fucked up for us. I don’t need your help. 
I just need you to recognize that this shit is killing you, too, however much more softly, you 
stupid motherfucker, you know?” (10). This recognition is not in any way given in the project of 
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increasing access to higher education to incarcerated and formerly incarcerated people, but the 
fugitive refusal of social death in my participants’ narratives suggest the possibility for 
constructing new modes of relation and habits of being, which is the basis of fugitive work.  
I am heartened by Gillian Harkins and Erica Meiners’s (2014) suggestion that in place of 
the punishing democracy that the “university-as-such” sustains, those engaged in prison 
education might use the tools of higher education to “facilitate abolitionist politicization: 
crossing the walls separating incarcerated people from ‘free world’ populations, redistributing 
resources and benefits for which college personnel are ‘gatekeepers,’ and displacing the college 
campus as the center of intellectual, cultural, and social capital while reinventing the public 
function of higher education institutions as meaningful sites of learning” (par. 8). Like Paul 
Lynch and Casey Boyle, Harkins and Meiners, following Harney and Moten, advocate a turn 
away from critique as the primary method of the university and instead suggests a turn toward 
coalition. As they explain, “College in prison programs help clarify the interdependence of 
universities/colleges and prisons during the era of alleged crisis in education and incarceration. 
These programs emerge in the interstices of educational and carceral institutions, often seeming 
to promise resolution or escape from crisis models while costing institutions little in the way of 
economic, political, or cultural capital. But these programs are also poised to clarify and move 
beyond crisis models to create alternative engagements with the abolitionist undercommons” 
(par. 33). Here, a commitment to fugitive enlightenment entails disrupting the status quo of both 
institutions, and many of the goals for prison education that Harkins and Meiners endorse are 
related to the ongoing political education, not only of incarcerated students, but of the faculty 
and staff of college-in-prison programs as well. The goal, then, is creating the conditions of 
possibility for radical worlds, particularly the abolitionist future that is marked not simply by the 
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absence of prisons, but by the eradication of the logics and mechanisms of exclusion that makes 
prisons thinkable in the first place. This means focusing our energies not only on transformation 
within prisons, but on university campuses as well.  
In her conclusion to Tactics of Hope, Paula Mathieu (2005) writes, “I have deep concerns 
about university partnerships with the streets, but I insist on hope for going forward, the kind of 
hope that doesn’t offer a premeditated blueprint for future practices but demands a critical 
interrogation of the present to accompany any action that results […] Working tactically in a 
university setting may be unpredictable and inefficient, but it is an act of hope” (134). It is in this 
spirit of insistence that I find myself stubbornly committed to a practice of hope, one that, while 
deeply skeptical of the humanistic narratives of redemption and liberation through education, 
proceeds from a desire for the not-yet-arrived justice and an obligation to never give up. No 
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